Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects modifications to the Windows Registry subkeys associated with the 'ms-settings' URI scheme, which are targeted by the 'fodhelper.exe' UAC bypass technique. The rule correlates registry operations in HKCU with the execution of fodhelper.exe to identify attempts to elevate privileges without triggering a UAC prompt.
Detects a suspected malicious sequence associated with RatHat activity. The rule identifies a device fetching an injection template configuration from a remote URL, followed by the exfiltration of credentials or form data to specific API endpoints on the same device within a 15-minute window.
This rule detects suspicious activity where a node.exe process, often associated with a node-pty terminal emulation, launches common Windows command-line shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) from specific file paths or directories. This behavior is indicative of a Node.js-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) or shell spawning mechanism being used to establish command and control or persistence on a Windows host.
Detects the invocation of SQL Server Management Studio (ssms.exe) by the PsExec or PsExec service process. This behavior is indicative of administrative tools being used for potentially unauthorized remote execution or lateral movement.
Detects the use of the net.exe or net1.exe utilities to create a new user account with a hardcoded password string ('Numlock!123') in the command line. This is a common indicator of automated exploitation, credential hardcoding, or post-exploitation activity.
Detects modifications to the Windows Explorer RunMRU registry key where values contain suspicious commands such as 'powershell', 'curl', or long base64-encoded strings, indicating potential command execution or persistence attempts.
Detects outbound WebSocket connections from endpoints containing specific JWR phishing framework session tokens (JWRCID/JWRCVV) or known C2 path suffixes. This pattern indicates active communication with a malicious C2 server used for session hijacking or proxy-based phishing operations.
This rule detects persistence mechanisms involving the creation or modification of a specific Windows Registry Run key ('ComponentTask33Agent') within the HKEY_CURRENT_USER hive, or the execution of PowerShell commands targeting this specific registry value. This is indicative of malware, such as the ChainScript Node.js RAT, attempting to maintain access across user reboots by abusing standard Windows autostart configuration points.
Detects EDRKiller.exe or WarsawKiller.exe binaries and the associated wsftprm.sys BYOVD driver used by The Gentlemen threat actor to terminate security product processes
This rule detects the execution, file presence, or driver loading associated with 'EDRKiller' and 'WarsawKiller', which are malicious tools used to terminate or disable endpoint security products.
Enumerates installed Chrome extensions, cross-references against public blocklists, and flags suspicious permissions.
Detects a suspected EvilTokens attack sequence where a user clicks a phishing URL and subsequently initiates a browser session to the Microsoft device-code authorization page (devicelogin) within 15 minutes, with the phishing lure domain appearing in the browser context.
Detects a specific adversarial pattern used to bypass authentication protections, where a browser process first navigates to an attacker-controlled identity verification or CAPTCHA challenge page, followed by an immediate navigation to legitimate Microsoft device code authentication endpoints within the same process session.
Detects a specific adversarial pattern used to bypass authentication protections, where a browser process first navigates to an attacker-controlled identity verification or CAPTCHA challenge page, followed by an immediate navigation to legitimate Microsoft device code authentication endpoints within the same process session.
Detects a specific adversarial pattern used to bypass authentication protections, where a browser process first navigates to an attacker-controlled identity verification or CAPTCHA challenge page, followed by an immediate navigation to legitimate Microsoft device code authentication endpoints within the same process session.
Detects a specific adversarial pattern used to bypass authentication protections, where a browser process first navigates to an attacker-controlled identity verification or CAPTCHA challenge page, followed by an immediate navigation to legitimate Microsoft device code authentication endpoints within the same process session.
Detects unauthorized processes (non-browser applications) creating, modifying, or renaming sensitive browser data files such as Login Data, Cookies, or local state files within standard browser profile directories. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or session hijacking attempts by malicious software.
Detects instances where suspicious or potentially non-standard processes (e.g., winappx.exe, MsCache.exe) or Python scripts running from specific ProgramData subdirectories spawn cmd.exe with a /c command line argument. This pattern is often indicative of persistence mechanisms, lateral movement, or malicious script execution.
This rule detects the execution of the SentinelOne memory scanner process (SentinelMemoryScanner.exe) or the loading of the associated SentinelOne core library (SentinelAgentCore.dll) from a directory path outside of the standard SentinelOne installation locations (Program Files\SentinelOne or Program Files (x86)\SentinelOne). This behavior is indicative of potential masquerading or tampering where an adversary attempts to execute a renamed or moved security tool to bypass policy or evade detection.
This rule monitors process creation events for common command-line obfuscation patterns used to evade detection. It flags suspicious usage of encoding (e.g., base64), character manipulation (e.g., caret char insertion, case randomization), and scripting-related concatenation or dynamic reassembly techniques within cmd, powershell, or script host commands.
This rule monitors for network connections, firewall traffic, and Entra ID authentication events involving known malicious IP addresses (the 'Wall of Shame'). The rule specifically flags interactions occurring over common VPN ports, suggesting potential unauthorized access or persistence attempts via VPN services.
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