Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for the execution and network activity of known data exfiltration tools such as WinSCP, rclone, and MegaSync. It also tracks the creation of configuration files associated with these tools and monitors DNS requests and browser navigation to known cloud storage and file-sharing destinations. This behavior is indicative of data staging and unauthorized exfiltration.
Detects indicators of Akira ransomware activity, including execution of the binary, dropping of ransom notes, renaming of files with .akira extension, and the use of vssadmin to delete volume shadow copies.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events: the enablement of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) via registry modification, followed by the creation of a new local administrator account with password expiration disabled, potentially accompanied by a netsh firewall rule modification to allow RDP. This combination of actions is highly indicative of an adversary establishing persistent remote access and creating a backdoor account.
Detects the creation, deletion, or starting of a Windows service named 'MixedSvc' via sc.exe. This activity is associated with the 'Operation DragonReturn' campaign, where adversaries leverage a service masquerading as legitimate Windows Media Player components to maintain persistence.
Detects a suspicious sequence where a non-Microsoft signed process running from a user-writable path (e.g., Temp, AppData) spawns a high-integrity or SYSTEM process, followed immediately by persistence activity (modifying Run keys) or the creation of suspicious services/modification of security preferences.
Detects the use of the Windows Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to create, start, or delete a service named 'MixedSvc'. The rule includes specific checks for binPath configurations, which can be indicative of persistence or privilege escalation attempts using services.
Detects potential local privilege escalation (LPE) attempts targeting the AnyDesk adprinterpipe named pipe. The rule monitors for the execution of known malicious indicators, unauthorized access to the adprinterpipe, AnyDesk spawning unexpected processes as SYSTEM, and the creation of services by AnyDesk child processes.
Detects a post-compromise reconnaissance burst associated with BeepRAT, where a process running from a suspicious directory (AppData, Temp, or ProgramData) executes five or more system discovery commands within a 60-second window, following the creation of a scheduled task on the same host.
Detects the BeepRAT malware using the Tiny C Compiler (tcc.exe) to execute shellcode directly from memory. The rule identifies TCC execution from non-standard directories (specifically within %LOCALAPPDATA%\TCC) using specific flags (-nostdlib -run), and correlates this activity with the creation of an elevated scheduled task named 'WindowsUpdateTempFileCleanUp' used for persistence.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using wevtutil or PowerShell, and the suspicious deletion of files in sensitive directories (AppData, ProgramData, Temp, Users) using the command prompt. These behaviors are commonly associated with anti-forensics and data destruction activities used by adversaries to hide their tracks during an intrusion.
Detects usage of the Windows Event Utility (wevtutil.exe) with the 'cl' command-line flag, which is commonly used to clear specific Windows Event logs such as Security, System, Application, or Setup. This behavior is frequently associated with attackers attempting to remove forensic artifacts and log entries after unauthorized activity.
Detects the clearing of Windows event logs using the native 'wevtutil.exe' utility. This behavior is a common indicator of anti-forensics activity where attackers attempt to remove evidence of their presence or actions on a compromised host.
Detects attempts to stop or modify critical Windows security services (Windows Defender, Security Center, Security Health Service) using the Service Control utility (sc.exe). This activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defenses.
Detects evidence of common Impacket tool execution (e.g., psexec, wmiexec, smbexec, ntlmrelayx), unauthorized access to sensitive SMB administrative shares (ADMIN$, IPC$), creation of suspicious services often used for remote execution, and lateral movement via NTLM network logons.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using either the built-in 'wevtutil.exe' utility or the PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' cmdlet. Attackers often clear these logs to remove evidence of intrusion activities, such as persistence mechanisms, account creation, or privilege escalation.
Detects the execution of known Turla STOCKSTAY/STOCKTRADER backdoor components (ConverterDDSNet.exe or SMEditor.exe) which are used to perform unauthorized screen capture and data exfiltration from the victim's host.
Detects the execution of the VNT tunneling tool disguised as a legitimate VMware executable (vmwared.exe) located in C:\ProgramData\VMware\. The rule also identifies the creation of a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdate' configured to execute the masqueraded binary at user logon with elevated privileges.
Detects the installation of RustDesk as a Windows service, identified via System event log ID 7045. Adversaries may abuse this remote access tool to maintain persistent, unauthorized remote access to compromised systems, as observed in ransomware intrusions.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the native 'wevtutil.exe' utility with the 'cl' command, the PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' cmdlet, or by identifying specific system events (EventID 1102 and 104) that signify the security or system logs have been cleared.
Detects the KuinaExtractor UAC bypass technique, which exploits the auto-elevated 'SilentCleanup' scheduled task. The rule identifies suspicious activity via two patterns: the execution of 'cleanmgr.exe' from an unexpected parent process (bypassing normal task scheduler invocation) or the explicit execution of 'schtasks.exe' to trigger the 'SilentCleanup' task.
Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic
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