Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
15,618
13,637
2,824
1,803
1,727
Contributors
7,678
5,999
5,315
4,504
4,206
Categories
18,287
9,897
3,918
3,796
3,721
Platforms
40,407
7,473
6,580
3,935
3,713
Products / Services
10,635
9,722
6,762
1,902
1,895
MITRE Techniques
13,801
13,234
8,133
6,014
4,458
CVEs
49
45
30
30
29
IDS Classtypes
214
56
43
23
19
IDS Protocols
183
172
20
16
8
Detects lib.dll being loaded by msiexec.exe, an unusual image-load relationship that matches the embedded MSI custom action used by msaRAT.
Detects XML parsing issues, if the application expects to work with XML make sure that the parser is initialized safely.
Detects logon events that specify new credentials
Use of Remote.exe
Sigma
Remote.exe is part of WinDbg in the Windows SDK and can be used for AWL bypass and running remote files.
Detects the execution of PingCastle, a tool designed to quickly assess the Active Directory security level.
Detects execution of "rundll32" calling "advpack.dll" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls in order to leverage the "RegisterOCX" function
Detects changes to the "MaxMpxCt" registry value.
MaxMpxCt specifies the maximum outstanding network requests for the server per client, which is used when negotiating a Server Message Block (SMB) connection with a client. Note if the value is set beyond 125 older Windows 9x clients will fail to negotiate.
Ransomware threat actors and operators (specifically BlackCat) were seen increasing this value in order to handle a higher volume of traffic.
MaxMpxCt specifies the maximum outstanding network requests for the server per client, which is used when negotiating a Server Message Block (SMB) connection with a client. Note if the value is set beyond 125 older Windows 9x clients will fail to negotiate.
Ransomware threat actors and operators (specifically BlackCat) were seen increasing this value in order to handle a higher volume of traffic.
Bulk staging before exfiltration commonly produces large archives written by archiving utilities or PowerShell.
Flags conhost.exe --headless launching a renamed interpreter or decoded payload (svchost.exe, synaptics.exe, certutil -decode, Users\Public, AppData, Temp) together with image-named payloads (.ico, .png), bot-ID markers (MRB_, DA_NEW_VER_, BOT) or a cmd/PowerShell/script-host parent.
Detects persistence mechanisms installed by the trojanized Claude Code extension on Cursor or Node-based applications. On macOS, it detects the creation of LaunchAgent property list files. On Windows, it detects scheduled tasks created via schtasks.exe or event logs, and modifications to the Startup folder.
Detects a sequence where a domain user account is created (via net.exe or New-ADUser) and the same account is subsequently added to privileged groups such as Domain Admins or Enterprise Admins within one hour.
Staging data into an archive and then sending it out within a short window is a hallmark of exfiltration. Correlating the two events on the same device (archive, then a public network connection from a transfer tool within 2 hours) is much higher fidelity than either event alone. The result is summarised per archive event to avoid join row multiplication.
Detects rclone-style copy operations transferring data from a UNC share to an SFTP remote. It identifies malicious use by inspecting specific argument sets and handles renamed binaries (such as SearchApp.exe) masquerading as rclone.
Detects command-line activity staging files using utilities like tar or mkdir into an AppData\Roaming\KB<digits> directory, followed shortly by the execution of a renamed Bun runtime (.js) or Java runtime (.java) from that same path.
Detects browser processes accessing a chatgpt.com/share/ link followed shortly thereafter by connections to multiple distinct external hosts, potentially indicating exfiltration or unauthorized interaction following an AI chat reference.
When binaries are blocked or the operator is living off the land, uploads are done with .NET primitives and cmdlets (WebClient.UploadFile, Invoke-RestMethod -Method Post -InFile, FtpWebRequest). The logic is anchored on strong upload indicators (not just webclient + a URL, which mostly catches download cradles).
Detects an Active Directory password spray attack originating from a single source IP, followed closely by a user account creation event (Event ID 4720) associated with a logon from that same source IP.
Flags endpoints associated with anonymous file-drop sites, paste services and chat platforms commonly abused for exfiltration and C2. Domains are matched with term-based has_any, which avoids the substring false positives of contains (e.g. t.me matching client.messaging.adobe, or file.io matching sharefile.io). Sanctioned services (Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive/SharePoint, Box) are intentionally left out to keep volume manageable; an optional block is included.
Detects when a process spawned by Microsoft Office or a web browser executes a child process.
These actions can be indicative of malicious activity such as macro-based malware or drive-by downloads.
These actions can be indicative of malicious activity such as macro-based malware or drive-by downloads.
Detects a DLL loaded into msiexec.exe that exports a function named RUN and exhibits Tokio async-runtime initialization behavior, reading the TOKIO_WORKER_THREADS environment variable and/or calling GetSystemInfo followed by multiple CreateThread calls to size its worker thread pool. Matches msaRAT behavior where the malicious Rust/Tokio DLL is loaded via an MSI custom action running under msiexec.exe.
Detects the PowerShell download-and-execute method used by the Exvicy ClickFix example without relying on its domain.
Page 24 of 1925