Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the use of PowerShell or Command Prompt to execute commands related to Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software or remote management tools such as IDrive or TeamViewer. It specifically looks for command-line arguments involving RMM-related keywords combined with execution flags or piping operators, which is a common pattern for automating the deployment, configuration, or malicious use of these remote access tools.
Detects the use of built-in Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, cipher) to delete Volume Shadow Copies or modify boot/recovery configurations, which is a common behavior used by ransomware and attackers to inhibit system recovery.
Detects suspected sandbox evasion techniques commonly utilized by BeepRAT malware. The rule monitors for WMI queries related to hardware/OS virtualization artifacts (e.g., CIM_Memory, Win32_OperatingSystem), registry enumeration of virtualization keys (VMware/VirtualBox), and suspicious child process spawning of wmiprvse.exe by known loader components (HFY.exe, tcc.exe, LuaJit.exe).
Detects instances where the 7z.exe process launches an executable or script file, often indicative of an adversary bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) protections by manually extracting malicious payloads from a downloaded archive.
Detects the use of 'netsh trace' commands to start or stop network packet capturing. Adversaries can leverage this native Windows utility to perform unauthorized network traffic sniffing and data collection.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that utilize Base64 encoded commands combined with memory-execution primitives such as Invoke-Expression (IEX) or DownloadString. The rule specifically flags commands longer than 100 characters to reduce noise from short administrative tasks.
Detects the execution of VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) with unusually long command lines containing common obfuscation patterns such as character replacement or string splitting. This pattern is indicative of attempts to hide malicious code from static analysis.
Detects instances of PowerShell being launched directly by explorer.exe. This activity is a known indicator of 'ClickFix' or similar social engineering campaigns, where users are instructed by a deceptive website or lure to copy and paste malicious PowerShell commands into the Windows Run dialog or the File Explorer address bar to execute code.
This rule detects instances where Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) initiates a DNS query to 'ip-api.com' within a 5-minute window. This behavior is often associated with reconnaissance activity, where an adversary uses scripts to determine the public IP address or geolocation of the compromised host for C2 registration or environment awareness.
Detects unexpected child process execution spawned by the Lunar Client Electron main process. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts, such as the lunar-modrinth-chain exploit, where malicious files (e.g., .mrpack entries) could lead to arbitrary code execution via shell.openExternal calls.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where a command prompt (cmd.exe) launched from a Startup LNK context initiates a hidden PowerShell process with Execution Policy bypass flags. This pattern is often associated with fileless malware execution, specifically linked to UAC-0226 activity, aiming to execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts by reading payloads from memory or staged files.
Detects reconnaissance behavior associated with the KuinaExtractor tool, identified by three or more distinct WMI hardware-related queries (CPU, disk, memory, etc.) executed within a 5-minute window by a non-administrative parent process.
Detects the execution of common command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, wscript, cscript, mshta, certutil) directly spawned by Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook). This is a common indicator of macro-based attacks or other exploit delivery chains where Office documents are used to execute malicious payloads.
Detects the use of 7-Zip (7z.exe or 7zip.exe) to archive files within common user directories (Desktop, Documents, Users, AppData). This activity is often associated with staging sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Detects the use of WMIC to query system information, such as BIOS, computer system, or product details. Adversaries often use this technique during the discovery phase to gather information about a target host's hardware and environment.
Detects the use of WMIC to query system information, such as BIOS, computer system, or product details. Adversaries often use this technique during the discovery phase to gather information about a target host's hardware and environment.
Detects potential lateral movement via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) by monitoring for WMI processes spawning interactive shells (cmd, powershell) or executing remote process calls using the /node syntax. Includes exclusions for common administrative tools associated with Microsoft management platforms.
Detects potential lateral movement via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) by monitoring for WMI processes spawning interactive shells (cmd, powershell) or executing remote process calls using the /node syntax. Includes exclusions for common administrative tools associated with Microsoft management platforms.
Detects techniques used to bypass PowerShell Constrained Language Mode (CLM) including version downgrades, execution from trusted binary proxy hosts (such as InstallUtil, MSBuild, or Regasm), and manipulation of the __PSLockDownPolicy environment variable.
This rule detects a sequence of events where a new local account is created on a device using common administrative commands (net user, PowerShell New-LocalUser), followed within 60 minutes by the execution of known offensive security tools or frameworks such as Impacket, NetExec, CrackMapExec, Chisel, or Havoc agent on the same device. This pattern is indicative of potential unauthorized system access, staging of persistence mechanisms, or active reconnaissance activities.
Detects execution of common Windows network configuration utilities (ipconfig, arp, route) by known command-line and script interpreters. This pattern is indicative of an attacker performing reconnaissance to gather information about the host's network settings, interfaces, and connectivity.
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