Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous activity associated with the CARBONATO worm, specifically monitoring for unauthorized creation of 'net-setup' containers or pulling 'system/resolved' images via the Docker API port 2375. Additionally, the rule identifies rapid, sequential network scanning behavior targeting the Docker API port across internal IP ranges.
Detects unauthorized access attempts to a Docker Registry API on port 5000. The rule identifies attempts to enumerate the image catalog and extract sensitive environment variable information from configuration blobs, which may contain hardcoded credentials or indicators of compromise.
Detects network communication associated with the CARBONATO Hermes Agent, including direct C2 beaconing to a hardcoded IP on port 8989 and TLS connections to Vercel-hosted proxy infrastructure identifying as 'carbonato-proxy'.
This rule detects network traffic originating from internal hosts directed to the Telegram API endpoint 'api.telegram.org' with a URI pattern associated with bot interaction, potentially indicating usage of a Telegram-based Command and Control (C2) mechanism by the CARBONATO/Hermes agent.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically focusing on its use of WebSocket-based FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) tunnels for command and control, session initialization, configuration retrieval, and local loopback proxy communication.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically the exfiltration of accessibility tree data and calls to Google's Generative Language API (gemini-2.5-flash-lite) for UI target resolution and automation.
Detects network activity associated with the NeedyMantis malware, including TLS SNI traffic to its hard-coded C2 domain, initial beaconing over HTTPS to specific paths, and potential exfiltration or reconnaissance markers in the server's Set-Cookie header response.
Detects network activity associated with the NeedyMantis malware, including TLS SNI traffic to its hard-coded C2 domain, initial beaconing over HTTPS to specific paths, and potential exfiltration or reconnaissance markers in the server's Set-Cookie header response.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the NeedyMantis actor, specifically identifying a hardcoded outdated Firefox/21.0 User-Agent in HTTP requests attempting to upgrade to a WebSocket connection, as well as direct TLS communication with the identified C2 domain corp.tripswithengine.com.
Detects DNS queries for RatHat C2 panels using characteristic naming patterns and specific malicious domains, as well as outbound network connections to known RatHat C2 IP infrastructure.
Detects network traffic from mobile devices to the Google Gemini API (generativelanguage.googleapis.com) specifically targeting the 'generateContent' endpoint. This behavior is indicative of mobile malware (e.g., RatHat/PromptSpy) that may be utilizing AI-assisted UI-automation, potentially to exfiltrate screen content or automate malicious interactions by processing visual layout data through a generative model.
Detects network traffic from mobile devices to the Google Gemini API (generativelanguage.googleapis.com) specifically targeting the 'generateContent' endpoint. This behavior is indicative of mobile malware (e.g., RatHat/PromptSpy) that may be utilizing AI-assisted UI-automation, potentially to exfiltrate screen content or automate malicious interactions by processing visual layout data through a generative model.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with a custom 'RatHat' malware variant utilizing Google's Gemini API for command and control or remote automation. The rule identifies the initial POST request to the API with specific generation parameters (temperature 0.1, 256 tokens) and the corresponding JSON-formatted coordinate response from the server.
Detects network connections to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolvers, specifically cloudflare-dns.com and dns.google, as well as non-browser processes performing HTTPS requests to these IPs. Such traffic patterns are often indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication utilizing DoH to bypass network-level DNS filtering and monitoring.
Detects network connections to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolvers, specifically cloudflare-dns.com and dns.google, as well as non-browser processes performing HTTPS requests to these IPs. Such traffic patterns are often indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication utilizing DoH to bypass network-level DNS filtering and monitoring.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with the VelvetCake malware used by North Korean threat actors Konni and Kimsuky. These signatures identify beaconing behavior to known free-hosting infrastructure, specifically monitoring for unique URL parameters ('OKey=', 'Who=', 'Areyou=cake') and common file naming conventions associated with the C2 communication.
Detects an attempt to bypass SharePoint authentication using a 'Register' directive in a POST request body directed at an .aspx page that is not a recognized ToolPane page. This pattern is indicative of an exploit attempt against a public-facing SharePoint server, specifically targeting vulnerability CVE-2026-65660.
Detects network communication to 'imageurlgenerator.com' where a VBScript downloader is attempting to retrieve a staged payload. The request pattern targets specific URI structures resembling GUID-based identifiers ending in '.txt', which is characteristic of the XHOPLESS malware delivery chain.
Detects outbound network traffic (TLS SNI and HTTP requests) directed to the Telegram Bot API endpoint. This behavior is often associated with malware using Telegram as a command-and-control (C2) channel or for the exfiltration of stolen data, credentials, or sensitive information.
Detects HTTP requests containing potential session, handoff, or access tokens within the URI pattern commonly associated with ORAX Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rule specifically targets requests routed to wildcard subdomains that mimic legitimate deployment or service endpoints, indicating an attempt to harvest authentication tokens from victims.
Detects network activity associated with a phishing campaign leveraging Cloudflare Workers, identified as 'ARToken'. The rules monitor for specific TLS SNI patterns, HTTP Host headers, and subsequent C2-like behavior involving device code authentication flows (api/device/start and api/device/poll) hosted on 'workers.dev'.
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