Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the configuration of cross-tenant access trust policies or cross-tenant synchronization settings within an Azure tenant, specifically where inbound trust for MFA or device compliance/hybrid-join claims is explicitly enabled. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement by leveraging trusted relationships between partner organizations.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity for Azure Service Principals by comparing the current source IP/ASN and country against a 30-day historical baseline. This alert identifies potentially compromised service principals, where attackers exfiltrate secrets or certificates and attempt to authenticate from their own infrastructure.
This rule detects modifications to domain federation settings in Azure Active Directory (Microsoft Entra ID), specifically when a domain is set to federated or when critical federation URLs (IssuerUri, ActiveLogOnUri, MetadataExchangeUri) are changed. Such modifications can indicate an attempt to establish malicious domain federation, allowing an adversary to authenticate as any user within the tenant.
This rule detects modifications to domain federation settings in Azure Active Directory (Microsoft Entra ID), specifically when a domain is set to federated or when critical federation URLs (IssuerUri, ActiveLogOnUri, MetadataExchangeUri) are changed. Such modifications can indicate an attempt to establish malicious domain federation, allowing an adversary to authenticate as any user within the tenant.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) Conditional Access Policies. This includes deleting a policy, disabling an enabled policy, narrowing the scope of users or groups targeted by a policy, or removing MFA requirements from existing policies.
Detects instances where a user grants consent to an Azure AD application with highly sensitive permissions (such as ReadWrite access to Directory, Roles, or Applications). This pattern is commonly used in OAuth consent phishing attacks to maintain persistence or escalate privileges by authorizing a malicious application to act on behalf of the user or the entire directory.
This rule detects modifications to multi-factor authentication (MFA) settings performed by privileged users (e.g., Global Admins) from IP addresses not previously associated with their account. The rule tracks actions such as registering new security information, changing default MFA methods, or deleting authentication methods. High-risk indicators like an unknown IP address for a privileged account are flagged for further investigation.
This rule detects modifications to multi-factor authentication (MFA) settings performed by privileged users (e.g., Global Admins) from IP addresses not previously associated with their account. The rule tracks actions such as registering new security information, changing default MFA methods, or deleting authentication methods. High-risk indicators like an unknown IP address for a privileged account are flagged for further investigation.
Detects impossible travel activity for Azure AD accounts by calculating the speed between consecutive sign-in events using the Haversine formula. The rule correlates sign-ins sharing the same SessionId or DeviceId and identifies instances where the calculated travel speed exceeds 900 km/h over a distance greater than 300 km. It includes filtering to exclude known corporate VPN egress points to reduce noise.
Detects impossible travel activity for Azure AD accounts by calculating the speed between consecutive sign-in events using the Haversine formula. The rule correlates sign-ins sharing the same SessionId or DeviceId and identifies instances where the calculated travel speed exceeds 900 km/h over a distance greater than 300 km. It includes filtering to exclude known corporate VPN egress points to reduce noise.
This rule monitors Azure AD and Office 365 non-interactive sign-in logs to identify anomalous spikes in activity from previously unseen applications or devices. It uses a 30-day baseline to determine if a sign-in pair (User/App/Device) is known. It further flags sign-ins from unrecognized locations (ASN/Country), flagging them with higher severity. This behavior is often indicative of automated credential abuse or token exploitation.
Detects OAuth application consent events in Azure Active Directory where the application is from an unverified publisher, requests high-risk scopes (specifically offline_access plus at least two others like Mail, Files, Contacts, or Directory), and potentially indicates a mass-campaign if multiple users consent to the same application.
Detects the reactivation of a Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) service principal that has been inactive for 90 or more days, specifically flagging those that perform privileged Graph API operations after their return. This rule helps identify potentially compromised or stale service principals being leveraged by adversaries for persistent access.
This rule monitors Office 365 management logs for device registration or join events in Azure Active Directory where the resulting device state is flagged as both non-compliant and unmanaged, despite having a 'Workplace' or 'AzureAd' trust type. It further aggregates these events by user to identify potential suspicious patterns, such as bulk registrations or rapid activity within a 30-minute window, which may indicate account compromise or unauthorized device enrollment.
Detects the reactivation of a Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) service principal that has been inactive for 90 or more days, specifically flagging those that perform privileged Graph API operations after their return. This rule helps identify potentially compromised or stale service principals being leveraged by adversaries for persistent access.
Detects modifications to Microsoft 365 tenant configurations that weaken security posture, specifically the disabling of Security Defaults or the re-enabling of legacy/basic authentication methods (e.g., POP, IMAP, ActiveSync).
Detects modifications to an Azure Active Directory application where a new Redirect URI is added, particularly when the URI points to localhost, a raw IP address, or a non-corporate domain. The rule additionally correlates this change with recent OAuth grant activities to identify potential adversary attempts to hijack tokens or maintain persistent access via malicious application configurations.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application consent to high-risk scopes (such as mail reading, file access, or directory reading) without administrator oversight. This behavior is a common indicator of OAuth abuse where an attacker lures a user into granting excessive permissions to a malicious application, providing the attacker persistent access to the user's data.
Detects the addition of new credentials (secrets or certificates) to an existing service principal or application within a cloud environment. This behavior is often associated with persistence or privilege escalation tactics in cloud identity platforms. The rule flags activity from potentially non-automated accounts and can correlate with recent administrative role assignments.
Detects when a new owner is added to an Azure/Entra ID enterprise application or service principal. This activity is a common persistence technique used by adversaries to gain long-term, high-privilege access, such as modifying application credentials or API permissions, without requiring directory administrator roles.
Detects OAuth application consent grants where the application requests both 'offline_access' (enabling refresh tokens for long-term access) and sensitive mailbox permission scopes (such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, or IMAP.AccessAsUser.All). This combination is indicative of consent phishing attacks designed to establish persistent, silent access to user email accounts, bypassing password resets and multi-factor authentication.
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