Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence where the 'chrome_cleanup.exe' binary is written to disk, its Mark of the Web (MOTW) identifier is removed, and it is subsequently launched by an unusual process (e.g., explorer, svchost, dllhost, or rundll32) without command-line arguments. This behavior is indicative of a COM-based shell launch, a technique often used by post-exploitation tools to bypass security controls and execute binaries stealthily.
Detects the creation of a process in a suspended state using the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag. This technique is commonly employed during process hollowing, process injection, or by legitimate security/debugging tools to prepare a process for memory modification before execution begins.
Sweeps Defender Advanced Hunting telemetry for known Sauron Loader indicators: 5 malicious SHA256 hashes (MSI installer, rnp.dll loader, tdwp.dll decrypter, embedded RSA private/public key blobs) across file/process/image-load events, plus 4 C2 domains and their full URLs across network and DNS telemetry. No IP indicators were published in the source reporting (C2 is domain-based over HTTPS) — the IP bucket is intentionally omitted rather than filled with placeholder data.
Sweeps Defender Advanced Hunting telemetry for known Sauron Loader indicators: 5 malicious SHA256 hashes (MSI installer, rnp.dll loader, tdwp.dll decrypter, embedded RSA private/public key blobs) across file/process/image-load events, plus 4 C2 domains and their full URLs across network and DNS telemetry. No IP indicators were published in the source reporting (C2 is domain-based over HTTPS) — the IP bucket is intentionally omitted rather than filled with placeholder data.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
Detects Sauron Loader stage-2 payload execution: a randomly-named file dropped in %TEMP% and executed within 5 minutes by a native launcher (rundll32/regsvr32/msiexec/cmd/powershell/wscript). Scoped to devices that already show the confirmed rnpkeys.exe side-load from ProgramData\keyroll, turning a very noisy fleet-wide 'temp file executed by native binary' heuristic (matches countless legitimate installers/updaters) into a targeted next-stage check on hosts with corroborated Sauron Loader activity. Also fixes an unused/dead variable and an ambiguous post-join column reference.
Detects Sauron Loader stage-2 payload execution: a randomly-named file dropped in %TEMP% and executed within 5 minutes by a native launcher (rundll32/regsvr32/msiexec/cmd/powershell/wscript). Scoped to devices that already show the confirmed rnpkeys.exe side-load from ProgramData\keyroll, turning a very noisy fleet-wide 'temp file executed by native binary' heuristic (matches countless legitimate installers/updaters) into a targeted next-stage check on hosts with corroborated Sauron Loader activity. Also fixes an unused/dead variable and an ambiguous post-join column reference.
Detects Sauron Loader stage-2 payload execution: a randomly-named file dropped in %TEMP% and executed within 5 minutes by a native launcher (rundll32/regsvr32/msiexec/cmd/powershell/wscript). Scoped to devices that already show the confirmed rnpkeys.exe side-load from ProgramData\keyroll, turning a very noisy fleet-wide 'temp file executed by native binary' heuristic (matches countless legitimate installers/updaters) into a targeted next-stage check on hosts with corroborated Sauron Loader activity. Also fixes an unused/dead variable and an ambiguous post-join column reference.
Detects Sauron Loader stage-2 payload execution: a randomly-named file dropped in %TEMP% and executed within 5 minutes by a native launcher (rundll32/regsvr32/msiexec/cmd/powershell/wscript). Scoped to devices that already show the confirmed rnpkeys.exe side-load from ProgramData\keyroll, turning a very noisy fleet-wide 'temp file executed by native binary' heuristic (matches countless legitimate installers/updaters) into a targeted next-stage check on hosts with corroborated Sauron Loader activity. Also fixes an unused/dead variable and an ambiguous post-join column reference.
Detects the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading chain: rnpkeys.exe (legitimate) side-loading malicious rnp.dll, which loads tdwp.dll to decrypt the loader in memory, all staged from C:\ProgramData\keyroll. Requires BOTH DLLs to be loaded by the same rnpkeys.exe process instance (not either/or) to eliminate single-artifact false positives, and surfaces SHA256 hashes of all three components for direct comparison against known IOCs (legitimate rnpkeys.exe: 194d7e8870ff783ce1e4e4e3015c895cc67ae52fd5e063c89dd1c069400d3991; malicious rnp.dll: 5606afdc5191d42f38d3c4f1692eda0a629c88810e29bfe78528733284ad1bf8; malicious tdwp.dll: 6551293e996d19755ba497f50b30a18c178f0d6e2a73b29ae742b8171e2985b7).
Detects the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading chain: rnpkeys.exe (legitimate) side-loading malicious rnp.dll, which loads tdwp.dll to decrypt the loader in memory, all staged from C:\ProgramData\keyroll. Requires BOTH DLLs to be loaded by the same rnpkeys.exe process instance (not either/or) to eliminate single-artifact false positives, and surfaces SHA256 hashes of all three components for direct comparison against known IOCs (legitimate rnpkeys.exe: 194d7e8870ff783ce1e4e4e3015c895cc67ae52fd5e063c89dd1c069400d3991; malicious rnp.dll: 5606afdc5191d42f38d3c4f1692eda0a629c88810e29bfe78528733284ad1bf8; malicious tdwp.dll: 6551293e996d19755ba497f50b30a18c178f0d6e2a73b29ae742b8171e2985b7).
Detects the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading chain: rnpkeys.exe (legitimate) side-loading malicious rnp.dll, which loads tdwp.dll to decrypt the loader in memory, all staged from C:\ProgramData\keyroll. Requires BOTH DLLs to be loaded by the same rnpkeys.exe process instance (not either/or) to eliminate single-artifact false positives, and surfaces SHA256 hashes of all three components for direct comparison against known IOCs (legitimate rnpkeys.exe: 194d7e8870ff783ce1e4e4e3015c895cc67ae52fd5e063c89dd1c069400d3991; malicious rnp.dll: 5606afdc5191d42f38d3c4f1692eda0a629c88810e29bfe78528733284ad1bf8; malicious tdwp.dll: 6551293e996d19755ba497f50b30a18c178f0d6e2a73b29ae742b8171e2985b7).
Detects the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading chain: rnpkeys.exe (legitimate) side-loading malicious rnp.dll, which loads tdwp.dll to decrypt the loader in memory, all staged from C:\ProgramData\keyroll. Requires BOTH DLLs to be loaded by the same rnpkeys.exe process instance (not either/or) to eliminate single-artifact false positives, and surfaces SHA256 hashes of all three components for direct comparison against known IOCs (legitimate rnpkeys.exe: 194d7e8870ff783ce1e4e4e3015c895cc67ae52fd5e063c89dd1c069400d3991; malicious rnp.dll: 5606afdc5191d42f38d3c4f1692eda0a629c88810e29bfe78528733284ad1bf8; malicious tdwp.dll: 6551293e996d19755ba497f50b30a18c178f0d6e2a73b29ae742b8171e2985b7).
Detects creation of the 'keyroll' scheduled task used to relaunch the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading chain. Requires the schtasks.exe command line to both reference the 'keyroll' task name AND explicitly reference the ProgramData\keyroll path or rnpkeys.exe (ruling out unrelated tasks that happen to be named 'keyroll', e.g. legitimate key-rotation automation), and requires an INNER join corroborating an actual rnpkeys.exe relaunch from that path within 24h — a lone task-creation event with no follow-on relaunch no longer alerts.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
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