Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
327 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
113
82
45
40
17
Contributors
117
114
23
15
12
Categories
104
100
94
71
62
Platforms
39,885
7,226
6,523
3,862
3,623
327
Products / Services
82
71
29
17
12
MITRE Techniques
62
45
43
42
34
CVEs
2
1
IDS Classtypes
54
14
6
3
1
IDS Protocols
48
25
5
3
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects malicious Android application installation or launch behavior consistent with the 'Corp MDM' implant. This rule specifically identifies instances where a package named 'com.corp.mdm' is installed or launched and rapidly requests a combination of high-risk permissions including SMS and telephony access (RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS, CALL_PHONE) alongside notification permissions, which is characteristic of the implant's initial setup phase.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of USSD codes by the corporate MDM agent to modify call-forwarding settings. This activity is indicative of a compromise where an attacker uses an MDM-controlled device to intercept calls or divert communications.
Detects rapid termination of specific mobile messenger applications (Max) within seconds of starting, while indicators of the Frida dynamic instrumentation tool are concurrently detected on the device. This pattern suggests the application is identifying the presence of a hooking/instrumentation environment and self-terminating as a defense mechanism. The detection is further correlated with failed connection attempts to the application's backend.
This rule monitors for suspicious interactions with Android device drivers via the 'getevent' utility, often used to capture raw input, combined with unusual file access patterns involving 'locateValues.json' and potential data exfiltration attempts to specific internal API endpoints.
Detects malicious persistence activity on Android devices originating from an ADB or shell context (UID 2000). The rule monitors for a sequential pattern: the silent re-installation of the 'RatHat' APK package via 'pm install' commands, followed by the modification of system security settings to re-grant Accessibility Service permissions.
Detects a suspected anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies instances where 'getprop' is used to query system properties related to device security (ro.debuggable, ro.secure) followed shortly by a local network probe to the standard Frida instrumentation server port (27042). This combination is indicative of malware gating its execution to ensure it is not running within a controlled or debugged environment.
Detects a suspected anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies instances where 'getprop' is used to query system properties related to device security (ro.debuggable, ro.secure) followed shortly by a local network probe to the standard Frida instrumentation server port (27042). This combination is indicative of malware gating its execution to ensure it is not running within a controlled or debugged environment.
Detects malicious persistence activity on Android devices originating from an ADB or shell context (UID 2000). The rule monitors for a sequential pattern: the silent re-installation of the 'RatHat' APK package via 'pm install' commands, followed by the modification of system security settings to re-grant Accessibility Service permissions.
Detects a specific sequence of Android Debug Bridge (ADB) commands typical of malicious Android agents, specifically those running with elevated privileges (UID 2000/shell/root). The rule identifies combinations of permission grants, battery optimization bypasses, and package tampering (disabling or uninstalling) occurring within the same context.
Detects a specific sequence of Android Debug Bridge (ADB) commands typical of malicious Android agents, specifically those running with elevated privileges (UID 2000/shell/root). The rule identifies combinations of permission grants, battery optimization bypasses, and package tampering (disabling or uninstalling) occurring within the same context.
Detects a specific sequence of commands indicative of the RatHat malware on Android, involving waking the device followed by automated unlock gestures or PIN input and password retrieval commands.
Detects the staging of a potential RatHat malware component by observing a native Go binary being moved into /data/local/tmp via ADB shell (uid 2000), followed by an associated service binding to local port 7912 within a 5-minute window. This sequence is characteristic of the deployment process for this specific Android threat.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically focusing on its use of WebSocket-based FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) tunnels for command and control, session initialization, configuration retrieval, and local loopback proxy communication.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically the exfiltration of accessibility tree data and calls to Google's Generative Language API (gemini-2.5-flash-lite) for UI target resolution and automation.
Detects the presence of known RatHat Go-based command agents (liblocal-service.so) or frpc reverse-proxy clients (libmedia_codec.so) when staged within temporary directories such as /data/local/tmp on Android devices, often following manual ADB shell interaction.
Detects the RatHat post-uninstall persistence sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies a daemon that silently reinstalls an APK using 'pm install' from a temporary directory, followed by the programmatic enabling of Accessibility Service settings without user interaction.
Detects the execution of the 'getevent' debugging utility within an Android ADB shell context, specifically targeting raw input events from /dev/input. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized input monitoring, such as capturing PINs, patterns, or passwords via touch coordinate tracking.
Detects communication patterns associated with the RatHat Android banking trojan. The rule identifies a multi-stage C2 flow: first, the device fetches malicious overlay configurations (templates for spoofed login screens) and subsequently exfiltrates captured credentials or form data to the adversary's infrastructure via POST requests.
Detects RatHat Android dropper applications that utilize automated build rotation to bypass file hash-based detection. The rule identifies stable artifacts, such as specific native library names, string obfuscation indicators, and manifest structure anomalies, that persist across these regenerated builds.
Detects a specific Android sandbox escape technique where a malicious app enables Accessibility Services and Developer Options/Wireless Debugging to initiate a self-pairing ADB connection over localhost. This bypasses typical app sandbox restrictions, allowing the execution of processes with the UID 2000 (shell) context.
Page 3 of 16