Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,264 detections
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Detects the usage of the "Accesschk" utility, an access and privilege audit tool developed by SysInternal and often being abused by attacker to verify process privileges
Detects usage of the PsLogList utility to dump event log in order to extract admin accounts and perform account discovery or delete events logs
Detects process creation for common RMM tools.
The idea here would be to alert on non approved RMM tools, and anything outside of the one or few approved tools would be suspicious/malicious.
The idea here would be to alert on non approved RMM tools, and anything outside of the one or few approved tools would be suspicious/malicious.
This rule detects potentially malicious lateral movement or persistence activities by monitoring the creation or modification of executable files in remote network shares and startup folders, as well as the use of administrative tools like sc.exe or schtasks.exe to create services or tasks. The rule specifically filters out processes signed by Microsoft, focusing on non-standard or unsigned binaries that perform these administrative actions across multiple instances, indicating potential automated lateral propagation.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create or start a service on a remote host, identified by the presence of UNC paths (\\) and service management commands (create, start) in the command line.
Detects the clearing of Windows Security and System event logs, or Defender XDR audit logs, indicating potential adversary activity to remove traces of their actions.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys associated with Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger configurations or Event Log service configurations. These modifications can be used by adversaries to disable or tamper with event logging mechanisms, effectively blinding security telemetry and evading detection.
Latin American banking trojan using DLL side-loading and overlay attacks
Banking trojan and loader using malicious Office macro delivery
Credential and browser data stealer distributed via OXLOADER campaigns
Loader malware delivering follow-on ransomware payloads
This rule detects potential malicious activity associated with the 'CadenceOptimizer' service and related 'agt.dll' library. It monitors for the creation or modification of Windows Registry keys for persistence, the creation or loading of a specific DLL in the 'ProgramData\CorsairUtil' directory, and the injection of code into 'svchost.exe' via 'Brn_Agent' command line arguments.
Detects a privilege escalation technique that exploits the Windows Error Reporting (WER) 'QueueReporting' scheduled task. An attacker leverages the Task Scheduler COM API to trigger this task, causing 'wermgr.exe' to execute as SYSTEM from an attacker-controlled directory (often via directory junction redirection), subsequently spawning shell processes.
Detects the use of common Windows system administration tools (cmd, powershell, net, sc, taskkill, wmic) to stop, delete, or terminate known backup software agents. This behavior is highly characteristic of ransomware or destructive attacks attempting to inhibit system recovery by destroying backup infrastructure.
Detects attempts to exploit the Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) for privilege escalation and domain compromise. This rule monitors for a high volume of Netlogon secure channel failures (Event ID 5805), machine account password resets to a zeroed/blank state (Event ID 4742 for computer accounts with specific password indicators), anomalous Netlogon service restarts (Event ID 7036), and Azure AD Identity Protection risk events referencing Zerologon or Netlogon anomalies. These indicators collectively suggest an active exploitation attempt of the Zerologon vulnerability.
Open-source derived remote access trojan with plugin architecture
Detects the execution of FTK Imager (FTKImager.exe), a forensic imaging tool that can be used by adversaries to perform data collection, including capturing physical memory, logical drives, or disk images from a local system.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task masquerading as a legitimate Mozilla maintenance task (UpdateTask or ElevateTask). The rule specifically flags when such tasks are configured to run as SYSTEM, triggered on system start, and are created via a command line executed by a parent process of cmd.exe, which is indicative of Payouts King ransomware persistence activity.
Detects the installation of a new Windows service where the ImagePath contains strings commonly associated with remote access or remote control software, such as 'remotepc' or 'rpclient'. This may indicate the unauthorized deployment of remote administration tools.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
This rule correlates a sequence of suspicious activities on a single host within a 24-hour window, indicating a multi-stage intrusion typically associated with ransomware campaigns. The detection chain includes initial credential harvesting (using tools like Impacket, BloodHound, or potential agent drops), followed by defense dismantlement (deleting shadow copies, terminating security processes, and disabling the firewall), and ending with system auditing/recovery sabotage.
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