Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation of a '.pkg_history' file, which is a known indicator of the Mastra NPM supply chain compromise, followed by a network connection to specific command and control (C2) IP addresses (23.254.164.123 or 23.254.164.92) within a 5-minute window on the same device. This correlation aims to identify successful exploitation and subsequent C2 communication by the Mastra NPM malware.
This rule detects the execution of specific Node.js scripts (`setup.cjs` or `protocal.cjs`) that are associated with the Mastra npm supply chain attack. It identifies Node.js process executions across Windows, macOS, and Linux, looking for these malicious script names in the command line.
Detects rclone copy, sync, move, or copyto operations with options commonly used for unattended bulk transfer, indicating potential data exfiltration to cloud storage.
Detects the use of 'sshpass' to supply a password to SSH while simultaneously disabling strict host key checking. This combination is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential stuffing attempts where an attacker is trying to bypass host key verification to connect to multiple systems without manual intervention.
Detects the spawning of shells (bash, sh) or utility processes (npx) as child processes of Amazon Q or VS Code extension host components. This activity is indicative of exploitation attempts involving malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configurations within workspace environments, as identified by CVE-2026-12957.
Detects execution of squid.exe with suspicious command line arguments
Detects OAuth token theft via malicious redirect URI manipulation
Detects exfiltration of sensitive data pushed to GitHub repositories
Detects the SSH worm component of the isp.sh dropper used in the CVE-2026-33017 Langflow cryptominer campaign. The worm enumerates local SSH private keys (id_rsa, id_ed25519, id_dsa), parses known_hosts, queries SSH_AUTH_SOCK for agent-loaded keys, and spreads via SSH and SCP with BatchMode=yes and StrictHostKeyChecking=no to avoid interactive prompts during lateral movement.
Identifies Storm-1175 utilizing the rclone utility (often renamed) with MEGA or Mega-CMD configurations to exfiltrate vast data troves before encryption.
Detects the execution of base64 decoded payloads in memory by interpreted languages such as Python or Node.js. This rule specifically looks for command-line arguments indicating base64 decoding or zlib decompression operations.
Detects a module changing protocol, destination class, or cloud service after repeated failed connections on its primary channel. This behavior is indicative of malware like Kazuar attempting to establish C2 communication through alternative means when its initial attempts fail.
Detects connections to cryptocurrency mining pools
Detects a persistent process creating similarly sized outbound transfers at regular intervals after staging local results, indicative of the Kazuar malware's exfiltration behavior. The rule identifies processes with significant outbound network traffic (bytes > 10000), aggregates this traffic over 15-minute intervals, and then looks for processes that exhibit consistent outbound activity with intervals between 10 and 20 minutes (600 to 1200 seconds).
Detects PHP or web server processes launching tools commonly used to download or upload files. This activity can indicate a web shell or other compromise where an attacker is attempting to transfer files to or from the compromised server. Investigate the transferred destination, remote endpoint, and whether the activity occurred during an approved deployment.
Detects PHP or web server processes launching common system, account, network, and domain reconnaissance utilities. This activity is often indicative of post-compromise internal reconnaissance, as web-facing application processes should not normally start these utilities. The rule specifically looks for processes like php.exe, w3wp.exe, httpd.exe, apache2, and nginx spawning reconnaissance tools such as whoami, hostname, systeminfo, ipconfig, ifconfig, net, nltest, dsquery, quser, and query.
Detects files or processes matching SHA256 indicators published by Google Threat Intelligence Group for the INFINITERED campaign. The hashes cover the help.php persistence component, credential harvesters, backdoors, and droppers. A match should be treated as a high-confidence indicator of compromise and investigated immediately.
Detects a web server or PHP runtime creating or renaming a PHP file inside a REDCap application directory. INFINITERED trojanised legitimate REDCap components and deployed PHP-based persistence. Production REDCap content should normally be changed through controlled deployment or upgrade activity, so unplanned PHP file creation by the serving process requires investigation.
Detects the MYRA RAT (Operation Friday Harvest) establishing persistence by creating systemd user services disguised as legitimate system daemons (colord, haveged) under ~/.config/systemd/user/, enabling the service via systemctl --user enable, and dropping binaries to ~/.local/bin/. Also covers related persistence artifacts including /usr/local/lib/.libcache.so and /etc/profile.d/.sh.local. The rule also identifies node or node.exe spawning systemctl with the --user flag.
Detects the command line sequence used by Miasma to restore passwordless sudo for the 'runner' user in GitHub Actions by overwriting sudoers via a Docker container. This specific pattern targets the Miasma Alpine container payload.
Detects the creation of a new deviceManagementScript or deviceShellScript object in Intune, indicating a PowerShell (Windows) or Shell (macOS/Linux) script has been uploaded to the Intune management platform. This is considered a high-fidelity indicator of script-based abuse as these scripts execute as SYSTEM on targeted endpoints and leave minimal forensic traces. The rule also identifies script creation initiated by service principals that might bypass human-UPN-based monitoring.
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