Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,052 detections
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Detects the DOGLEASH backdoor utilizing /bin/sh -c to execute arbitrary shell commands. The detection specifically looks for the execution of the Unix shell with -c arguments triggered by parent process command lines containing specific C2 command codes (0x2268 or 0x2267).
Detects rapid succession of power-off, suspend, or destroy operations on virtual machines via esxcli or vim-cmd following an SSH login, a behavior pattern often associated with ESXi ransomware activity (e.g., Qilin).
This rule detects potential mass emailing or spam activity by identifying instances where a single email account sends more than 100 emails within a one-minute window. This behavior is often characteristic of compromised accounts performing phishing campaigns or bulk unauthorized communication.
Detects instances where the Claude Code AI agent process spawns shell interpreters (bash, sh) or network utilities (curl, wget, dig, nslookup) with potentially malicious command line arguments. This behavior can be indicative of indirect prompt injection or unauthorized remote code execution attempts, such as reverse shells, base64 encoded payloads, or DNS-based exfiltration.
Detects the LEASHTEST MIPS-compiled test binary linked to UAT-7810 ORB network R&D activity; presence indicates device compromise
Detects TeamPCP-associated behavior in CI/CD environments, specifically the encryption and staging of sensitive secrets using tools like OpenSSL, tar, and curl. The rule monitors for the execution of at least three distinct tools from a specified list within a short time window that interact with files in a /tmp/tmp. staging directory, indicative of preparation for data exfiltration.
Detects attempts to perform container escapes or escalate privileges within a Gitea Actions runner environment. The rule monitors for the execution of dangerous container options (e.g., --pid=host, --privileged, --cap-add=ALL) in CI/CD workflow configurations, the spawning of 'nsenter' by the runner process, and writes to sensitive host system paths from containerized processes.
This rule detects the exploitation of CVE-2026-48558, a critical OIDC authentication bypass vulnerability in SimpleHelp. The detection logic correlates log events for 'Registering technician login' involving 'New Anon' sessions with subsequent configuration save requests occurring within 30 seconds. This pattern signifies the unauthorized creation of a privileged technician account by an unauthenticated attacker, bypassing standard identity verification.
This rule detects potential SSH brute force attacks by monitoring syslog for multiple failed SSH login attempts, connection closures, or invalid user attempts from a single source IP address within a short time frame. It specifically looks for keywords like 'error', 'Connection closed', 'authentication failure', and 'invalid user' in SSHD logs.
Detects signs of a supply chain attack, specifically referencing the IronWorm/Shai-Hulud pattern, involving the backdating of git commits, manipulation of git environment variables (GIT_COMMITTER_DATE/GIT_AUTHOR_DATE) to mask malicious activity history, and the use of 'touch' commands to modify file timestamps on project-related binaries and configuration files.
Detects AI agent processes (e.g., claude, node) executing environment enumeration commands (env, printenv) following suspected prompt injection, combined with subsequent network traffic associated with credential exfiltration patterns.
Detects evidence of exploitation attempts related to the hypothetical CVE-2026-55200 vulnerability. The rule monitors for known exploit file names, command-line arguments, and specific network patterns targeting SSH ports (22, 2222) that indicate potential LibSSH2 exploitation.
Detects indicators of the DirtyClone (CVE-2026-43503) Linux kernel local privilege escalation exploit. The rule identifies the execution or compilation of the PoC binary, the specific su invocation used for shell spawning by the exploit, and subsequent post-exploitation actions including modifying sensitive files (/etc/passwd, /etc/sudoers) and creating new local accounts with sudo privileges.
Detects suspicious command-line patterns on Linux systems commonly associated with post-exploitation activity, including the establishment of reverse shells, encoded payload delivery via DNS, and manual modifications to crontab or SSH authorized_keys for persistence.
Detects artifacts, execution patterns, and post-exploitation behaviors associated with the exploitation of the libssh2 heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability (CVE-2026-55200). The rule monitors for the presence of known proof-of-concept files, malicious SSH server orchestration via Python, outbound network traffic to the PoC's default non-standard port (2222) from SSH-capable applications, and post-exploitation shell or calculator spawns.
This rule detects potential SSH brute force attacks by identifying multiple failed password attempts from a single source IP address to a specific computer within a 5-minute window. It specifically looks for 'Failed password' messages in syslog entries from the 'sshd' process.
Detects the execution of the GS-Netcat network utility with flags characteristic of reverse shells (e.g., -e, -i, -S, -D) in conjunction with the creation of a systemd service unit file on the same host, which is a technique used by the Velvet Ant threat actor for persistence.
Detects an attacker-controlled SOCKS5 proxy masquerading as the Samba daemon (smbd) by renaming the process to 'smbd' and executing it with the '-D' flag from non-standard filesystem locations such as /tmp, /home, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm. This behavior is associated with the Velvet Ant threat group, which uses this technique to maintain persistent command-and-control communication while evading detection by blending in with legitimate system processes.
Detects suspicious file creation activities by system authentication processes (e.g., sshd, su, sudo, PAM) in known staging directories (/tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm) or SSH configuration paths. The rule looks for hidden files or files with specific extensions (.log, .dat, .bak) often associated with malicious backdoored components used to intercept and store credentials in plaintext.
Detects indicators of persistence on Linux systems, specifically targeting unauthorized cron job creation/deletion in /etc/cron.d/, execution of suspicious shell scripts (ssync.sh), modification of startup scripts (e.g., /etc/rc.d/cron), and execution of binaries from world-writable directories by cron or system daemons. This rule is designed to identify the footprint of known Linux-based persistence mechanisms associated with service account exploitation.
This rule detects the installation, service configuration, and key management activities associated with the OpenSSH server on both Windows and Linux environments. It monitors for commands related to installing OpenSSH capabilities or packages, starting the sshd service, modifying SSH registry keys on Windows, creating or modifying configuration files (sshd_config), and updating authorized_keys files. It also flags inbound network connections to non-standard or default SSH ports originating from external IP ranges.
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