Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a behavioral sequence where a signed process loads an unsigned DLL from a user-writable path (DLL sideloading) followed shortly by outbound HTTPS network connections from the same process to legitimate cloud storage or API infrastructure.
Detects creation, modification, disabling, or deletion of Windows Firewall rules and profiles using netsh.exe or PowerShell NetSecurity cmdlets. Adversaries tamper with the host firewall to disable defenses, open inbound or outbound paths for tools and C2, or remove blocking rules. This is common in hands-on-keyboard intrusions and ransomware staging. The query matches on file name and original file name to catch renamed binaries, covers both modern (advfirewall) and legacy (netsh firewall) syntax, and labels each event with the action performed to speed up triage.
Detects process command lines referencing browser credential
store filenames such as Chromium "Login Data"/Cookies and Firefox
logins.json/key4.db/cookies.sqlite. Amatera and similar infostealers copy
or read these files to harvest saved passwords and session cookies for
account takeover.
store filenames such as Chromium "Login Data"/Cookies and Firefox
logins.json/key4.db/cookies.sqlite. Amatera and similar infostealers copy
or read these files to harvest saved passwords and session cookies for
account takeover.
Hunts DeviceFileCertificateInfo for files signed by certificates issued by the eight eMudhra (and eight Sectigo) intermediate CAs with compromised weak keys. It matches on issuer hash, issuer name and CA serial, with an optional broader eMudhra/emSign match.
Detects Node.js builds, Express, and body-parser libraries vulnerable to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell) via Microsoft Defender vulnerability inventory, process telemetry, and software inventory.
Detects the installation or execution of unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools such as MeshCentral, Atera, Teramind, AnyDesk, or AdaptixC2 artifacts on endpoints. It flags devices running multiple distinct RMM tools or featuring AdaptixC2.
Detects regsvr32 execution to download/install/register new DLLs that are hosted on Web or FTP servers.
Detects PowerShell commands using the call operator with 'Get-Command' (gcm) or 'Get-Alias' (gal) containing wildcards to resolve and execute sensitive cmdlets. This is a common technique to evade static string-based detections for commands like 'Invoke-Expression' or 'Invoke-WebRequest'.
This rule detects the execution of 'hh.exe' (Microsoft HTML Help Executable) specifically when it is used to open '.chm' (Compiled HTML Help) files. Adversaries often abuse 'hh.exe' to execute malicious code embedded within CHM files as a defense evasion technique, leveraging a legitimate system binary to proxy execution.
Detects exclusive SMB file handle requests (ShareAccess = 0), which are utilized by the GhostLock denial-of-service technique.
GhostLock is a proof-of-concept tool that evades traditional write-based ransomware defenses by locking files rather than encrypting them, causing widespread STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION errors.
Note: To effectively identify the attack and reduce false positives, implement thresholding/aggregation in your SIEM. It is highly recommended to alert only when the count of these events exceeds 500 within a 5-minute window, grouped by the source 'IpAddress'.
GhostLock is a proof-of-concept tool that evades traditional write-based ransomware defenses by locking files rather than encrypting them, causing widespread STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION errors.
Note: To effectively identify the attack and reduce false positives, implement thresholding/aggregation in your SIEM. It is highly recommended to alert only when the count of these events exceeds 500 within a 5-minute window, grouped by the source 'IpAddress'.
Detects the Grandoreiro Campaign 2 obfuscated VBS loader executed via wscript.exe / cscript.exe from a user-writable directory. The rule has been expanded to also detect additional Grandoreiro behaviors, including the spawning of Delphi payloads from AppData, WMI queries for AntiVirusProduct, browser kiosk mode execution, and potential DLL side-loading of abused legitimate executables (FastStone, MinGW, FreeMat, AbiWord).
Detects the execution of PowerShell cmdlets used to mount ISO/VHD images. This behavior is a known prerequisite for the RoguePlanet Windows Defender vulnerability exploit, which relies on a race condition triggered during the mounting of an ISO image by a standard user.
Detects the use of the Add-MpPreference PowerShell cmdlet to add the entire C:\ drive or powershell.exe to Microsoft Defender exclusions. This technique is actively used by threat actors to bypass antivirus scanning and ensure the execution of subsequent payloads.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task utilizing an XML configuration file located in the C:\Users\Public\Documents directory. The CryptoBandits worm component creates these tasks to maintain persistence for both itself and the stealer payload.
Detects the creation or execution of the trepamobq.cmd file, which is associated with the Trepamo banking malware. This detection identifies instances where the trepamobq.cmd script is created in the filesystem or executed, which may indicate a compromise or malicious activity related to banking malware.
Detects the execution of 'reg.exe' with command line arguments that query registry keys associated with virtualization software, which is indicative of anti-VM behavior commonly observed in QuimaRAT malware. This detection identifies instances where 'reg.exe' is used to check for the presence of virtualization environments, which may suggest that the malware is attempting to evade analysis or detection in virtualized environments.
Detects attempts to enumerate Active Directory user objects using the Get-ADUser cmdlet with wildcard filters. This technique is often employed by attackers to gather information about user accounts and their attributes.
Detects attempts to enumerate DNS zone records using the Get-DnsServerResourceRecord cmdlet. This technique is often employed by attackers to gather information about DNS configurations and potential targets within a network.
Detects when rundll32 runs with the "jangadeiro" argument from the AppData directory.
Detects msiexec.exe-associated registry activity involving Chrome or Edge installation paths, matching msaRAT browser discovery before it launches a headless CDP session.
This rule attempts to detect the command flags from the msaRAT.
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