Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections to domains and IP addresses associated with known malicious TLS CA infrastructure (TLC DV TLS CA) identified by JA4X fingerprints. It monitors endpoint network telemetry for communication with identified command-and-control (C2) servers.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-3248 in Langflow by identifying suspicious inbound network traffic targeting the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint, correlated with subsequent python child processes containing base64 decoding and execution primitives such as eval, exec, or subprocess.
Detects known malicious SilverFox trojan payloads by matching their SHA256 file hashes. This rule operates on file hashing metadata to identify specific binary artifacts associated with the SilverFox threat actor, regardless of the delivery mechanism or download source.
Detects endpoint DNS resolution for the 'mysignins.microsoft.com' domain. This domain is frequently used in Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks to facilitate user interaction with legitimate Microsoft portals while the attacker intercepts session tokens.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader, which employs specific anti-sandboxing and anti-analysis techniques. The detection relies on identified file hashes, as well as heuristic analysis of process filenames containing common media-related keywords in sensitive directories and command line arguments indicating the presence of Global mutexes.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader, which employs specific anti-sandboxing and anti-analysis techniques. The detection relies on identified file hashes, as well as heuristic analysis of process filenames containing common media-related keywords in sensitive directories and command line arguments indicating the presence of Global mutexes.
Detects instances where a process named msedge.exe is running from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. This is a common location used by attackers to hide malicious executables by masquerading them as legitimate browser processes, particularly when the process command line includes arguments like 'preview' or 'thumbnail' which are often used to blend in with background system activity.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
Detects execution artifacts of the MovieReaper stage 2 implant, specifically its capability to parse and load COFF modules into memory without writing them to disk. The rule monitors process command lines for 'module_init' and identifies suspicious API activity related to memory-based module loading, such as reflective DLL loading or remote thread creation.
Detects process and file creation activity matching known MovieReaper loader and downstream module file hashes (MD5/SHA256). C2 IP/domain network indicators for this campaign require a separate network_connection-category rule, since Sigma logsource categories cannot be mixed within a single rule.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a command line involving remote HTTP connections or suspicious file extensions (.dat), which are often used by adversaries to proxy the execution of malicious scripts or HTA files.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a command line involving remote HTTP connections or suspicious file extensions (.dat), which are often used by adversaries to proxy the execution of malicious scripts or HTA files.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize a combination of 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) and obfuscated strings typical of download cradles. The rule looks for escaped double quotes inside the command line and specific regex patterns that match common obfuscation techniques used to hide malicious URLs or script components.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, C2 domains, and specific URL markers associated with identified threat activity. It consolidates multiple detection vectors including file activity, process execution, network connections, and DNS queries to identify compromised devices communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Comprehensive IOC sweep across endpoint file/process/network telemetry for the full set of known SilkParasite/SpiceRAT/NodeEdgeRAT/NomadRAT/BloodAlchemy infrastructure indicators reported by Hunt.io and Security Affairs: all listed C2/decoy/certificate-hosting IPs, all listed spoofed/infrastructure domains, and known file/certificate hashes (SHA256, SHA1).
Detects outbound network connections from devices to specific suspicious domains identified in the detection logic. This rule monitors for connections to 'ns2.asiainfo.it.com' and 'www.wordcheck.info', which may be indicative of malware communication, command and control, or malicious web activity.
This rule detects a high frequency of process terminations occurring within a 5-minute window on a device where specific driver-related processes or command lines ('nvfsflt64.sys', 'Alinubx.sys') have been identified. Such behavior is characteristic of malicious activity attempting to disrupt system security components or clear traces, potentially indicating an endpoint denial of service or evasion attempt.
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