Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a single Salesforce user or connected-app session performing an anomalous volume of SOQL queries against sensitive objects including Case, Account, Contact, and Opportunity. This behavior is indicative of mass data enumeration and potential exfiltration, as observed in historical incidents where attackers targeted CRM platforms to extract embedded secrets and sensitive record data.
Detects OAuth application consent events in Entra ID where the application display name mimics legitimate services like Salesforce or Data Loader while requesting high-risk API scopes (full_access, offline_access, api). This behavior is characteristic of phishing-driven OAuth grant campaigns, such as those observed by the ShinyHunters group.
Monitors SaaS application integration service accounts (e.g., Salesforce connected apps) by establishing baselines for API call volume and accessed object types. The rule alerts on anomalous spikes in usage or deviations in the scope of accessed data objects, which could indicate the abuse of compromised OAuth tokens following a vendor supply-chain compromise.
Detects anomalous anti-forensic behavior where a Salesforce Bulk API query job is deleted shortly after its creation or completion. This sequence is often associated with efforts to obscure data exfiltration activities by removing the metadata trail of bulk data exports.
Detects anomalous Salesforce API export patterns where a user or connected application maintains a daily record export volume below typical burst thresholds, yet accumulates a high total volume over a rolling 7-day period. This pattern mimics 'low-and-slow' data exfiltration techniques used by actors like ShinyHunters to evade standard volume-based DLP alerts.
Detects the creation of new Entra ID applications or service principals that use display names similar to well-known SaaS vendors but lack a verified publisher status, followed within 24 hours by a consent grant for high-privilege permissions. This pattern is characteristic of OAuth-impersonation campaigns aimed at gaining persistent access to cloud resources.
Detects a correlation between a DNS query for a potential typosquatting or brand-lookalike domain (newly observed within the last 30 days) and a subsequent sign-in authentication event originating from the same client IP within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker, such as ShinyHunters vishing operators, directing victims to a lookalike SSO phishing portal to harvest credentials and MFA tokens before attempting access to the legitimate environment.
Detects an abnormally high volume of POST requests from a single source to the Salesforce Aura API endpoint (/s/sfsites/aura) within a short window, which is indicative of automated guest profile enumeration and AuraInspector-style probing activity associated with the ShinyHunters Salesforce campaigns.
Detects additions, updates, or modifications to External Authentication Methods (EAM) or federated identity providers in Microsoft Entra ID. This activity is consistent with the TrustSink technique, where an adversary registers a malicious OIDC MFA provider to facilitate authentication bypass or persistence.
Detects OAuth application consent grant events where an application name matches common 'Data Loader' naming conventions and requests high-privilege scopes (read/write/full/api). This pattern is consistent with consent phishing campaigns used by threat actors to gain persistent access to SaaS environments like M365 or Salesforce.
Detects high-volume, anomalous data read operations performed by the Gainsight integration service account within Salesforce, which may indicate unauthorized use of the integration token for data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous, high-volume data access patterns within Salesforce, specifically monitoring for bulk API or SOQL query requests by a single user or application. This behavior is indicative of mass data exfiltration from a CRM instance, a tactic observed in extortion-themed campaigns such as those associated with the ShinyHunters group.
Detects high-frequency HTTP requests targeting Salesforce Aura endpoints associated with structural introspection, such as retrieving component definitions or field metadata. This behavior is consistent with the use of the AuraInspector reconnaissance tool to map the internal structure of a Salesforce application.
Detects unauthorized access to CRM platforms (Salesforce) using Salesloft or Drift OAuth tokens, where the source IP address does not match the known legitimate service provider IP ranges. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or misuse, particularly relevant to supply-chain campaign activities.
Detects high-volume database or CRM read activity performed by a user, followed by significant outbound network traffic to known public cloud storage, file-sharing, or messaging services. This pattern is consistent with data staging and exfiltration behaviors often attributed to the ShinyHunters threat actor group.
Detects a pattern associated with ShinyHunters/UNC6040, where a user authorizes a new or rarely-used OAuth connected application shortly after performing a help-desk initiated password reset or MFA re-enrollment, originating from a different geographic location.
Detects unauthenticated guest users abusing the Salesforce Experience Cloud Aura endpoint (/s/sfsites/aura) to perform high-volume metadata and schema enumeration. This activity typically involves tools like AuraInspector to harvest CRM data by repeatedly invoking Aura actions such as describeSObjects, getSObjectMetadata, ObjectInfoController, or RecordUiController.
Detects successful authentication to administrative identity provider consoles that are flagged by identity-provider risk engines as anomalous (e.g., unfamiliar location, new device, or suspicious sign-in properties). This pattern monitors for potential account takeovers or compromised insider activity targeting critical administrative infrastructure, as observed in attacks utilizing recruited or purchased credentials.
Detects high-volume data exports or bulk API queries against sensitive Salesforce CRM objects (Accounts, Contacts, Cases, Opportunities) performed by connected applications. This pattern is characteristic of exfiltration efforts where a newly authorized OAuth application is used to quickly extract large quantities of sensitive records.
Detects anomalous engineering account activity associated with supply-chain compromise, specifically identifying the generation of access tokens or retrieval of secrets followed by unauthorized changes to CI/CD pipeline configurations or secret stores in platforms like GitHub, JFrog Artifactory, or BrowserStack.
Detects unauthorized abuse of the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow in Salesforce environments, commonly used by threat actors like ShinyHunters (UNC6240) to gain programmatic access. Attackers register malicious connected apps to impersonate legitimate tools, then use social engineering (vishing) to trick victims into approving device codes. This rule flags token issuance from non-allowlisted connected apps using the device_code grant type.
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