Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,153 detections
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Detects the modification of an Azure Storage account configuration to enable public access (allowBlobPublicAccess: true). This activity is often associated with attackers attempting to facilitate anonymous data exfiltration by enabling public access to blobs and subsequently reading them.
Detects Azure AD / M365 audit log events associated with OAuth2 permission grants or application consent
where a high-privilege delegated scope (e.g. Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Directory.ReadWrite.All, offline_access)
is granted to an application. This technique has been publicly attributed to APT29 (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard)
for maintaining persistent access to M365 mailboxes and directory data via malicious or unverified OAuth
applications, consistent with MITRE ATT&CK T1098.001 (Additional Cloud Credentials) and T1550.001 (Use Alternate
Authentication Material: Application Access Token).
where a high-privilege delegated scope (e.g. Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Directory.ReadWrite.All, offline_access)
is granted to an application. This technique has been publicly attributed to APT29 (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard)
for maintaining persistent access to M365 mailboxes and directory data via malicious or unverified OAuth
applications, consistent with MITRE ATT&CK T1098.001 (Additional Cloud Credentials) and T1550.001 (Use Alternate
Authentication Material: Application Access Token).
Detects the assignment of highly privileged OAuth scopes or application roles to service principals or users within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). This activity is often associated with consent phishing or token abuse, where an adversary attempts to gain long-term programmatic access to sensitive resources like email, files, or directory services using a malicious or compromised application.
Detects registration of a new actor-controlled MFA authentication method (phone, authenticator app, or software OTP token) via an Update user operation, matching the NO_DEVICE/NO_DEVICE_TOKEN/SoftwareTokenActivated pattern used to convert temporary compromise into durable identity persistence
This rule detects potentially malicious reconnaissance or enumeration activity by tracking high volumes of read-only API calls (LIST/read operations) across multiple Azure resource providers (e.g., VMs, Subscriptions, Web sites, Storage, Recovery Services) performed by a single identity within a 30-minute window.
Detects modifications to Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) that disable security defaults, per-user MFA enforcement, or conditional access policies requiring MFA. Such actions remove tenant-wide MFA protection and are often precursors to account takeover, password spraying, or ransomware attacks.
Detects potential consent phishing attacks by identifying newly registered multi-tenant Azure AD applications that receive OAuth consent from end-users within a short timeframe (10 minutes) of application registration. The rule specifically flags consents requesting high-risk delegated scopes (e.g., Mail.Read, Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, offline_access) where the application has not been verified by a trusted publisher.
Detects unauthorized changes to the token-signing certificate for federated domains in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). This behavior is often associated with the Golden SAML attack technique, where an adversary modifies federation settings to forge authentication tokens. The rule filters for events occurring outside of standard business hours and alerts when the modification is not performed by known automation service accounts.
This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted sensitive Exchange Online permissions, such as 'full_access_as_app', 'Mail.Read', 'Mail.ReadWrite', or 'Mail.Send'. Granting these permissions allows an application to access mailboxes across the tenant without requiring a signed-in user context, which is a common persistence and data exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) and espionage campaigns.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings where a new partner is added or inbound trust settings (such as MFA or device compliance) are enabled for an external tenant. This activity may indicate an attempt to establish a persistent backdoor or facilitate initial access into the environment via a compromised or malicious external identity provider.
This rule detects administrative changes to cloud storage configurations (AWS S3, Azure Blob, and GCP Storage) that result in public or anonymous read/write access to buckets or containers, which could lead to unauthorized data exposure.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to audit and logging configurations across AWS, Azure, and GCP. The rule identifies actions such as stopping, deleting, or updating logging trails, diagnostic settings, or logging sinks, which may indicate an adversary attempting to impair visibility into their activities (Anti-Forensics).
Detects the creation of high-cost, resource-intensive compute instances (such as GPU-enabled or large-scale VMs) within cloud regions that have not been previously utilized by the account, subscription, or project. This behavior is often indicative of unauthorized resource hijacking, such as crypto-mining or large-scale data processing by threat actors.
Detects the creation or modification of serverless functions (AWS Lambda, Azure Function Apps, GCP Cloud Functions) that exhibit high-risk configurations. These include functions assigned overly permissive IAM roles, configured for public or unauthenticated invocation, or tied to event triggers commonly abused for persistence in cloud environments.
This rule detects the creation or modification of identity federation trust configurations across multiple cloud platforms (AWS, Azure AD, GCP). Attackers often modify trust relationships to establish persistence, forge credentials, or escalate privileges by introducing malicious identity providers (SAML/OIDC) that grant unauthorized access to the environment.
Detects modifications to cloud storage configurations in Azure and GCP that grant public access to containers or blobs. Attackers may leverage this to expose sensitive data stored in cloud environments by changing permissions to be publicly readable.
Detects unauthorized modifications or deletions of cloud logging sinks in Google Cloud Platform (GCP) or diagnostic settings in Azure, which may indicate an attacker attempting to disable audit logs to cover their tracks or evade detection.
Detects unauthorized or risky configuration changes in Google Cloud Storage or Azure Storage accounts that grant public access (e.g., allUsers/allAuthenticatedUsers or public blob access) specifically on storage resources identified as production or sensitive (PII/financial data).
Detects instances where an administrative user grants 'AllPrincipals' OAuth consent to a multi-tenant application that is unverified or lacks a trusted publisher. This behavior is indicative of an attacker tricking a global admin into granting broad permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All) to a malicious application, bypassing per-user consent restrictions.
Detects the addition of suspicious, attacker-controlled URLs (such as webhook.site, ngrok.io, or pipedream.net) as valid redirect URIs in an OAuth application's configuration. This technique can be used by an adversary to intercept OAuth authorization codes or tokens by luring users through a malicious authorization link, enabling persistent unauthorized access without further consent.
Detects the addition of a Service Principal to an Azure AD group that has the 'isAssignableToRole' property set to true. This behavior is a known privilege escalation technique where the service principal inherits the privileged roles assigned to that group, bypassing standard direct role-assignment monitoring.
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