Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
338 detections
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Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
Detects HTTP POST requests directed at 'relay.php' that contain a hardcoded Authorization Bearer token ('crpx0_c2_2026') used by the CRPx0 ransomware. This activity indicates a compromised host is actively beaconing to C2 infrastructure for command execution, key exchange, or data exfiltration.
Detects DNS resolution requests for the domain 'myaccount.microsoft.com', which is the Microsoft account management portal. This activity is often associated with legitimate user authentication or account configuration processes, but can be used as part of reconnaissance or credential-related activities.
Detects DNS lookups and TLS SNI requests to known domains associated with Storm-3121 and Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These campaigns utilize passkey or Single Sign-On (SSO) themed lures to facilitate credential harvesting.
Detects high-rate scanning and automated service probing patterns consistent with network reconnaissance. This includes tracking TCP SYN floods to external segments, excessive HTTP/login requests, and automated fingerprinting probes (e.g., favicon or admin panel enumeration). The rule accounts for common uptime monitoring services to minimize false positives.
Detects network activity associated with the ProRAM C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for DNS resolutions, TLS SNI field matches, and specific HTTP WebSocket upgrade patterns directed towards the 'clash-verge-upgrade.com' domain.
Detects high-rate scanning and automated service probing patterns consistent with network reconnaissance. This includes tracking TCP SYN floods to external segments, excessive HTTP/login requests, and automated fingerprinting probes (e.g., favicon or admin panel enumeration). The rule accounts for common uptime monitoring services to minimize false positives.
Detects high-rate scanning and automated service probing patterns consistent with network reconnaissance. This includes tracking TCP SYN floods to external segments, excessive HTTP/login requests, and automated fingerprinting probes (e.g., favicon or admin panel enumeration). The rule accounts for common uptime monitoring services to minimize false positives.
Detects network activity associated with the ProRAM C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for DNS resolutions, TLS SNI field matches, and specific HTTP WebSocket upgrade patterns directed towards the 'clash-verge-upgrade.com' domain.
This rule identifies potential DNS tunneling or beaconing activity by detecting an unusually high volume of DNS queries (exceeding 50 requests) made to a specific domain name within a given timeframe. Such patterns are often associated with C2 communication or data exfiltration via the DNS protocol.
Pycodevx Rat C2 Beacon
YARA-L
Detects outbound HTTP(S) requests carrying the 'pyCodeVx', 'pyCodeV3', 'pyCodeV4', or 'NEWW' string marker in the URI, User-Agent, headers, or body, indicating beaconing by the pyCodeVx Python-based RAT (and its variants) to its command-and-control infrastructure
Detects network connections, DNS resolutions, or TLS SNI values matching known TWINLOOT command-and-control infrastructure, including the attacker-registered domains sharepointx.th2ch.com and lpi-web.com and the failover IP 193.24.211.221. TWINLOOT is a modular Python implant that hides its C2 inside trusted Microsoft cloud services (Graph API, SharePoint Online, Teams TURN relay) while also relying on dedicated attacker-controlled infrastructure for direct TLS/WebSocket tunneling and failover.
Detects high-frequency, repeated exploitation attempts or IDS alerts referencing Siemens S7 CVEs directed at a single destination IP, potentially indicating iterative exploit development or automated vulnerability testing against Industrial Control System (ICS) hardware.
Detects unauthorized S7comm 'GET' or 'Read' operations directed at Siemens S7 Series PLCs over TCP port 102. These commands are often used in reconnaissance phases of ICS/OT attacks to map memory blocks, read ladder logic, or identify system state before executing more disruptive operations.
Detects outbound HTTP traffic indicative of pyCodeVx RAT check-in behavior. The rule identifies communication with ddnsfree.com C2 domains or requests containing the 'pyCodeVx' marker in the URL or User-Agent, coupled with a base64-encoded, fixed-format victim/session ID.
Detects instances where a host that is not identified as a Domain Controller performs a DRSUAPI 'DRSGetNCChanges' request against another Domain Controller. This pattern is commonly associated with DCSync attacks, where an adversary mimics the Active Directory replication process to extract password hashes.
Detects instances where a host that is not identified as a Domain Controller performs a DRSUAPI 'DRSGetNCChanges' request against another Domain Controller. This pattern is commonly associated with DCSync attacks, where an adversary mimics the Active Directory replication process to extract password hashes.
Detects privileged Active Directory enumeration seen on the wire by Corelight, filtered to source hosts that don't appear in the Cortex endpoint inventory. It reads ldap_search records from corelight_zeek_raw, tiers them by the LDAP filter (CRITICAL for credential-attribute and DCSync hunting, HIGH for Tier Zero, Kerberoast, delegation, and UAC-bitmask targeting, MEDIUM for broad group, computer, and GPO enumeration), then joins the source address against endpoints and keeps only the queries whose id_orig_h has no matching managed agent
This rule monitors Kerberos TGS (Ticket-Granting Service) requests for suspicious patterns indicative of Kerberoasting, specifically looking for the use of weak encryption algorithms (RC4 or DES) and high volumes of service ticket requests for unique Service Principal Names (SPNs). It groups activity by source host and time window, flagging activity that involves DES encryption or a significant number of unique SPN requests. Great for detecting kerberoasting activity from unmanaged or rogue devices
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