Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects impossible travel sign-in events where a user authenticates from geographically distant locations within a short time window. The rule specifically flags the second, suspicious event as having occurred via a non-interactive session or single-factor authentication, suggesting the use of a replayed or stale session token to bypass MFA.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft 365/Exchange inbox rules that suggest malicious staging or exfiltration activities. This includes rules configured for external email auto-forwarding, automatic deletion of messages, or movement of emails into hidden/system folders (e.g., RSS Subscriptions, Archive) which may be filtered based on sensitive keywords related to financial or credential theft (e.g., invoice, wire, payment).
Detects mailbox permission changes (FullAccess, SendAs) or abnormally high volume of mailbox item access events occurring shortly after a risky, non-interactive, or unusual location sign-in. This pattern indicates a potential follow-on activity from a successful session hijacking or token theft attack.
Detects mailbox permission changes (FullAccess, SendAs) or abnormally high volume of mailbox item access events occurring shortly after a risky, non-interactive, or unusual location sign-in. This pattern indicates a potential follow-on activity from a successful session hijacking or token theft attack.
Detects a user account adding a new client secret or certificate to an Azure AD application/service principal, followed by a sign-in event from that same service principal originating from an IP address not observed in the prior 14 days. This behavior is indicative of potential persistent access creation by an adversary using newly generated credentials.
This rule detects Entra ID Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role activations that occur with missing or generic justification, correlated with a sign-in session that has been flagged as risky (high/medium risk) or non-interactive. This combination suggests a potential session hijacking scenario where an adversary is attempting to elevate privileges using a compromised, legitimate user session.
This rule correlates a risky or compromised sign-in event in Entra ID (Azure AD) with a subsequent OAuth consent grant by the same user within 60 minutes. It specifically looks for grants that request sensitive permissions such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All, or offline_access, which are commonly associated with consent phishing and persistence tactics.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox or transport rules that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as external forwarding, movement to hidden or system folders, automatic deletion/marking as read, or rules containing keywords related to financial fraud. The rule specifically monitors for activities occurring via non-standard or automated clients to increase detection fidelity.
Detects when a user account assigned to a highly privileged directory or cloud role performs the assignment shortly after exhibiting signs of compromise, such as risky sign-ins, anomalous locations, or suspected session token reuse.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) PIM or Just-In-Time role activations that occur without a proper approval workflow, are self-approved, or coincide with identified risky sign-in signals.
Detects instances where a user account that has been flagged as risky (e.g., unfamiliar features, impossible travel, or malicious IP activity) performs a modification or registration of multi-factor authentication (MFA) security information within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls after a credential compromise.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a single session identifier is used to access three or more distinct SaaS applications within a one-hour window. This behavior often indicates the unauthorized use of a stolen session cookie or OAuth token (Pass-the-Cookie) across multiple SSO-integrated platforms.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox or transport rules that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as external forwarding, movement to hidden or system folders, automatic deletion/marking as read, or rules containing keywords related to financial fraud. The rule specifically monitors for activities occurring via non-standard or automated clients to increase detection fidelity.
Detects when a user account assigned to a highly privileged directory or cloud role performs the assignment shortly after exhibiting signs of compromise, such as risky sign-ins, anomalous locations, or suspected session token reuse.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) PIM or Just-In-Time role activations that occur without a proper approval workflow, are self-approved, or coincide with identified risky sign-in signals.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating suspicious authentication activity (such as risky sign-ins, impossible travel, or malicious OAuth/Mail-rule configurations) with a subsequent spike in SharePoint or OneDrive file access, downloads, or external link sharing within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary performing cloud-based data exfiltration after gaining unauthorized access to an account.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange inbox rules that involve suspicious actions, such as forwarding or redirecting emails to external domains, deleting messages, or marking messages as read. These actions are common indicators of persistent access or data exfiltration attempts following a mailbox compromise.
Detects mailbox configuration changes in Exchange Online where email forwarding (ForwardingSmtpAddress, ForwardingAddress, or DeliverToMailboxAndForward) is enabled to an external, non-tenant domain. This technique is commonly used for persistence and data exfiltration following account compromise, allowing attackers to redirect incoming communications to an external mailbox even after the original account credentials have been reset.
Detects high-volume file download activity in Office 365/SharePoint/OneDrive audit logs. The rule correlates download spikes with users who have recently triggered security alerts related to session hijacking, token theft, or risky sign-ins, which are indicators of a potential cloud account takeover scenario.
Detects anomalous OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant sign-in activity within Microsoft 365. The rule identifies suspicious token redemption behavior where the initial device code request and the subsequent token redemption occur from disparate IP addresses or utilize different user-agent strings, which is indicative of EvilTokens or similar adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) device-code phishing frameworks.
Detects high-privilege OAuth application consent grants (such as Mail.Read or Files.ReadWrite.All) occurring within four hours of a risky or anomalous user sign-in. This sequence indicates a potential compromise where an attacker uses a compromised account to authorize a malicious OAuth application for persistent access and data exfiltration.
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