Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
411 detections
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Detects unauthorized execution of a Bun runtime executing an 'index.js' payload within a GitHub Actions workflow context, specifically targeting known compromised action paths (e.g., issues-helper, maintain-one-comment). The detection requires correlation with either sensitive environment/secret access or anomalous outbound network activity originating from the same process, indicating potential credential theft or C2 communication by a malicious CI/CD pipeline component.
Detects the use of specific malicious versions (v2.2.1) of GitHub Actions (actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment) in workflow runs that also involve the exposure or referencing of the GITHUB_TOKEN, indicating potential credential theft and CI/CD pipeline compromise.
Detects the suspicious reactivation of 'actions-cool/issues-helper' or 'actions-cool/maintain-one-comment' repositories within a known malicious window (September 14-19, 2026). These repositories were involved in the 'Mini Shai-Hulud' supply-chain attack. This rule identifies when previously disabled repositories are re-enabled or modified to become active, potentially re-exposing malicious release tags to downstream users.
Detects the suspicious reactivation of 'actions-cool/issues-helper' or 'actions-cool/maintain-one-comment' repositories within a known malicious window (September 14-19, 2026). These repositories were involved in the 'Mini Shai-Hulud' supply-chain attack. This rule identifies when previously disabled repositories are re-enabled or modified to become active, potentially re-exposing malicious release tags to downstream users.
This rule detects potentially suspicious activity within a Git repository environment, specifically monitoring for code pushes, administrative changes (such as added collaborators, permission changes, or ownership transfers), and force push operations. It identifies high-impact repository modifications that could indicate unauthorized access, persistence, or attempts to disrupt repository integrity.
This rule detects potential credential theft by correlating access to local git credential files (e.g., .git-credentials, .netrc) followed by a git push event from the same user account within 24 hours. The rule flags these pushes if they originate from an unrecognized host or an IP address outside of the trusted internal network range.
Detects malicious tampering with GitHub Actions workflows by monitoring for two specific patterns within an hour: the addition of automatic push triggers for the main branch alongside the removal of manual approval gates, or rapid sequential commits that rewrite workflows to facilitate an unattended publish of a package. This rule also integrates with npm registry publish events to identify potential malicious distribution of compromised packages like @dforge-core/dforge-mcp.
Detects instances where a repository's GitHub CI/CD workflow, git configuration, or repository settings are modified, followed shortly thereafter by an npm package publish event. This behavior is indicative of a supply chain compromise where an adversary modifies workflow files to auto-publish malicious versions of a package.
Detects rapid mass-cloning or downloading of private GitHub repositories shortly after an OAuth token authorization, originating from IP addresses or countries not previously associated with the user account. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized bulk data extraction using compromised credentials, consistent with threat actor activity (e.g., TeamPCP/UNC6780).
Detects rapid mass-cloning or downloading of private GitHub repositories shortly after an OAuth token authorization, originating from IP addresses or countries not previously associated with the user account. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized bulk data extraction using compromised credentials, consistent with threat actor activity (e.g., TeamPCP/UNC6780).
Detects instances where a removed GitHub organization member performed bulk repository access (cloning or downloading) shortly before their removal, potentially indicating exploitation of retained access by a departed employee or an adversary using a valid account before deprovisioning. The rule identifies activity occurring more than 24 hours prior to removal involving multiple repositories or multiple access actions.
Detects rapid, bulk cloning or downloading of GitHub repositories containing sensitive data (e.g., consensus algorithms, PII, internal blocklists). This behavior is characteristic of unauthorized data exfiltration, specifically tracking activity involving suspicious OAuth token prefixes (gho_) and rapid high-volume access to sensitive organizational assets within a short timeframe.
Detects anomalous activity in a CI/CD environment where a runner process accesses sensitive credential files (such as PyPI tokens or GitHub secrets) followed closely by a network connection to public package registry domains, potentially indicating a supply-chain compromise where stolen credentials are used to publish malicious packages.
This rule detects potential CI/CD security compromises in GitHub by monitoring for modifications to workflow permissions that grant 'write-all' access, access to sensitive workflow secrets via 'pull_request_target' from forked repositories, and the registration of new self-hosted runners. These actions are common indicators of supply chain attacks aimed at poisoning pipeline execution or exfiltrating build secrets.
Detects an anomalous burst of git clone, fetch, or download events performed by a single GitHub user account against a large number of private repositories within a short timeframe (15-minute window). This pattern often indicates unauthorized bulk collection or exfiltration of sensitive source code by an actor using a valid account.
Detects GitHub OAuth authorization, repository cloning, or ZIP downloads from source IP addresses that have not been observed for the specific actor within the past 30 days. This rule helps identify potential account compromise or token theft where an attacker attempts to access repository data from a new location, while specifically excluding bot/service accounts known for rotating CI infrastructure IPs.
Detects high-frequency actions including code pushes, branch policy overrides, or workflow completions on the 'main' branch of the 'dforge-core/dforge-mcp' repository within a short time window (under 120 minutes). This may indicate automated interaction, potential rapid CI/CD activity, or unauthorized mass modification of the core repository.
This rule detects modifications to GitHub Actions workflow configuration files (.yml or .yaml) located in the .github/workflows/ directory. Such modifications may indicate unauthorized tampering with CI/CD pipelines to facilitate persistent execution, credential theft, or supply chain attacks.
Detects a single developer identity performing a high volume of git push or clone operations across a large number of distinct repositories within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a compromised developer account being used to programmatically inject code into multiple repositories, potentially for a supply chain attack or mass payload propagation.
Detects rapid mass-cloning or downloading of private GitHub repositories shortly after an OAuth token authorization, originating from IP addresses or countries not previously associated with the user account. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized bulk data extraction using compromised credentials, consistent with threat actor activity (e.g., TeamPCP/UNC6780).
Detects the creation and immediate deletion of a GitHub OAuth token that is used to clone or fetch a large volume of private repositories within a short lifespan. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using a temporary, ephemeral token to perform rapid data exfiltration or mass reconnaissance on source code repositories.
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