Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
15,361
13,596
2,797
1,803
1,725
Contributors
7,678
5,999
5,315
4,504
4,191
Categories
18,113
9,760
3,854
3,760
3,714
Platforms
40,063
7,331
6,542
3,907
3,666
Products / Services
10,442
9,677
6,722
1,888
1,879
MITRE Techniques
13,738
13,119
8,068
5,949
4,415
CVEs
49
45
30
30
29
IDS Classtypes
214
56
43
23
19
IDS Protocols
183
172
20
16
8
Detects the execution of Active Directory Explorer (ADExplorer.exe or ADExplorer64.exe), a legitimate tool often repurposed by adversaries to enumerate Active Directory structures, accounts, and group memberships.
Detects the installation or update of browser extensions that possess both 'declarativeNetRequest' and 'content_scripts' permissions, while also requesting host permissions for major AI assistant or trusted vendor domains (e.g., google.com, gemini.google.com, copilot.microsoft.com, claude.ai). This specific combination of permissions is characteristic of the BragJack attack chain used to redirect network traffic and hijack AI browser agent sessions.
Detects the presence or installation of 'truesight.sys' or 'rentdrv2.sys' drivers, which are associated with malicious activity. The rule also triggers when system utilities like sc.exe or services.exe are used to set services related to these names to a 'demand' start type, indicating potential persistence or malicious driver loading.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is used to download or execute remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools or remote access software binaries (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Atera). This pattern is often indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistent remote access to a compromised system after initial intrusion.
Detects execution of PowerShell processes using the '-w hidden' argument and '-enc' (EncodedCommand) parameter, which is a common technique used by attackers to execute obfuscated code silently.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands using encoded arguments combined with network download cmdlets. This pattern is indicative of a multi-stage loader chain often used in 'ClickFix' style social engineering lures to download and execute secondary malicious payloads.
Detects instances of thread execution where the start module is identified as a critical system component (ntdll.dll or kernel32.dll) but the associated call trace contains 'UNKNOWN' entries. This behavior is indicative of call stack spoofing, a technique used by malicious software to hide the true origin of code execution and evade endpoint security analysis by mimicking legitimate thread start addresses.
Detects access, reading, or modification of sensitive credential files (such as KeePass databases, VPN profiles, private SSH keys, and certificates) by a process. This behavior is often associated with pre-encryption staging for data exfiltration during ransomware attacks.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the schtasks utility where the execution principal is set to SYSTEM. This pattern is commonly observed in malware such as DragonForce ransomware to establish persistence or execute payloads with elevated privileges.
Detects the execution of the s5cmd utility using 'cp' or 'sync' commands directed towards S3 storage paths. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized data exfiltration to attacker-controlled cloud storage, a tactic identified in intrusions associated with the 'Ransom Busters' group.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window styles and encoded commands that perform common post-exploitation activities, such as remote file downloading or expression evaluation via IEX. This is a common pattern for fileless malware delivery and secondary payload execution.
This rule detects malicious activity by monitoring for specific known indicators, including hashes of malicious files (ProcessRollup2), network connections to known C2 infrastructure (NetworkConnectIP4), and URL clicks (UrlClick) associated with malicious domains or paths. It acts as a multi-stage indicator correlation rule to identify execution or communication with known threats.
Detects the Perplexity Comet or Google Chrome browser processes accessing files in locations outside expected directories (such as Downloads, User Data, or Temp), which is a common indicator of a malicious browser extension or process attempting to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.
Detects the execution of a Google Chrome process on a system with a known vulnerability (versions below 143.0.7499.192) in conjunction with browser extension installation or loading activity. This behavior is indicative of the GlicJack exploit (CVE-2026-0628), where a malicious extension attempts to impersonate a trusted AI vendor server to send unauthorized commands to the in-browser AI agent.
Detects mshta.exe spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or reg.exe) that are characteristic of the ReverseRAT backdoor. The rule identifies common discovery commands or persistence attempts via Registry Run keys triggered from mshta.exe.
Detects the execution of wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe with command-line arguments related to querying antivirus products or security centers (e.g., AntiVirusProduct, SecurityCenter2). The rule focuses on executions originating from non-standard system paths (e.g., Temp, Users, AppData) or processes that lack a valid code signing signature, which is often indicative of reconnaissance by malicious actors.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for any outbound network connections to a specific list of known malicious domains. The rule identifies potential command and control (C2) communication by matching remote URLs against a hardcoded set of domains associated with known threats.
Detects network and DNS activity associated with the SideCopy threat group, specifically monitoring for connections to known C2 domains, C2 IP addresses, or the usage of port 5863 typically associated with the ReverseRAT backdoor.
This rule monitors for user interactions with specific domains and URLs known to be associated with suspicious or malicious activity. It aggregates data from multiple sources, including email clicks (UrlClickEvents), device network activity (DeviceNetworkEvents), device browser events (DeviceEvents), and DNS queries (DnsEvents), to identify potential exposure to these indicators of compromise.
Detects the execution of an ONVIF-related tool or process with flags indicating credential retrieval. This is often associated with the reconnaissance or credential access phase targeting IoT devices such as cameras that support the Open Network Video Interface Forum (ONVIF) protocol.
Page 295 of 1908