Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,270 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,342
1,086
505
478
472
Contributors
1,824
1,622
874
505
300
Categories
3,031
2,542
1,076
1,049
929
Platforms
39,960
7,270
6,537
3,868
3,651
Products / Services
1,331
1,109
991
658
494
MITRE Techniques
2,271
1,336
1,318
904
885
CVEs
66
65
33
32
28
IDS Classtypes
81
80
56
27
10
IDS Protocols
149
98
6
5
4
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, reconnaissance, and command execution originating from web server and PHP lineage processes, indicating potential webshell activity or compromised web applications.
Detects process command lines containing C2 operator start flags or strings alongside reconnaissance tools or platforms like fofa or skynet.
Detects a PHP-FPM child process crashing with signal 11 (SIGSEGV) as logged by the FPM master, which may indicate exploitation attempts following an arm-shaped request. Correlate with the arm fatal error by timestamp and source. Note - the logsource product linux / service php-fpm is not defined by SigmaHQ. Map it with a processing pipeline to the PHP-FPM master log (for example /var/log/php8.x-fpm.log on Debian/Ubuntu, /var/log/php-fpm/error.log on RHEL-family, container stderr for official php-fpm images, or the php-fpm systemd journal unit).
Detects web requests originating from the RedTail botnet user-agent 'libredtail-http' attempting to exploit two or more distinct vulnerability families (such as Apache path traversal, PHP-CGI argument injection, PHPUnit eval-stdin, and ThinkPHP pearcmd) from a single source IP.
Detects repeated PHP memory exhaustion (OOM) errors combined with segmentation faults or session warnings within a short timeframe, which may indicate application instability, resource exhaustion attacks, or exploitation attempts.
Detects a sequence where an Apache HTTP server spawns a shell (sh, bash, dash) followed within a 6-hour window by network connections to internal ports (LDAP, SMB, Kerberos) from the same device, indicative of web shell activity and potential internal reconnaissance or relay attempts.
Detects when typical discovery commands (whoami, id, uname, ipconfig) are executed under a web server or PHP process parent, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity following a web application compromise. The rule aggregates distinct commands within a 15-minute window to reduce false positives.
Detects post-exploitation activity targeting PaperCut servers, including shells spawned by the PaperCut Java process or the creation of malicious files (such as .class files in lib/ or .txt webshells in custom/web/) by the Java application.
Detects modifications to Certificate Authority (CA) trust stores, configuration files, or blocklists on Linux and macOS endpoints, followed by trust store update commands within a 30-minute window.
Detects a sequence of events on Linux hosts involving a remote interactive or network logon from an external IP, followed within 5 minutes by root-level process execution, and subsequently within 2 hours by an outbound SSH connection to a private or known attacker IP. Also includes a separate branch for direct logons from known malicious IPs.
Detects attempts to download the cache_base file using various command-line utilities (wget, curl, node fetch) on a single device, correlating multiple download methods within a 10-minute window or matching known malicious mirror IOCs.
Detects instances where the Claude Code AI assistant CLI or related node processes spawn command-line shells (such as cmd, powershell, bash, sh, zsh), followed by system firewall rule modifications on the same device within a 4-hour window.
Detects process command lines containing Magento database audit strings (cms_block, cms_page) alongside specific loader domains, or network events communicating with these known loader domains.
This rule aggregates software inventory, vulnerability assessments, network connection events, and exposure graph data to prioritize patching and identify internet-facing devices running PHP with known vulnerabilities or active web listeners.
Detects inbound network connections from known IP addresses associated with PHP2Shell exploitation attempts and malicious tooling infrastructure.
Detects PHP SAPI processes accessing /proc/self/mem (or equivalent memory mapping) and subsequently spawning a Unix shell, which is characteristic of web shell activity or exploitation of PHP memory corruption/injection vulnerabilities like zif_system.
Detects files written under Magento pub/media/custom_options/quote by a web server or PHP process, and flags when a subsequent process command line references the uploaded file, indicating potential web shell activity.
Detects an SSH process establishing local port forwarding to a Unix socket (such as docker.sock) or a path containing a socket, followed shortly after (within 15 minutes) by non-administrative tool access to sensitive files like /etc/shadow or Docker sockets on the same device.
Detects a sequence where a process is launched from or references the hidden /tmp/.x directory (indicative of cryptominer deployment), followed within 30 minutes on the same device by a process-check command (such as ps, top, or htop) referencing XMRig or /tmp/.x.
Detects node or agent-initiated npm installation commands (such as npm install or npm i) executed within 24 hours of creating or modifying a developer assistant instruction file (such as AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules) in common user directories like Downloads, Desktop, or Temp.
Detects instances where web server processes or PHP interpreters (apache2, httpd, php-fpm, php) spawn a shell process (sh, bash, dash). This behavior is often indicative of post-exploitation activity such as remote code execution (RCE) via PHP session upload progress or web shell activity.
Page 3 of 347