Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,045 detections
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Correlates a Webcam.dll image load with VM-detection commands (such as queries for VirtualBox, VMware, vbox, vmtoolsd, Win32_ComputerSystem, or Win32_BIOS) executed by the same RegSvcs.exe process, which is characteristic of XWorm malware behavior.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects a data loss prevention violation. DLP telemetry is widely collected and
almost never written against as detection content — it is usually treated as a
compliance report rather than a security signal, which means repeated violations by
one user often go unexamined.
The file hash and process are both recorded, so a violation can be pivoted into
endpoint telemetry directly.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, file, hash, process, threat, srcip
almost never written against as detection content — it is usually treated as a
compliance report rather than a security signal, which means repeated violations by
one user often go unexamined.
The file hash and process are both recorded, so a violation can be pivoted into
endpoint telemetry directly.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, file, hash, process, threat, srcip
The following analytic identifies the execution of commonly used NirSoft utilities on Windows systems.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution details such as process name, parent process, and command-line arguments.
This activity is significant for a SOC because NirSoft utilities, while legitimate, can be used by adversaries for malicious purposes like credential theft or system reconnaissance.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
Note that this search does not use a where clause to filter out known benign paths, as NirSoft utilities can be executed from various locations. This might hinder performance in environments with high data volumes.
Apply additional filtering as necessary to enhance this.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution details such as process name, parent process, and command-line arguments.
This activity is significant for a SOC because NirSoft utilities, while legitimate, can be used by adversaries for malicious purposes like credential theft or system reconnaissance.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
Note that this search does not use a where clause to filter out known benign paths, as NirSoft utilities can be executed from various locations. This might hinder performance in environments with high data volumes.
Apply additional filtering as necessary to enhance this.
This detection flags a parent and child process pair on internet-facing Windows servers, where the parent is a web server process and the child is the process it launched. The web server processes covered are w3wp, httpd, nginx and Tomcat, including versioned Tomcat service executables such as tomcat9.exe and Tomcat running under java.exe, which is identified by the Catalina bootstrap class in its command line. A server is treated as internet-facing based on the most recent status recorded for it.
Instead of matching known web shell names, the query builds a baseline from the previous 30 days of process activity on each device and alerts when a pair appears in the latest window that has never been seen on that device before, so it can catch web shell activity it has never seen before. Because the baseline is held per device, a pair that is normal on one server does not hide the same pair appearing on another.
The rule runs every 24 hours, as this is the only Defender custom detection frequency with a 30-day lookback, and the alert window covers the last 25 hours so that a slightly delayed run does not leave a gap.
The baseline and alert windows are separated by ingestion time rather than event time, so events that arrive late are still evaluated.
Instead of matching known web shell names, the query builds a baseline from the previous 30 days of process activity on each device and alerts when a pair appears in the latest window that has never been seen on that device before, so it can catch web shell activity it has never seen before. Because the baseline is held per device, a pair that is normal on one server does not hide the same pair appearing on another.
The rule runs every 24 hours, as this is the only Defender custom detection frequency with a 30-day lookback, and the alert window covers the last 25 hours so that a slightly delayed run does not leave a gap.
The baseline and alert windows are separated by ingestion time rather than event time, so events that arrive late are still evaluated.
Detects the execution of tools and commands commonly used to enumerate Group Policy Objects (GPOs) within an environment, such as gpresult.exe with specific flags, PowerShell scripts querying GPO modules, or ldifde.exe checking group policy containers.
Detects a file creation event for any executable inside the "tmphtml" staging
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
Detects inbound external connections on TCP port 541 (FGFM/FMG-Access protocol) correlated with the creation of .tm archives on the same device, or connections from known malicious IP addresses communicating over TCP 541.
Detects when a Bandizip executable loads an unsigned dynamic-link library (DLL) from outside the standard installation directory, where the Bandizip process was launched by explorer.exe, potentially indicating DLL side-loading.
Detects hosts with the trojanized version 3.0.123 of the Rank Math PRO WordPress plugin distributed in October 2026. It correlates software inventory, file events, command-line process events, and network connections to identify affected packages, installation activity, and C2 communications.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task with the name or command containing 'WinRTCS' correlated with WMI permanent event subscription activities or execution of the 'own_lib.ps1' watchdog script within a 1-hour window on the same device, using Microsoft Defender XDR tables.
Detects a specific sequence of behavior associated with Gryxa data collection and exfiltration. A single process queries system state or logs (scheduled tasks, WMI, event logs), creates an archive file (.zip, .7z, .rar), and establishes an outbound public network connection shortly thereafter.
Detects when the same initiating process stops or deletes Windows services and subsequently deletes scheduled tasks or WMI event subscriptions within a 15-minute window on a single device, potentially indicating defense evasion or clean-up actions.
Detects Gryxa staging behavior where files are written across 2 or more distinct toolkit directories (such as WinRTCS, WER .wucache, and Diagnosis .etlcache) within a 1-hour window on a single device.
Detects inbound UDP traffic on port 443 (QUIC) targeting known HTTP/3-capable server processes (such as Caddy, Traefik, Cloudflared) followed closely by the termination or crash of that process, which may indicate an exploit attempt or vulnerability leading to denial of service.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a device first exhibits usage of a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, followed by the execution of known data transfer or exfiltration utilities such as WinSCP or Rclone.
Detects processes that make outbound API calls to known Large Language Model (LLM) domains while simultaneously performing high-volume network connection attempts or scanning-like fan-out activity across multiple public IP addresses.
Detects potential web shell activity where a web or application server process (such as IIS, Apache, Nginx, or Tomcat) writes a script file (e.g., .aspx, .jsp, .php) into a web-accessible directory, followed shortly by spawning a command-line shell or utility process.
Detects outbound network connections to domains associated with the AdFection / Discover-Tech / Controlium threat infrastructure using a Sentinel watchlist, filtering out known browser activity or allowing custom domain lists.
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Detects when common office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, OneNote, etc.) or archive utilities/PDF readers spawn command-line interpreters or scripting engines (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, etc.), which is a common indicator of phishing document execution or malicious archive extraction.
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