Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
303 detections
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Detects anomalous SSH sessions originating from potentially suspicious IP addresses that utilize an 'SSH-2.0-Go' banner and immediately perform file creation operations associated with the RedTail botnet (e.g., shell scripts or architecture-specific binaries).
This rule detects potentially unauthorized root account activity by monitoring for 'root' logon events and privileged process execution (such as 'su' or 'sudo'). It flags sessions or commands that occur outside of defined business hours, originate from unapproved IP addresses, use unapproved accounts, or are executed via suspicious parent processes, providing a high-confidence indicator of anomalous administrative behavior.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized root account activity by monitoring for 'root' logon events and privileged process execution (such as 'su' or 'sudo'). It flags sessions or commands that occur outside of defined business hours, originate from unapproved IP addresses, use unapproved accounts, or are executed via suspicious parent processes, providing a high-confidence indicator of anomalous administrative behavior.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized root account activity by monitoring for 'root' logon events and privileged process execution (such as 'su' or 'sudo'). It flags sessions or commands that occur outside of defined business hours, originate from unapproved IP addresses, use unapproved accounts, or are executed via suspicious parent processes, providing a high-confidence indicator of anomalous administrative behavior.
Detects SSH persistence planted during the Red Heron campaign: authorized_keys file writes under a .ssh folder, correlated with process command lines referencing authorized_keys and the operator's observed key comment naming pattern (backdoor / root-shell).
Detects anomalous SSH sessions originating from potentially suspicious IP addresses that utilize an 'SSH-2.0-Go' banner and immediately perform file creation operations associated with the RedTail botnet (e.g., shell scripts or architecture-specific binaries).
Detects anomalous SSH sessions originating from potentially suspicious IP addresses that utilize an 'SSH-2.0-Go' banner and immediately perform file creation operations associated with the RedTail botnet (e.g., shell scripts or architecture-specific binaries).
Detects anomalous SSH sessions originating from potentially suspicious IP addresses that utilize an 'SSH-2.0-Go' banner and immediately perform file creation operations associated with the RedTail botnet (e.g., shell scripts or architecture-specific binaries).
This rule detects either the execution of a specific SSH daemon binary known to be trojanized or the creation/modification of files within the /var/lib/sshd/ directory, which is a common indicator of backdoor persistence or credential theft targeting SSH sessions.
This rule detects either the execution of a specific SSH daemon binary known to be trojanized or the creation/modification of files within the /var/lib/sshd/ directory, which is a common indicator of backdoor persistence or credential theft targeting SSH sessions.
This rule detects either the execution of a specific SSH daemon binary known to be trojanized or the creation/modification of files within the /var/lib/sshd/ directory, which is a common indicator of backdoor persistence or credential theft targeting SSH sessions.
This rule detects either the execution of a specific SSH daemon binary known to be trojanized or the creation/modification of files within the /var/lib/sshd/ directory, which is a common indicator of backdoor persistence or credential theft targeting SSH sessions.
This rule detects successful SSH logins that follow a burst of at least 10 failed SSH authentication attempts from the same remote IP address to the same device within a 10-minute window, followed by a successful login within 15 minutes. This pattern is indicative of a successful credential brute-force attack, frequently associated with botnet propagation efforts.
Detects successful SSH authentication to a Linux system using public-key authentication by monitoring system logs for the 'Accepted publickey for' message. This rule identifies remote access attempts and serves as a foundation for monitoring lateral movement via SSH.
The aim of this query is detect SSH connections attempts where the external sources are specifying babeld (Network Protocol) or Conker (Network Conf. Manager) as parameters to establish a connection, is detect suspicious activity such as:
Unauthorized SSH connections.
Malicious use of SSH for lateral movement within a network.
Exfiltration attempts via SSH tunneling.
Unauthorized SSH connections.
Malicious use of SSH for lateral movement within a network.
Exfiltration attempts via SSH tunneling.
This rule detects when a user containing the name "admin" in the username fails to log in via SSH.
This could indicate an attempt to access the system using administrative credentials, which may be a sign of malicious activity.
However, it is important to note that this rule may also generate false positives if legitimate users with "admin" in their usernames fail to log in due to typos or other issues.
This could indicate an attempt to access the system using administrative credentials, which may be a sign of malicious activity.
However, it is important to note that this rule may also generate false positives if legitimate users with "admin" in their usernames fail to log in due to typos or other issues.
This rule detects the presence and execution of files and scripts associated with the exploitation of CVE-2026-55200, such as harness binaries and proof-of-concept scripts. Additionally, it identifies post-exploitation behavior where common network-related processes (like curl, git, or sshd) spawn suspicious or unexpected child processes, which may indicate successful code execution or lateral movement originating from the compromised service.
This rule detects potential SSH brute force attacks by monitoring syslog for multiple failed SSH login attempts, connection closures, or invalid user attempts from a single source IP address within a short time frame. It specifically looks for keywords like 'error', 'Connection closed', 'authentication failure', and 'invalid user' in SSHD logs.
Detects post-compromise persistence techniques, including crontab modifications, SSH authorized_keys updates, and systemd service creation, when performed by child processes of AI agentic tools like Claude, Node.js, or Python. This activity suggests malicious persistence establishment following an indirect prompt injection or supply-chain compromise of the AI agent environment.
Detects network traffic attempting to modify SSH authorized_keys or the sshd_config file using SCP or SFTP protocols, which is a common technique used by attackers to maintain persistence on compromised systems.
This rule detects the installation and configuration of the OpenSSH Server feature on Windows endpoints. It monitors for the use of Add-WindowsCapability to install the feature, administrative commands (net.exe, sc.exe) used to manage the sshd service, and the creation or modification of authorized_keys files, which are often used to maintain persistent, passwordless access to the system.
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