Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects Node.js processes executing system-level reconnaissance (e.g., CPU, memory, hostname, uptime enumeration) followed by network connections to known exfiltration endpoints (Slack, Telegram API). This behavior aligns with identified npm malware campaigns using host fingerprinting for target selection and data exfiltration.
Detects the creation of a shortcut file named 'AppUpdateHelper.lnk' within the Windows Startup folder by the 'UpdateAssistant.exe' process. This pattern may indicate an attempt to establish persistence by an application posing as an update process.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity where a non-browser or non-Telegram application initiates network connections to the Telegram Bot API within 24 hours of a new entry being created in the Windows Registry Run key. This combination suggests a persistence mechanism combined with a C2 channel.
Detects persistence attempts using Component Object Model (COM) hijacking by modifying HKCU CLSID InProcServer32 registry keys. The rule specifically identifies instances where the registry value points to a DLL file located within the user's AppData or LocalAppData directories, excluding typical system or program directories, as seen in sideloading persistence chains.
Detects the loading of 'opencv_world4120.dll' by specific process names commonly associated with update activity (UpdateAssistant.exe, AppUpdateHelper.exe, SysMaintenance.exe) when the loaded DLL is either unsigned, untrusted, or has an invalid signature. This is indicative of potential DLL side-loading where malicious code is executed under the context of an ostensibly legitimate update process.
Detects malicious processes associated with the HVNC backdoor (e.g., UpdateAssistant.exe, SysMaintenance.exe) concurrently running alongside identified security product processes on the same device. This behavior suggests the malware is performing automated reconnaissance of installed security software to inform further compromise actions.
Detects malicious code within the BTree.prototype.set function designed to trigger a secondary payload (sharedLoad.min.js) at runtime. This behavior is intended to bypass npm install-script scanning by embedding the logic within legitimate-looking library code and using Node.js child_process spawns with hidden parameters to maintain persistence and execution.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
Detects Node.js processes spawning common system discovery utilities such as systeminfo, wmic, or uname. This behavior is indicative of a post-compromise scenario where a web application or Node.js-based service is being used to gather information about the underlying operating system environment.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects the creation of files named '.git-checker' within common temporary directories. This behavior is often associated with staging or persistence mechanisms used by malware or malicious scripts to track execution or environment status.
Detects the creation of files named '.git-checker' within common temporary directories. This behavior is often associated with staging or persistence mechanisms used by malware or malicious scripts to track execution or environment status.
Detects instances where the AnyDesk remote support application initiates a Windows command shell (cmd.exe) or executes a batch (.bat) file. This behavior is often associated with remote access tools being used to execute arbitrary commands on a target system.
Detects the execution of signed, Microsoft-publisher binaries that are located in typically user-writable or suspicious directories (e.g., AppData, ProgramData, Temp, Users) when initiated by cmd.exe or powershell.exe with an argument indicating a batch file reference. This pattern is indicative of potential masquerading or living-off-the-land techniques where a signed binary is moved or executed from an unconventional location to bypass security controls or execution policies.
This rule monitors for the installation of the 'indexed-btree' JavaScript package via common package managers (npm, yarn, pnpm) or its presence within a 'node_modules' directory. This specific package has been associated with supply chain attacks where malicious code is embedded within dependencies to compromise build systems or environments.
Detects a suspicious Node.js process pattern characterized by the execution of 'sharedLoad.min.js' or detached child processes, followed by rapid outbound network communication to known messaging platforms (Slack, Telegram). This behavior is indicative of the indexed-btree malware family, which exfiltrates host fingerprint data including architecture, hostname, and system metrics.
This rule detects the execution of the Xray proxy utility (xray-core) when launched by the RemoteApp workspace broker process (wkspbroker.exe) or located within the RemoteApp Gateway application data folder. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using proxy tools to facilitate command-and-control communication or network traffic tunneling via trusted remote access infrastructure.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks initiated by the WinGet DSC configuration processes, specifically ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe or WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe. This activity is indicative of the abuse of the 'ScheduledTask' resource within a WinGet configuration file to establish persistence via a logon-triggered task.
This rule detects the presence of the malicious indexed-btree npm package by searching for its obfuscated runtime loader triggered via BTree.prototype.set. The malware attempts to spawn a detached Node.js process to execute a secondary payload (sharedLoad.min.js) instead of relying on standard installation scripts, allowing it to maintain persistence and bypass simple static analysis.
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