Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a potential web shell deployment by identifying a web server process creating or modifying a file in common web directory locations, followed shortly (within 10 minutes) by the execution of that same file.
Detects browser extension updates that request a combination of high-risk permissions capable of account takeover (e.g., cookies, webRequest, identity) for extensions previously classified as low-risk. This pattern often indicates a supply chain compromise where a benign extension is acquired and subsequently updated with malicious capabilities.
This rule detects network communication with known malicious infrastructure (C2 IPs and URLs), presence of malicious files identified by SHA256 hashes on disk, and execution of known malicious files. It also correlates these activities with specific operator email addresses involved in the malicious campaign.
This rule identifies installations of TeamViewer software that are vulnerable to specific CVEs (CVE-2026-19743, CVE-2026-92368, CVE-2026-92369, CVE-2026-92370, CVE-2026-92371) by analyzing the 'DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory' dataset. It checks for versioning patterns against known vulnerable build numbers across Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms to pinpoint systems requiring patching.
This rule detects indicators of the PitScaler campaign targeting Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances, exploiting vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772). It identifies the full attack chain including initial DTLS heap corruption exploitation, WHIPSHOT web shell C2 patterns, SLAPSHOT tunneling artifacts, web shell deployment files, httpd.conf PHP configuration tampering for persistence, privilege escalation via setuid /bin/sh modification, and anti-forensic log tampering.
Detects DNS lookups and outbound network connections to known command and control (C2) and staging domains associated with the STAC4924 campaign. The rule performs strict matching on domain names to ensure that subdomains are identified while avoiding false positives from partial string matches within URLs.
Detects a sequential pattern where a browser process (Chrome, Edge, or Safari) accesses an AI chat platform's conversation API, followed within 5 minutes by a network connection to a known unauthorized exfiltration destination (api.pbapi.xyz). This pattern suggests the potential use of a browser-based tool or extension (e.g., Poper Blocker or similar) to intercept and exfiltrate AI chat history.
Detects an exploitation attempt against PoeLLM or LiteLLM MCP test/connection endpoint using a python3 stdio payload that fetches data from port 81.
Detects an exploitation attempt against PoeLLM or LiteLLM MCP test/connection endpoint using a python3 stdio payload that fetches data from port 81.
Detects runtime processes associated with AI agents or scripting environments (e.g., python, node, deno) accessing sensitive credential storage paths and files, such as SSH keys, cloud provider configuration directories, and local environment variables, which may indicate credential exfiltration.
This rule monitors the software inventory for vulnerable versions of OpenSSL and WolfSSL libraries. Specifically, it flags instances of WolfSSL prior to version 5.9.4, which are susceptible to peer-authentication bypass vulnerabilities. The rule is intended for patch management and asset exposure tracking rather than detecting active exploitation.
Detects modifications to core NetScaler startup configuration files 'ns.conf' or 'rc.netscaler'. Attackers often target these files after initial access to establish persistence by injecting malicious commands, rewrite, or responder policies to maintain access to the appliance.
Detects evidence of exploitation and post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2026-59310, an unauthenticated RCE vulnerability in the VMware vCenter Syslog Server. The rule monitors for suspicious child processes spawned by vmsyslogcollector, directory traversal patterns in command lines, and persistence mechanisms involving SSH authorized_keys modification, cron job creation, or systemd unit deployment on the VCSA shell.
Detects unauthorized process activity that reads, copies, archives, or transmits the NetScaler ns.conf configuration file. This file contains highly sensitive information, including AAA/LDAP bind credentials and certificates. Adversaries may stage or exfiltrate this file following the exploitation of vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2026-88771 or CVE-2026-88772) on NetScaler appliances to facilitate further network compromise.
This rule detects potential post-exploitation activity on a NetScaler appliance where a crontab modification occurs within a short window (1 hour) following suspicious syslog entries indicative of oversized-parameter buffer overflow exploitation attempts (CVE-2026-88771/CVE-2026-88772).
This rule detects potential command injection attacks targeting the Zimbra 'swatchdog' service, specifically involving the abuse of SNMP trap notifications (CVE-2026-73570). The attack works by injecting malicious shell metacharacters into the 'zimbra-MIB::zmServiceName' argument, which is processed by a Perl-invoked 'swatchdog' script. The rule monitors process execution events for shell commands spawned by the swatchdog utility that contain suspicious shell operators and the targeted MIB parameter.
Detects awk-based shell command construction on ESX BusyBox that interleaves
an esxcli/vim-cmd command string with invisible Unicode code points (zero-width space,
zero-width non-joiner/joiner, word joiner, Mongolian vowel separator, left/right-to-left
marks, or Plane-16 private-use characters generated via sprintf hex escapes), strips them
with gsub(), and passes the result to system(). CrowdStrike documented this as one of 21
validated ESX obfuscation techniques that leaves only the invisible-character-laden string
in shell logs while the executed command is fully hidden from cleartext review.
an esxcli/vim-cmd command string with invisible Unicode code points (zero-width space,
zero-width non-joiner/joiner, word joiner, Mongolian vowel separator, left/right-to-left
marks, or Plane-16 private-use characters generated via sprintf hex escapes), strips them
with gsub(), and passes the result to system(). CrowdStrike documented this as one of 21
validated ESX obfuscation techniques that leaves only the invisible-character-laden string
in shell logs while the executed command is fully hidden from cleartext review.
Detects a system shell/interpreter copied or moved into a writable or non-standard path -
the precursor to the 'copy /bin/bash, set SUID, run bash -p' misconfiguration abuse and a
common staging step in the page-cache PoCs. Enriched with source/destination decode, an
inline-SUID-intent flag (chmod +s / chmod 4755 / install -m / setcap in the same command),
masquerade flags (renamed, hidden dotfile, system-lookalike name), a weighted RiskScore /
TriagePriority and DeviceInfo context. Pairs with OS-DET-LNX-006 and correlation
OS-DET-LNX-007. Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
the precursor to the 'copy /bin/bash, set SUID, run bash -p' misconfiguration abuse and a
common staging step in the page-cache PoCs. Enriched with source/destination decode, an
inline-SUID-intent flag (chmod +s / chmod 4755 / install -m / setcap in the same command),
masquerade flags (renamed, hidden dotfile, system-lookalike name), a weighted RiskScore /
TriagePriority and DeviceInfo context. Pairs with OS-DET-LNX-006 and correlation
OS-DET-LNX-007. Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
The following analytic identifies DNS queries from internal hosts to dynamic domain providers. It leverages DNS query logs from the `Network_Resolution` data model and cross-references them with a lookup file containing known dynamic DNS providers. This activity is significant because attackers often use dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or command-and-control servers, making it crucial for security teams to monitor. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass firewall blocks, evade detection, and maintain persistent access to the network.
This rule monitors Linux system authentication logs to identify potential unauthorized access attempts. It triggers when a single source IP initiates a high volume of failed SSH login attempts (brute force) or when a single user account is targeted by multiple distinct source IPs within a short time window (password spraying).
This rule monitors for Linux web-server service accounts (such as www-data or nginx) attempting to elevate privileges by modifying file permissions to set SUID/SGID bits or by executing common system binaries with shell-escape patterns commonly documented in GTFOBins for privilege escalation.
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