Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects instances where PowerShell is launched with hidden window arguments by explorer.exe or mshta.exe, and the command line indicates interactions with specific file extensions (.vbs, .ps1) located within the AppData directory. This pattern is often indicative of malicious script execution, such as those used in Konni malware campaigns to drop and execute payloads.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands indicative of the VelvetCake variant of the Konni malware. The rule identifies the use of 'Net.WebClient.DownloadString' combined with 'Invoke-Expression' (iex) to execute scripts in memory, alongside specific command-line indicators such as the 'Areyou=cake' campaign marker or associated C2 domains.
Detects the execution of elevated cmd.exe processes (running with High or System integrity) spawned by parent processes originating from the AppData directory. This pattern is commonly associated with malicious installers, droppers, or payload execution where a staged binary in the user profile attempts to perform administrative actions.
Detects unauthorized access to critical Chromium-based browser credential databases (such as Login Data, Cookies, and History) by processes other than recognized browser executables. This behavior is indicative of credential-harvesting activity, specifically matching techniques employed by infostealers like RevStealer.
Detects the execution of a RevStealer native PE payload by an Electron-based loader (XabivSystem.exe). The rule identifies when the loader spawns an unsigned, detached process from a hidden, randomly-named subdirectory within the user's AppData folder. This process creation is a precursor to the malware's environment checks, anti-VM/sandbox gating, and CAPTCHA verification routines.
Detects a non-privileged user creating a new DLL file within the C:\ProgramData\CrossDevice\ directory on a system that has specific COM registration keys (CLSID {135fd325-45b7-4c30-89f8-4386961669f0} or {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}) pointing to potentially missing or hijacked InprocServer32 paths. This is a common technique used for COM Hijacking or Persistence via phantom DLL loading.
Detects instances where dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) running under high-integrity accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) loads an unsigned DLL file located in the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious library injection to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or attacker-controlled DLL into a SYSTEM-context dllhost.exe process, consistent with the exploitation of dangling COM CrossDevice CLSIDs (e.g., forcing ICreateObject::Proc3 to LoadLibrary from a C:\ProgramData location).
Detects instances where dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) running under high-integrity accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) loads an unsigned DLL file located in the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious library injection to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that leverage specific tooling for scheduled task enumeration, commonly used for discovery or persistence management. The rule flags usage of 'Get-AccessibleScheduledTask' in conjunction with flags associated with tools like NtObjectManager or OleViewDotNet.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell activity involving the enumeration and manipulation of COM objects and .NET assemblies, patterns often associated with reconnaissance or post-exploitation activities. It flags instances where PowerShell scripts utilize specific command-line arguments (e.g., Get-ComDatabase, Get-ComClass, Import-Win32Module, NtObjectManager) in conjunction, suggesting automated discovery of COM infrastructure or assembly loading.
Detects non-browser processes accessing sensitive browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data, Cookies) and cryptocurrency wallet files within a short time window. This pattern is characteristic of infostealer malware like Vidar, which grabs browser and wallet data for exfiltration.
Detects web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera, IE) being spawned by a parent process that is not part of the standard, trusted application launch lineage. This pattern is commonly observed in credential-stealing malware like Vidar Stealer, which invokes browsers to access and exfiltrate stored browser data.
Detects the use of OleViewDotNet or NtObjectManager PowerShell tools to enumerate running COM host processes (e.g., dllhost.exe) and check for the absence of specific security mitigations like EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL or COMGLB_UNMARSHALING_POLICY_STRONG. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance activity aimed at identifying targets for fake-marshaled CoGetInstanceFromIStorage exploit chains.
Detects the custom ARX-based stream cipher used by Vidar Stealer (v2.2+) to encrypt strings and configuration data. The rule identifies the presence of specific FNV-1a and golden-ratio constants used for state initialization, in combination with unique, per-build keystream constants observed in recent variants.
Detects the presence of known Vidar Stealer malware binaries (internal build versions 2.0 through 3.4) by matching their SHA256 file hashes. Vidar is an infostealer malware typically used to exfiltrate sensitive data from victim systems.
Detects the presence of a specific Russian-language error string ("Не удалось сгенерировать HWID") within binary files, which is characteristic of the HWID generation mechanism used by Vidar Stealer malware.
Hunts network, HTTP, and email-URL telemetry for known ARToken infrastructure (operator backend IPs and phishing/panel domains). Bounded to a 30-day lookback and tiers matches by confidence: domain hits are high-confidence (attacker-registered infrastructure), while IP hits are medium-confidence since the IPs sit on shared DigitalOcean hosting that can be reassigned to unrelated tenants once ARToken's infrastructure is taken down. Empty/unparsed indicator fields are excluded to avoid spurious matches in the HTTP event parsing branch. No known file hashes are associated with this intel.
Detects in-memory modification of the AmsiScanBuffer function within PowerShell processes, specifically targeting the injection of patch instructions (e.g., MOV EAX, 80070057; RET). This technique is characteristic of .NET loaders like PIVOTPIPE attempting to bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) inspection before executing malicious payloads.
Detects the presence of PIVOTPIPE .NET loader components within files by searching for specific magic bytes, debug strings, hardcoded developer file paths, and agent-related operational strings.
Detects the GHAPPIER four-stage loader execution chain initiated during npm postinstall processes. This rule monitors for malicious child process spawning (cmd, powershell, curl, wget) by node or npm, as well as the presence of specific markers like the '.git-checker' string or URLs associated with the PolinRider/FAMOUS CHOLLIMA npm supply chain campaign.
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