Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
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Detects behavioral artifacts associated with Impacket remote execution tools (such as wmiexec, smbexec, and atexec) on target hosts using Microsoft Defender XDR process telemetry. It identifies command-line signatures spawned by system processes like WmiPrvSE.exe, services.exe, and svchost.exe.
Identifies devices that have communicated with domains present in the OpenPhish public phishing feed by comparing domains observed in DeviceNetworkEvents.RemoteUrl against domains extracted from the current OpenPhish feed.
Detects installation of a Windows service (Security EventID 4697)
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
Identifies devices running PHP versions affected by CVE-2026-109618 or CVE-2026-109619. The detection returns affected hosts, operating system platform, installed PHP version, and associated IPv4 addresses to support vulnerability assessment and remediation.
Detects execution of virtualization and container software on Windows endpoints by image name, covering Hyper-V, VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU, Xen, Parallels, WSL, Docker and containerd. Attackers can run payloads inside a virtual machine or WSL instance to hide activity from host-based security tools. Developers and administrators use these tools routinely, so the rule suits inventory and hunting. To triage, check the user, parent process, command line and hash, and whether the host is expected to run virtual machines.
Detects processes reconnecting to a public IPv4 or IPv6 address after at least 7 days of inactivity on ports other than DNS (53), HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), 8000.
Command-and-control implants often sit idle and then call back to infrastructure they have contacted before. Private, loopback, link-local, multicast and documentation ranges are excluded, and connections are grouped by endpoint, process, remote IP and port, then split into the last 24 hours and the prior history. Backup agents, license checks, update services and scheduled jobs also reconnect on a long cycle, so triage by process, destination reputation and how rare the destination is.
Run this over a search window of 30 days or more.
Command-and-control implants often sit idle and then call back to infrastructure they have contacted before. Private, loopback, link-local, multicast and documentation ranges are excluded, and connections are grouped by endpoint, process, remote IP and port, then split into the last 24 hours and the prior history. Backup agents, license checks, update services and scheduled jobs also reconnect on a long cycle, so triage by process, destination reputation and how rare the destination is.
Run this over a search window of 30 days or more.
Detects and correlates installed PHP software packages and active PHP process execution across endpoints using device inventory, configuration data, and system logs to provide exposure visibility for PHP environments.
Detects instances of BTCPay Server versions <= 2.4.1 running on endpoints based on command-line arguments and image tags, identifying potentially vulnerable software versions.
Detects outbound IPv4 and IPv6 connections from endpoints to public IP addresses on high-numbered ports (1023 and above), excluding private, reserved IP ranges and known noisy processes. Command-and-control tools, malware and tunneling activities may use uncommon ports to evade network monitoring.
Connections are aggregated by endpoint, process, remote IP and port to identify suspicious communication patterns.
Legitimate applications, custom services and administrative tools may also use these ports, so triage based on process context, destination reputation and connection frequency.
Connections are aggregated by endpoint, process, remote IP and port to identify suspicious communication patterns.
Legitimate applications, custom services and administrative tools may also use these ports, so triage based on process context, destination reputation and connection frequency.
The following analytic detects cmd.exe being used to write a Windows Scheduled Task XML definition to disk through the echo command.
This analytic focuses on command lines that combine echo with the Task Scheduler XML namespace. This is a significant activity because legitimate
software rarely assembles a task definition on the fly from the console. Browser hijackers and adware droppers do this to create a scheduled task,
through schtasks.exe and the generated XML file, that periodically relaunches a copy of themselves, and then delete the XML file to hinder forensic analysis.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, repeatedly execute a payload and maintain control over the victim's browser.
This analytic focuses on command lines that combine echo with the Task Scheduler XML namespace. This is a significant activity because legitimate
software rarely assembles a task definition on the fly from the console. Browser hijackers and adware droppers do this to create a scheduled task,
through schtasks.exe and the generated XML file, that periodically relaunches a copy of themselves, and then delete the XML file to hinder forensic analysis.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, repeatedly execute a payload and maintain control over the victim's browser.
Detects follow-on staging activity typically associated with Quick Assist abuse where an archive is extracted from Downloads to an AppDataRoamingRB[0-9]+ directory via command shell and tar, followed closely by the execution of a runtime from that directory.
Detects a sequence of process execution events where a device first downloads a public key (id_tunnel.pub) using curl or wget, subsequently downloads a private/tunnel key file (id_tunnel), and finally establishes an SSH tunnel or port forwarding session using ssh or a tun4000 script within a 4-hour window.
Detects instances where Microsoft Teams (ms-teams.exe, Teams.exe) or its associated WebView2 process spawns a command or script interpreter (such as PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta, Wscript, Cscript) with suspicious download-and-execute arguments, which is commonly associated with ClickFix social engineering attacks or similar initial access tactics.
Detects host reconnaissance activities (such as whoami or systeminfo) executed via Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools or accompanied by suspicious PowerShell download and execution activity within a specific time window.
Detects post-exploitation behavior where a Node.js process spawns a shell, interpreter, or utility (such as sh, bash, nc, curl, python), which may indicate Remote Code Execution (RCE) via vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-111497 in the Node.js Brotli decoder.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "edputil.dll"
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "roboform.dll", a DLL used by RoboForm Password Manager
Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
Detects processes rapidly invoking multiple system and network reconnaissance APIs (such as NetGetJoinInformation, NetSessionEnum, GetAdaptersAddresses, etc.) within a short window, which is indicative of automated discovery or reconnaissance activity.
Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.
Detects a sequence of suspicious behaviors on a single device within a 4-hour window: web shell file creation by a web server process, subsequent credential extraction or dumping tooling execution (such as accessing LSASS, NTDS, or SAM), and enumeration of installed security software or endpoint sensors.
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