Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
896 detections
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Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by performing in-memory patching of the AmsiScanBuffer function within amsi.dll. The rule identifies suspicious memory manipulation operations (VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory) performed by script hosts (PowerShell, WScript, CScript) involving PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE permissions or specific memory modification patterns (0xB8 opcode patching) indicative of disabling security scanning capabilities.
This rule detects common security product executables (MsMpEng.exe, SenseNdr.exe, csfalconservice.exe, CylanceSvc.exe) that are running from file paths inconsistent with their legitimate installation directories. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade as trusted security software to evade detection or achieve persistence.
Detects potential Reynolds ransomware activity by identifying processes that enumerate a significant number of security software processes (EDR/AV) using `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot` or similar process creation events. This behavior is often a precursor to security software termination or evasion.
This rule detects various activities associated with the SilverFox loader chain, including Defender exclusion modifications, suspicious child processes spawned from trojanized OEM binaries, VirtuOne DLL loading, scheduled task creation with specific names or unusual principals, creation of 'checktime.vbs' in public user directories, and masquerading of 'svchost.exe' in the Windows directory.
This rule detects common security product executables (MsMpEng.exe, SenseNdr.exe, csfalconservice.exe, CylanceSvc.exe) that are running from file paths inconsistent with their legitimate installation directories. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade as trusted security software to evade detection or achieve persistence.
Detects the addition of broad exclusion paths to Microsoft Defender, specifically targeting drive roots, administrative shares, or common working directories. This activity is often associated with ransomware, such as the 'Gentlemen Ransomware', to evade detection.
Detects when Windows Defender's real-time monitoring or anti-spyware features are disabled via registry modification. This can indicate an attempt by an adversary to impair defenses and evade detection.
This rule detects attempts to modify Windows Defender preferences to exclude the 'Hola' application directory or a related miner process. It specifically looks for command-line executions of PowerShell, pwsh, or MpCmdRun.exe that include 'add-mppreference', 'exclusionpath', 'exclusionprocess', or '-addexclusion' in conjunction with 'hola'. This activity is often associated with malware attempting to disable security defenses.
Detects LCRYX ransomware behavior characterized by the disabling of Windows Defender real-time monitoring followed by an attempt to overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) on PhysicalDrive0 using PowerShell. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes spawned by wscript.exe or cscript.exe that reference disk drive objects or specific LCRYX image files, and correlates them with Defender tampering activities.
Detects a single parent process launching registry or PowerShell queries for both Defender PUA policy and Windows product edition within a ten-minute window. This behavior can indicate malware attempting to understand its environment and potentially evade detection or tailor its execution.
Detects suspicious execution of MpCmdRun.exe (Windows Defender command-line utility) when it is spawned by an unexpected parent process or executed with arguments commonly used to disable or modify Windows Defender's functionality. This rule aims to identify attempts to impair defenses.
Detects suspicious MpCmdRun.exe command line arguments or execution by unexpected parent processes.
Identifies the EDR killer utility actively tampering with the Windows Defender registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring) after kernel access is achieved. This rule specifically looks for modifications to the 'DisableAntiSpyware' or 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring' registry values under the Windows Defender policy key, setting them to '1' (enabled/disabled respectively), and correlates this with the loading of a '.sys' driver file by the same initiating process.
Detects attempts to forcefully stop or disable the Windows Defender service (WinDefend) using either 'sc.exe stop WinDefend' or 'powershell.exe Stop-Service WinDefend' commands. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defenses.
This rule detects command-line executions that query for Windows Defender PUA (Potentially Unwanted Application) policy settings and Windows product edition information. This activity is often performed by adversaries during the discovery phase to understand the environment and tailor subsequent actions. The rule specifically looks for `reg`, `powershell`, `pwsh`, or `wmic` commands containing keywords related to 'puaprotection', 'windows defender', 'productname', or 'editionid'.
This rule detects suspicious executable or DLL file creations in common temporary or user-writable directories shortly after a Microsoft Defender related process (MsMpEng, Nissrv, Werfault, Services) terminates unexpectedly. The rule focuses on the causality chain to link the Defender crash with the subsequent file placement, suggesting an attempt to bypass or disable security software before deploying malicious payloads.
This rule detects attempts to modify Windows Defender preferences to exclude the 'Hola' application directory or a related miner process. It specifically looks for command-line executions of PowerShell, pwsh, or MpCmdRun.exe that include 'add-mppreference', 'exclusionpath', 'exclusionprocess', or '-addexclusion' in conjunction with 'hola'. This activity is often associated with malware attempting to disable security defenses.
This rule detects attempts to create symbolic links, junctions, or reparse points that target Microsoft Defender directories such as quarantine, platform, or scan paths. Adversaries may use these techniques to interfere with security tools, evade detection, or manipulate how Defender processes files.
Identifies the threat actor executing PowerShell commands to add entire root directories (C:\) to Defender's exclusion list before dropping the ransomware payload.
Detects PowerShell commands using 'Add-MpPreference' to add exclusions for paths or processes in Windows Defender, which is a common technique for defense evasion by adversaries to prevent security software from scanning malicious files or activities.
Detects when Windows Defender's real-time monitoring or anti-spyware features are disabled via registry modification. This can indicate an attempt by an adversary to impair defenses and evade detection.
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