Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects suspicious process injection attempts into browser processes (e.g., chrome.exe, msedge.exe) characterized by direct NT API syscall invocation (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) originating from a non-browser parent process. This behavior, often associated with the Remus infostealer, bypasses standard user-mode API hooking by using direct syscall stubs to chain injection actions.
Detects a single host or account interacting with a high volume of archive (PST/OST) and document files, or initiating mailbox exports within a short window, which is often indicative of mass data staging and collection prior to exfiltration.
Detects outbound network connections to known command-and-control IP addresses associated with the SpiceRAT malware family. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for successful connections or connection attempts over ports 80 and 443.
Detects a sequence of PowerShell commands consistent with the VelvetCake reconnaissance module, including enumeration of antivirus software via SecurityCenter2, system information, IP configurations, running processes, recent files, and drive mapping within a short timeframe.
Detects a sequence of PowerShell commands consistent with the VelvetCake reconnaissance module, including enumeration of antivirus software via SecurityCenter2, system information, IP configurations, running processes, recent files, and drive mapping within a short timeframe.
Detects anomalous MS_T120 channel binding and MCS handshake patterns characteristic of the BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft RDP services.
Detects potential Certificate Authority (CA) key theft by correlating command-line execution of certutil (with export flags) on a CA server with subsequent suspicious certificate issuance events. Suspicious issuance includes unauthorized certificate requests (missing event 4886), requests for high-privilege subjects (e.g., Domain Admins), or requests with unusually long validity periods.
This rule monitors for two distinct suspicious patterns: first, the interaction between Claude Desktop and the CEF (Chromium Embedded Framework) library, which may indicate unauthorized plugin or extension loading; second, the execution of non-standard binaries initiated by various JetBrains IDE processes located outside of standard program directories, which could indicate process hollowing or unauthorized tool execution.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
Detects unauthorized child processes spawned by ScreenConnect client binaries. The rule specifically looks for files created or modified within 60 seconds prior to execution, which is indicative of attackers leveraging an authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2026-84869) to transfer and execute malicious payloads via an active remote access session without requiring additional user interaction or authentication.
Detects the execution of the Rubeus toolset with command-line arguments indicative of Kerberos ticket abuse, including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and Pass-the-Ticket (PTT) techniques. These methods are commonly used by adversaries for credential harvesting and facilitating lateral movement within an Active Directory environment.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
C2 Ioc Detection
YARA-L
Detects Network, File, or Process events associated with known C2 IOCs
C2 Ioc Detection
YARA-L
Detects Network, File, or Process events associated with known C2 IOCs
C2 Ioc Detection
YARA-L
Detects Network, File, or Process events associated with known C2 IOCs
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
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