Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or starting of a Windows service on a remote host using the Service Control Manager (sc.exe) utility. This is a common method for lateral movement and remote execution of malicious payloads.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
Detects the execution of processes associated with remote command execution, specifically identifying the PsExec service (psexesvc.exe) or the invocation of command shell (cmd.exe) by the Service Control Manager (services.exe) with remote path arguments.
Detects the use of the Windows command-line utility 'wevtutil.exe' to clear Windows event logs. Attackers often clear logs to hide evidence of post-compromise activity.
Detects the execution of processes associated with remote command execution, specifically identifying the PsExec service (psexesvc.exe) or the invocation of command shell (cmd.exe) by the Service Control Manager (services.exe) with remote path arguments.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the native 'wevtutil.exe' utility or the PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' command. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove evidence of their actions from a compromised system.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the native 'wevtutil.exe' utility or the PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' command. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove evidence of their actions from a compromised system.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows services using sc.exe where the binary path (binpath) points to suspicious or user-writable directories such as User profiles, AppData, Temp, or Public folders, which are often used by adversaries for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the use of the sc.exe utility to create a new service on a remote system by specifying a path using a UNC share. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement, where an attacker attempts to execute code on a remote host by installing a service via SMB/Admin Shares.
Detects the execution of sc.exe with subcommands 'create' or 'start' where the command line includes a UNC path. This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to install or execute a service on a remote host to facilitate lateral movement.
Detects the modification or termination of critical Windows security services using the Service Control utility (sc.exe).
This rule detects attempts to tamper with Windows Defender services (WinDefend, SecurityHealthService, wscsvc) by stopping or disabling them. It covers actions performed via 'sc.exe' commands, 'Set-Service' PowerShell cmdlets, and direct modification of registry keys related to these services. The rule specifically filters out legitimate system and TrustedInstaller processes when detecting registry modifications to reduce false positives.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys associated with Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger configurations or Event Log service configurations. These modifications can be used by adversaries to disable or tamper with event logging mechanisms, effectively blinding security telemetry and evading detection.
Detects the creation, reading, or execution of payloads stored within NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS). This technique is commonly used by adversaries to hide malicious content within file metadata to evade security tools. The rule monitors process command-line arguments for ADS syntax, identifies usage of utilities like type, Get-Content, wmic, or various LOLBins (e.g., regsvr32, rundll32) interacting with ADS paths, and flags anomalous file creation/modification events that involve ADS, excluding known system-generated streams.
Detects modifications to the Windows Update registry keys that disable automatic updates. Attackers may perform this action to prevent the installation of security patches and maintain vulnerabilities on a compromised system.
Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "process" flag, which might indicate an attempt to perform reconnaissance on running processes.
Adversaries may use wmic to query for running processes and their details as part of their reconnaissance efforts.
Adversaries may use wmic to query for running processes and their details as part of their reconnaissance efforts.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the built-in 'wevtutil.exe' utility or PowerShell cmdlets 'Clear-EventLog'. Adversaries often perform this action to remove evidence of malicious activity from the host.
Detects the loading of 'SystemSettings.dll' by 'SystemSettings.exe' when the process is launched from an unusual path, specifically within the user's AppData directory. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL sideloading, where an attacker attempts to masquerade as or hijack the execution flow of a legitimate Windows utility by placing a malicious DLL in an untrusted, user-writable directory.
Detects the execution of a process named 'wusvc.exe' located outside of the standard C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Windows\SysWOW64 directories. Attackers often rename malicious binaries to look like legitimate system services (such as Windows Update service) to evade detection and maintain persistence.
Detects the loading of ntdll.dll or amsi.dll by the Windows Update Service (wusvc.exe). This pattern is often observed in the context of advanced techniques like SNOWLIGHT, which uses direct syscall table enumeration to bypass security controls. Monitoring for these modules in this specific process context can indicate memory-resident malicious activity or evasion attempts.
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