Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,141 detections
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Detects files associated with the ClipXDaemon malware campaign based on their SHA256 hashes.
Detects processes masquerading as kernel worker threads (e.g., 'kworker/*') but running in a non-root user context. This technique is used by the ClipXDaemon malware to evade detection by blending in with legitimate system processes.
Detects an npm installation process (node.exe) spawning a shell or network utility to download a secondary payload from a Vercel-hosted domain. This TTP was observed in the StegaBin campaign where malicious packages used install scripts to fetch next-stage malware.
This rule detects the execution of a process that attempts to build an executable using 'zig build-exe' and subsequently initiates a process with a command line containing 'https://github.com/nullclaw/nullclaw.git'. This could indicate an adversary building a malicious executable on a host and then attempting to download or interact with a malicious GitHub repository, potentially for further stages of an attack.
This rule detects potential indicators of compromise related to CVE-2026-20127 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN systems. It focuses on two main areas: 1) suspicious successful SSH authentications for the 'vmanage-admin' account, and 2) SD-WAN control plane connection events indicating a new 'up' state. The first part looks for specific log entries related to publickey authentication for 'vmanage-admin' from any source IP. The second part identifies control connection state changes to 'up' and extracts peer type, peer system IP, and public IP from the raw logs. The rule aims to surface events that require human confirmation by comparing them against known network designs and change records, as these events can indicate unexpected relationships between devices or unauthorized privileged access.
Detects active SSH session takeover attempts.
When the process of one user accesses another user's SSH agent
When the process of one user accesses another user's SSH agent
Identifies network connections to known command and control (C2) and dropper distribution infrastructure associated with the EncystPHP web shell campaign.
Detects outbound network traffic or DNS queries to the Yandex Cloud Functions domain (functions.yandexcloud.net). This domain was used as a C2 relay by the 'ambar-src' malicious npm package, indicating potential command and control activity.
Monitors for command-line activity indicating the addition of SSH keys to authorized_keys files or the modification of the SSH daemon configuration to permit root login on Cisco SD-WAN devices. This is a common persistence technique used by attackers after gaining initial access, such as through CVE-2026-20127.
Detects the creation or modification of Python scripts in the /unitree/etc/programming/ directory on Unitree Go2 robots. This activity is a strong indicator of exploitation of CVE-2026-27509 or CVE-2026-27510, where an attacker uploads a malicious script for remote code execution.
This hunting query searches Defender XDR telemetry for activity consistent with the GRIDTIDE campaign by combining network, process, and file-based indicators. It identifies endpoint connections to published campaign infrastructure, including known IP addresses and dynamic DNS-style domains. It also looks for direct access to Google Sheets API endpoints and parameters described as part of the actor’s command-and-control workflow, particularly when the initiating process is not a normal web browser. In addition, it checks for file and process indicators associated with reported GRIDTIDE artefacts by matching published SHA-256 hashes and common artefact filenames. Results are returned as a unified view with a match type label to help triage whether the alert is driven by network IOC matches, Google Sheets API usage, or host artefact indicators.
Detects the deletion or clearing of critical Cisco SD-WAN log files. This is a common post-exploitation technique used by attackers to cover their tracks after compromising a device, for instance, after exploiting CVE-2026-20127. The rule identifies direct file deletions and commands used to clear or truncate log file content.
Detects broad filesystem searches using native OS commands ('dir' on Windows, 'find' on Linux/macOS) for files containing sensitive developer information like private keys, mnemonic phrases, and configuration files. This TTP is used by modules 5 and 6 of the StegaBin toolkit.
Detects the creation or modification of a Claude Code settings file (`.claude/settings.json`). This file can be configured to automatically approve Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers by setting `enableAllProjectMcpServers` to `true` or by using `enabledMcpjsonServers`. This bypasses security prompts designed to warn users about potential command execution, which can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) as described in CVE-2025-59536.
Detects network connections from the Claude Code CLI ('claude' or 'claude.exe') to a destination other than the official 'api.anthropic.com' endpoint. This indicates that the 'ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL' environment variable has likely been overridden by a malicious '.claude/settings.json' configuration file in an attempt to intercept and exfiltrate API keys, as described in CVE-2026-21852.
This detection identifies the execution of suspicious shell commands (such as download cradles, reverse shells, or unexpected GUI applications like Calculator) spawned as child processes of the Claude Code CLI ('claude'). This activity is indicative of potential Remote Code Execution (RCE) through the exploitation of malicious hooks in `.claude/settings.json` or malicious MCP server commands, as described in CVE-2025-59536.
Detects active SSH session takeover attempts.
Watching for common terminal multiplexing utilities attaching to sessions.
Watching for common terminal multiplexing utilities attaching to sessions.
Detects attempts to disable or stop syslog services (syslog, rsyslog, syslog-ng) using common system utilities like systemctl, service, chkconfig, or update-rc.d. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to impair defenses by preventing logging of their actions.
Detects the creation of an unusual lock file at `/usr/share/nano/.lock`. This specific path is used by a backdoored Go module (impersonating golang.org/x/crypto) to temporarily store harvested plaintext passwords before exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for file creation events at this highly specific path.
This detection is designed to help you find activity related to BRICKSTORM espionage backdoor (appliances/vCenter). It is based on the specific threat intelligence in the reference, so it focuses on concrete, easy-to-verify signals rather than vague patterns. It uses exact indicators and tightly scoped behaviors described in the referenced threat intelligence. A match does not automatically prove a compromise, and it does not prove the activity was successful, but it is a strong reason to investigate because the signal lines up with published reporting. When this fires, start by confirming which host, account, or server produced the event and whether the behavior is expected for that system. If it is not expected, preserve the relevant logs and files, check for repeated attempts over time, and look for nearby signs such as new admin accounts, unusual remote access, or suspicious downloads. Treat a match as a scoping signal and pivot to other telemetry around the same host, account, and time window. Use the reference link to document why you treated the alert as significant and to support incident notes.
Detects the execution of rsync using GSocket-based user-space tunnels (gs-dbus, gs-netcat) as the transport shell. This is a core, stealthy exfiltration technique used by the ShadowHS framework to bypass traditional network inspection and firewall rules.
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