Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of Invoke-Obfuscation's VAR+ Launcher technique, which leverages obfuscated environment variables to execute PowerShell commands. This technique aims to evade detection by making the command-line arguments difficult to analyze.
Detects the use of the WMI class "Win32_NTEventlogFile" within a PowerShell script to perform suspicious actions such as deleting, backing up, changing permissions, renaming, or taking ownership of event logs. This activity is often associated with defense evasion tactics by adversaries attempting to remove forensic evidence or impair system defenses.
Detects the usage of the PowerShell '::FromBase64String' cmdlet within a process command line, specifically looking for both direct string and UTF-16 LE encoded variations. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to deobfuscate or decode base64 encoded strings, often containing malicious payloads, within PowerShell scripts.
Detects suspicious PowerShell code that is UTF16 and base64 encoded, often used in command lines for obfuscation. The rule specifically looks for patterns indicative of obfuscated PowerShell, such as '-bxor 0x', '.Invoke() |', and format string patterns like '{1}{0}" -f' or '{0}{3}" -f' in their encoded forms.
Detects the use of the WMI class "Win32_NTEventlogFile" with methods that can be used to manipulate event logs, such as deleting, backing up, or changing permissions. This activity, especially when originating from a PowerShell script, can be indicative of an adversary attempting to evade detection or inhibit system recovery.
Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants
Detects the creation of a new service using powershell.
Detects usage of the Get-ADUser cmdlet to collect user information and output it to a file
Detects remote PowerShell sessions
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where the output is stored in a potentially suspicious location that is used often by malware for exfiltration.
An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
Detects attempts of decoding encoded Gzip archives via PowerShell.
Detects usage of the "TcpClient" class. Which can be abused to establish remote connections and reverse-shells. As seen used by the Nishang "Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine" reverse shell and other.
Detects suspicious powershell process starts with base64 encoded commands (e.g. Emotet)
Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credential
Detects suspicious ways to run Invoke-Execution using IEX alias
Detects PowerShell script execution from Alternate Data Stream (ADS)
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