Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential audio stream exfiltration using the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). It specifically looks for UDP traffic with a packet size between 160 and 200 bytes, which is characteristic of some RTP audio streams. A threshold of 100 such packets from the same source within 10 seconds triggers the alert, indicating a sustained audio stream.
This rule detects the upload of a PNG image file over HTTP using a POST request. This could indicate an attacker exfiltrating screen captures, which aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1113 (Screen Capture). The rule specifically looks for the HTTP POST method and the PNG file signature (89 50 4E 47) within the file data.
This rule detects a UDP flood Denial of Service (DoS) attack targeting the home network. It triggers an alert if more than 1000 UDP packets are observed from any source to any destination within the home network within a 5-second interval, tracked per destination.
This rule detects a TCP SYN Flood Denial of Service (DoS) attack. It triggers when a high volume of TCP SYN packets (1000 packets within 5 seconds) are observed targeting a single destination IP address within the HOME_NET, indicating an attempt to overwhelm the target's network resources.
This rule detects the exfiltration of encrypted archives over HTTP POST requests. It specifically looks for HTTP POST methods, the presence of file data, the 'PK' magic bytes indicating a ZIP or similar archive, and a file size greater than 50,000 bytes. This combination suggests an attempt to send a large, potentially encrypted, archive out of the network.
This rule detects network connections to TCP port 45700, which is a default port used by the XMRig cryptocurrency miner. The detection specifically looks for the initiation of a connection (SYN flag) from the internal network ($HOME_NET) to any external host. This activity is indicative of a system within the internal network potentially running an XMRig miner, which aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1496 (Resource Hijacking).
This rule detects devices exhibiting high volume outbound network traffic, specifically more than 10MB of data transferred across more than 100 sessions to a single remote IP address within a one-minute window. This behavior can be indicative of data exfiltration, unauthorized data transfer, or other suspicious network activity.
Detects network connections to known Command and Control (C2) servers associated with the ValleyRAT backdoor, used by the Silver Fox APT group.
Detects web requests containing the specific user-agent or custom secret headers used by the Moika campaign beacon to retrieve its stage 2 payload.
This rule identifies potential network scanning or high-volume communication by detecting a large number of connections (50 or more) between a single source IP and a single destination IP within a 5-minute time window. It aggregates connection details such as total connections, sent bytes, and received bytes from the CommonSecurityLog.
This rule detects potential HTTP/2 Rapid Reset or similar denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by identifying an unusually high number of streams and total requests within a single HTTP/2 network connection over a one-minute interval. Such behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to exhaust server resources by rapidly opening and closing streams.
This rule detects a high number of distinct URLs and total network connections originating from a single remote IP address within a one-minute time window. This behavior can be indicative of various malicious activities such as data exfiltration, command and control (C2) communication, or network scanning. The threshold for distinct URLs is set to greater than 100 and total connections greater than 500.
Detects web requests containing the specific user-agent or custom secret headers used by the Moika campaign beacon to retrieve its stage 2 payload.
Detects outbound web requests or GitHub API interactions containing the specific description string "Miasma: The Spreading Blight". This string is used as a signature by the Miasma malware (a Shai-Hulud variant involved in the @redhat-cloud-services npm supply chain attack) when creating malicious GitHub repositories to exfiltrate stolen credentials.
Detects HTTP requests containing specific URL query parameter combinations (`ia=` and `df=`) or POST bodies containing `a=iz&b=`, which are unique to the JS.MonoGlyphRAT check-in and beaconing protocol.
This rule detects instances where a single remote IP address exhibits a high number of idle network events (more than 200 idle events) and a high total number of network events (more than 500 total events) within a one-minute interval. This pattern can be indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication, where an adversary establishes a connection and then waits for commands, or data exfiltration, where data is sent in bursts with idle periods in between. It highlights unusual network communication patterns that might suggest malicious activity.
This rule looks for URL patterns matching common SQLi keywords used to break out of the array key for CVE-2026-9082.
Detects DNS queries to domains associated with tunneling tools (Ngrok, Tailscale) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (FleetDeck, TacticalRMM, Level.io, Pulseway, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, RustDesk, Atera, Remcos) known to be used by threat actors like Scattered Spider/Muddled Libra for covert persistent connectivity, remote access, and lateral movement.
Detects a device making an unusually high number of unique outbound network connections to different remote IP addresses within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can indicate various malicious activities such as network scanning, botnet activity, or data exfiltration to multiple external hosts.
Detects web traffic indicating client-side injection loading JavaScript from the known malicious domain hello-mywordl.info, which is associated with a WordPress malware campaign.
Detects network connections or web requests to the specific malicious GitHub repository paths used to host the 5th and 6th stage payloads of the Miasma malware (a Shai-Hulud variant).
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