Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the sharedLoad.min.js obfuscated first-stage loader dropped by the malicious npm indexed-btree package, triggered via BTree.prototype.set to evade static/taint-analysis scanners
Detects the sharedLoad.min.js obfuscated first-stage loader dropped by the malicious npm indexed-btree package, triggered via BTree.prototype.set to evade static/taint-analysis scanners
Detects the indexed-btree npm malware loader embedded in BTree.prototype.set that spawns a detached hidden Node.js child process and references sharedLoad.min.js
Detects the execution of npm commands to install specific, potentially malicious or typo-squatted npm packages. The rule filters for common npm install command line arguments and matches against a predefined list of package names that are often associated with supply chain compromise attempts.
Detects the execution of npm commands to install specific, potentially malicious or typo-squatted npm packages. The rule filters for common npm install command line arguments and matches against a predefined list of package names that are often associated with supply chain compromise attempts.
This rule detects potentially malicious child processes spawned by Node.js. It specifically monitors for scenarios where a Node.js process executes a detached child process using standard library options ('detached', 'stdio', 'windowsHide', 'ignore'), which is a common technique used by malware to run background tasks while remaining hidden from the parent process terminal. The rule excludes common benign development, build, and process management tools to reduce false positives.
This rule detects potentially malicious child processes spawned by Node.js. It specifically monitors for scenarios where a Node.js process executes a detached child process using standard library options ('detached', 'stdio', 'windowsHide', 'ignore'), which is a common technique used by malware to run background tasks while remaining hidden from the parent process terminal. The rule excludes common benign development, build, and process management tools to reduce false positives.
This rule detects potentially malicious child processes spawned by Node.js. It specifically monitors for scenarios where a Node.js process executes a detached child process using standard library options ('detached', 'stdio', 'windowsHide', 'ignore'), which is a common technique used by malware to run background tasks while remaining hidden from the parent process terminal. The rule excludes common benign development, build, and process management tools to reduce false positives.
This rule detects instances where a Node.js process spawns a child Node.js process from a 'node_modules' directory using configuration flags typically associated with hidden, detached background tasks (e.g., 'detached', 'stdio', 'windowsHide', 'ignore'). It explicitly excludes common Node.js process managers and build tools to reduce false positives associated with legitimate development activities.
Detects the PUROSANGUE malware loader, which achieves execution by being sideloaded as 'vsdbg.dll' alongside a legitimate debugger executable. The detection leverages YARA rules focusing on specific artifacts such as a hardcoded build path, a custom Base16 alphabet, and a structural anomaly in the PE file's .reloc section compared to the declared base relocation directory size, alongside known malicious hash values.
Detects the modification of Windows Registry Run keys that point to suspicious executable paths or known naming patterns associated with specific services (SMQDService and winappx) often utilized for persistence.
Detects the creation or modification of registry entries within the 'HKCU\...\Run' hive that point to executables located in suspicious or atypical directories such as 'ProgramData', 'Users\All Users', or specific non-standard application paths often used by malware for persistence.
Detects the execution of binaries masquerading as legitimate software (such as KeePass, Adobe Flash, or specialized medical document viewers) from user-writable and non-standard execution paths (e.g., Downloads, Temp). This behavior is characteristic of the CHOSEN BRICK malware's lure-execution stage, where users are socially engineered into running a decoy installer.
Detects instances where critical system processes (such as svchost.exe, lsass.exe, or w3wp.exe) spawn known command-line interpreters or script execution utilities (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, certutil.exe) which then initiate outbound network connections to common ports (445, 3389, 135, 5985, 5986, 1433, 80, 443) that are external to the local network. This behavior is often associated with lateral movement, command and control (C2) communication, or reconnaissance.
Detects the use of built-in Windows utilities and commands to disable system recovery features, delete volume shadow copies, clear backup catalogs, or perform mass file deletion. This behavior is highly indicative of wiper malware preparing for a destructive attack by preventing system recovery.
Detects anomalous patterns associated with potential WordPress comment moderation bypass. The rule identifies suspicious rapid sequences of comment submissions, use of unapproved comment preview endpoints with moderation hashes, or reuse of approved-commenter cookies. These behaviors can be indicative of an attacker attempting to preview or force-render stored XSS payloads to administrators or visitors before the comment has been officially approved.
Detects anomalous patterns associated with potential WordPress comment moderation bypass. The rule identifies suspicious rapid sequences of comment submissions, use of unapproved comment preview endpoints with moderation hashes, or reuse of approved-commenter cookies. These behaviors can be indicative of an attacker attempting to preview or force-render stored XSS payloads to administrators or visitors before the comment has been officially approved.
Detects anomalous patterns associated with potential WordPress comment moderation bypass. The rule identifies suspicious rapid sequences of comment submissions, use of unapproved comment preview endpoints with moderation hashes, or reuse of approved-commenter cookies. These behaviors can be indicative of an attacker attempting to preview or force-render stored XSS payloads to administrators or visitors before the comment has been officially approved.
Detects anomalous patterns associated with potential WordPress comment moderation bypass. The rule identifies suspicious rapid sequences of comment submissions, use of unapproved comment preview endpoints with moderation hashes, or reuse of approved-commenter cookies. These behaviors can be indicative of an attacker attempting to preview or force-render stored XSS payloads to administrators or visitors before the comment has been officially approved.
Detects potential zero-click administrator session hijacking by correlating a logged-in administrator accessing a page containing user-generated content (e.g., comments) followed immediately by a sensitive administrative action (e.g., plugin installation, user creation) within a 5-second window, suggesting automated script execution via an autofocus/onfocus handler triggered by the admin's browser.
This rule detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run keys, which are a common technique used for achieving persistence. The rule specifically monitors for known suspicious or potentially malicious file names (e.g., RuntimeSSH.exe, MicDriver.exe, winappx.exe, MsCache.exe, smqdservice.exe) being added to Run locations, which triggers automatic execution upon user logon.
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