Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line flags often associated with malicious scripts (e.g., hidden windows, no profile, bypassed execution policies) when the script is located in the Windows Temporary directory.
Detects instances of the Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe) loading graphics-related libraries such as System.Drawing.dll or gdiplus.dll. These modules are typically not required by charmap.exe and their loading is a common indicator of process injection for the purpose of capturing the screen or desktop interface.
Detects instances where PowerShell.exe spawns the .NET C# compiler (csc.exe) with command-line arguments referencing a '.cmdline' file. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to compile malicious code in-memory, bypassing traditional disk-based file scanning.
Detects the execution of known development, scripting, and administrative tools (e.g., Python, Node.js, GCC, Docker) from non-standard or unauthorized file paths. The rule leverages allowlists for process names, publishers, and trusted installation directories to identify potentially unauthorized usage of powerful tooling often abused by attackers for post-exploitation activities.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive Mozilla Firefox profile files such as cookies.sqlite, places.sqlite, and permissions.sqlite. These files contain sensitive information including cookies, history, and permission settings. Access by processes other than the legitimate Firefox executable may indicate credential theft, data exfiltration, or reconnaissance activities.
Detects suspicious processes (named UpdateAssistant.exe, AppUpdateHelper.exe, or SysMaintenance.exe) executing from specific file system paths and initiating network connections to known suspicious IP addresses (5.230.249.49, 40.124.169.27) on non-standard ports (27015, 27017). The rule correlates process execution from specific suspicious directories with network activity to identify potential command-and-control communication.
Detects the execution of suspected Hidden VNC (HVNC) backdoor components that demonstrate behaviors consistent with banking credential theft, specifically targeting keystroke logging APIs. The rule monitors for specific process names executing from suspicious directories often used for persistence.
Detects execution of mass file-deletion or system wipe commands triggered by processes running from known persistence or staging locations associated with the CHOSEN BRICK campaign. The rule monitors for the combination of suspicious process paths (such as disguised winappx.exe or SysWOW64-lookalike directories) and destructive command-line arguments like 'del', 'cipher', 'format', or 'vssadmin' operations.
Detects malicious processes associated with the HVNC backdoor (e.g., UpdateAssistant.exe, SysMaintenance.exe) concurrently running alongside identified security product processes on the same device. This behavior suggests the malware is performing automated reconnaissance of installed security software to inform further compromise actions.
Detects the execution of known HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) backdoor binaries identified by specific file names and staging directory paths. These binaries are designed to create hidden desktop sessions and perform input injection to facilitate unauthorized remote control of a compromised host.
This rule monitors network traffic, DNS queries, and user web clicks to detect interactions with known malicious domains associated with credential harvesting and phishing campaigns, specifically those impersonating security or SSO portals.
Detects the mounting of Virtual Hard Disk (VHD) files using system processes such as explorer.exe or vds.exe. This activity is a known technique for bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security protections, as files within the mounted container may not inherit the MOTW attribute. This behavior was observed in Operation QUICSILVER, where actors used VHD files disguised with benign extensions to deliver malicious LNK payloads to targets.
Detects network beaconing activity associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan. The rule monitors for specific C2 communication patterns, including the 'client;' string and the 'VVx-4.3' version marker, which are characteristic of this malware's host reconnaissance and command-and-control exfiltration phase.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where an executable with an MD5-formatted name is created in the user's temporary folder, followed by the creation of a registry key with a matching MD5-formatted name in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\ within 15 minutes. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism where malware drops a payload in a temp directory and sets a run or autorun registry key to ensure its execution upon logon or startup.
This rule detects the execution of common command-line utilities (cmd.exe, mshta.exe, AutoIt3.exe) using command-line arguments that mimic legitimate service names or security analysis tools (e.g., 'Microsoft Update Superfetch Core Endpoint Service'). This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to mask malicious activity by using strings that resemble benign system services or localized security scanner output, likely for obfuscation or evasion.
Detects execution of common administrative and potentially malicious processes originating from the Microsoft Exchange Server worker process (w3wp.exe). This pattern is indicative of a web shell or post-exploitation activity where an attacker has achieved code execution on an Exchange server.
Detects a variant of the ClickFix technique where an attacker directs a user to open an administrative PowerShell or Command Prompt instance via the Windows+X power user menu through Windows Terminal. This execution chain, involving WindowsTerminal.exe, OpenConsole.exe, and a shell binary, bypasses traditional RunMRU registry artifacts often associated with the standard Windows Run dialog.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of stealth or obfuscation, such as hidden windows or encoded commands. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious script execution lures, such as JavaScript-based droppers or ClickFix-style campaigns that use PowerShell to stage and execute in-memory payloads.
Detects instances where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe with command-line arguments indicative of stealth or obfuscation, such as hidden windows or encoded commands. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious script execution lures, such as JavaScript-based droppers or ClickFix-style campaigns that use PowerShell to stage and execute in-memory payloads.
Detects the presence of PureLogs Stealer, a .NET-based information stealer, by identifying specific family name strings embedded within PE files that conform to the .NET assembly structure. This rule targets the static analysis of malicious binaries often used in credential harvesting campaigns.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to evade detection through programmatic runtime creation using Runspaces (RunspaceFactory, CreatePipeline, AddScript) combined with cryptographic operations or dynamic string substitution techniques. This behavior is often associated with obfuscated malware payloads attempting to execute code in memory.
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