Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Detects instances where an email previously detected as malware or phishing and quarantined is subsequently released and the recipient interacts with/clicks URLs contained within the email.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
Detects inbound emails featuring Spanish government and COVID-19 themes in the subject or sender display name, which contain URLs pointing to domains resembling Amnesty International or various media organizations, indicating potential phishing or social engineering campaigns.
Detects the removal of user accounts from a specific sensitive Microsoft Entra ID group, which may indicate unauthorized group membership changes or potential privilege escalation activities.
Builds a 28-day hourly baseline of mail and file access operations (MailItemsAccessed, FileAccessed, FileDownloaded and SearchQueryPerformed) for each application identity and action type in CloudAppEvents, counting hours with no activity as zero, then alerts on each complete hour in the latest window where the identity’s operation count exceeds its average by more than three standard deviations and reaches a minimum volume.
Application identities legitimately read data at high volume, so a per-identity statistical baseline separates abuse of granted permissions from normal machine traffic where fixed thresholds fail. Identities with no activity in the baseline period are excluded, and a sustained change in behaviour, such as a large synchronisation or recovery job, will produce one result for each hour it remains elevated.
The rule runs every 24 hours, as this is the only Defender custom detection frequency with a 30-day lookback, and tests the 25 complete hours ending two hours before each run, allowing for audit log ingestion delays while overlapping the previous run so that no hour is missed.
Where the display name matches the AccountId, Defender for Cloud Apps could not name the identity, which is common for Microsoft first-party services, so analysts should confirm the application before drawing conclusions.
Application identities legitimately read data at high volume, so a per-identity statistical baseline separates abuse of granted permissions from normal machine traffic where fixed thresholds fail. Identities with no activity in the baseline period are excluded, and a sustained change in behaviour, such as a large synchronisation or recovery job, will produce one result for each hour it remains elevated.
The rule runs every 24 hours, as this is the only Defender custom detection frequency with a 30-day lookback, and tests the 25 complete hours ending two hours before each run, allowing for audit log ingestion delays while overlapping the previous run so that no hour is missed.
Where the display name matches the AccountId, Defender for Cloud Apps could not name the identity, which is common for Microsoft first-party services, so analysts should confirm the application before drawing conclusions.
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in followed within 60 minutes by non-interactive replay from a different IP AND a persistence action (inbox rule, app consent, device add) from a non-original IP. Persistence is now mandatory (inner join) instead of optional, and the retired AADSignInEventsBeta table is replaced by EntraIdSignInEvents.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects an Entra 'Add device' event within 2 minutes after a successful sign-in from an IP never seen for that user in the lookback window, and where the registration originates from that same new IP (rogue device persistence after token replay).
Detects scenarios where a user's password is reset or sessions are revoked in Azure Active Directory, followed closely by mailbox access (items accessed, sent, or deleted) from a client IP address that was never seen interacting with that mailbox prior to the password reset event.
Detects an Entra 'Add device' event within 2 minutes after a successful sign-in from an IP never seen for that user in the lookback window, and where the registration originates from that same new IP (rogue device persistence after token replay).
Azure AD Device Code Flow Token Phishing
Cortex XDR
Detects potential device code phishing attacks by identifying OAuth token requests associated with the device code flow that originate from unmanaged or non-compliant devices. The rule specifically monitors for suspicious Cmsi (Client Managed Service Identity) activity or the use of unbound sign-in tokens within the device code flow for targeted Microsoft productivity and management applications.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in followed within 60 minutes by non-interactive replay from a different IP AND a persistence action (inbox rule, app consent, device add) from a non-original IP. Persistence is now mandatory (inner join) instead of optional, and the retired AADSignInEventsBeta table is replaced by EntraIdSignInEvents.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in followed within 60 minutes by non-interactive replay from a different IP AND a persistence action (inbox rule, app consent, device add) from a non-original IP. Persistence is now mandatory (inner join) instead of optional, and the retired AADSignInEventsBeta table is replaced by EntraIdSignInEvents.
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