Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,276 detections
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Detects outbound network connections to 'seed1.getsession.org', a known Miasma Command and Control domain. This rule specifically looks for network events where the remote URL contains this domain, indicating potential C2 communication.
This rule detects successful network connections from devices to a list of known botnet command and control (C2) IP addresses. This indicates potential compromise and communication with malicious infrastructure.
Detects attempts to exfiltrate environment variables by piping the output of 'env' or 'printenv' commands into 'curl'. This technique can be used by adversaries, such as the Miasma malware, to quickly steal sensitive API keys or other credentials stored in environment variables.
Detects Python scripts utilizing ctypes, ptrace, or process_vm_readv to perform advanced, programmatic memory scraping without relying on shell utilities. This activity can be indicative of credential dumping or other forms of sensitive data exfiltration from process memory.
Detects execution of 'transformers.pyz', a zipped Python payload associated with the Miasma toolkit, by monitoring process creation events for command lines containing both 'python' and 'transformers.pyz'.
Detects the gh-token-monitor script using grep to extract GitHub Classic or Fine-Grained tokens (matching the ghp_ or gho_ structure) from the filesystem. This rule specifically looks for process command lines containing 'grep' and the regex pattern 'gh[po]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}', which is indicative of searching for GitHub tokens.
Identifies devices with FFmpeg installations below version 9.0 that include the vulnerable MagicYUV decoder (libavcodec), exposing the host to heap out-of-bounds write RCE via crafted AVI, MKV, or MOV files (CVE-2026-8461).
Detects automated execution of hidden workspace scripts triggered upon opening IDE folders, specifically looking for bash or sh processes executing 'vendor/run-update.sh' initiated by VS Code or Cursor.
Detects the execution of the Chisel client establishing a reverse SOCKS tunnel with authentication. This activity is often associated with adversaries using Chisel for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects creation, modification, or renaming of 'help.php' within a REDCap application path. This activity is indicative of a web shell deployment, as observed by GTIG with UNC6508 using 'help.php' for persistence and payload uploads. The combination of the campaign-specific filename and REDCap path provides a high-confidence signal.
Detects REDCap-associated PHP or web server processes launching operating system command interpreters. GTIG observed INFINITERED using trojanised REDCap components and web shell functionality to execute arbitrary shell commands. This behaviour is highly unusual for normal REDCap operations and may indicate post-exploitation activity.
Detects PHP or web server processes launching archive and compression utilities. A compromised web application may use these tools to package REDCap files, database exports, credentials, or research data before exfiltration. This behaviour should be rare outside documented backup or deployment activity.
This rule correlates the modification of 'Upgrade.php' with subsequent changes to REDCap authentication, login, or hook-related PHP files on the same device within a 30-minute window. This activity is indicative of the INFINITERED threat actor's technique to intercept the REDCap upgrade process and reinject credential harvesting, backdoor, and persistence code into new software versions. Such a sequence should be compared with approved maintenance windows and expected deployment activity to identify malicious behavior.
Detects the creation of systemd unit files masquerading as Google Chrome components used to launch the GS-Netcat backdoor on boot.
Correlates the execution of the trojanized scp binary passed with the '!' flag, an internal trigger designed to disable SELinux enforcing mode prior to payload execution. This rule specifically looks for 'scp' command-line executions containing '!' and excludes standard scp syntax that might contain '@' for user@host.
Detects cron job creation for Linux persistence or execution
Detects connections to cryptocurrency mining pools
Detects web server processes (IIS/Nginx) spawning native Windows or Linux shells (cmd.exe, sh), immediately followed by reconnaissance or download tool execution.
Identifies Python-based LLM agents (LangChain, etc.) blindly passing unsanitized, prompt-injected strings to native command shells (cmd, bash). This rule specifically looks for Python processes initiating command shell executions where the command line of the shell contains common data exfiltration or remote access tools like curl, wget, nc, or base64.
This rule detects process execution events on Linux systems where the command line contains references to 'dirtyfrag.conf'. This file is associated with a mitigation for the 'Dirty Frag' Linux vulnerability. Detection indicates that a process is interacting with this specific mitigation configuration, which could be part of a system hardening effort or an attempt to modify/disable the mitigation.
Detects attempts to escalate privileges via sudo
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