Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by identifying an unusual number of Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) for service principal names (SPNs) ending with '$' from a single client address within an hour. A high count (over 10) is flagged as 'High' suspicion, while a count between 5 and 10 is flagged as 'Medium'. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to obtain service ticket hashes for offline cracking.
This rule detects sign-in attempts by 'Break Glass' accounts. Break Glass accounts are emergency access accounts typically used in situations where normal administrative access methods are unavailable. Monitoring their usage is critical due to the high privileges usually associated with these accounts. The rule joins sign-in logs with a watchlist of identities to specifically identify activity related to these designated accounts.
This rule detects potential DCSync replication abuse by monitoring Security Event ID 4662, specifically looking for access to 'domainDNS' or user objects with the GUID '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2', which is associated with Directory Replication Service (DRS) permissions. It filters out machine accounts to reduce false positives.
Detects the use of a specific PowerShell command pattern using the '[adsiSearcher]' type accelerator to enumerate and count computer objects in Active Directory. This technique was observed being used for discovery in campaigns following the exploitation of CVE-2026-1731 (BeyondTrust).
Detects the use of the 'net' command to create a new domain user and immediately add that user to a high-privilege domain group (e.g., Enterprise Admins, Domain Admins) within a short time window. This TTP was observed in campaigns following the exploitation of BeyondTrust (CVE-2026-1731) to establish persistent, privileged access.
Detects a high volume of Kerberos pre-authentication failures (Event ID 4771, Status 0x18) against multiple distinct user accounts originating from a single source IP address within a short time window. This behavior is characteristic of password spraying attacks where an attacker attempts a small number of common passwords across many accounts to avoid lockouts and detection in a Windows Active Directory environment.
Identity LOLBA trying to dump AD server credentials and security information´s
This rule detects when a member is added to or removed from highly sensitive administrative groups within Active Directory. It specifically monitors Windows Security Event IDs 4728 (member added) and 4729 (member removed) for a predefined list of critical groups such as 'Administrators', 'Domain Admins', 'Enterprise Admins', and 'Schema Admins'. The rule excludes changes made by computer accounts to reduce false positives.
This rule detects successful sign-ins to Azure Active Directory (AAD) from IP addresses outside of Australia and New Zealand, where the User-Agent string matches a list of known suspicious User-Agents. It filters out many legitimate User-Agents to reduce false positives, including those from Microsoft applications, mobile devices, and common tools.
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests (TGS) for canary Service Principal Names (SPNs). Any request for a ticket to a canary SPN is highly indicative of a Kerberoasting attack (T1558.003) or other reconnaissance activity, as these accounts have no legitimate purpose. Creation of Canary SPNs can be found here: https://github.com/fluffybunnies-h4x/CyberDeception?tab=readme-ov-file#creating-a-canary-spn-account
Detects the use of 'dsquery.exe' to perform broad Active Directory user reconnaissance. Threat actors like UAT-8837 use this legitimate tool to enumerate all users in a domain to identify high-value targets.
This rule detects when a certificate is issued to a privileged user. It identifies privileged users by checking their group membership against a predefined list of administrative groups such as 'Domain Admins', 'Enterprise Admins', and 'Administrators'. The rule then looks for Windows Security Event ID 4886, which indicates a certificate services operation, and extracts the principal name from the Subject Alternative Name field. Finally, it joins this information with the identified privileged users to flag any certificate issuance to them.
This detection rule identifies the execution of the Purple Knight tool, a free Active Directory security assessment utility developed by Semperis. Purple Knight is designed to scan for AD vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and common attack paths. While it is a legitimate tool used by defenders, its execution in production environments may also indicate red team activity or unauthorized reconnaissance by adversaries attempting to map domain weaknesses.
Detects registry values containing Base64-encoded PowerShell commands. Attackers use this technique to obfuscate malicious commands in the registry for persistence or execution.
This rule detects attempts to discover Group Policy settings on a system. It identifies the execution of common command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wmic.exe, rundll32.exe) followed by specific commands or PowerShell cmdlets used for GPO enumeration. This includes native Windows commands like 'gpresult' and 'secedit', registry queries for policy settings, PowerShell cmdlets such as 'Get-GPO' and 'Get-GPResultantSetOfPolicy', and LDAP-related queries for 'groupPolicyContainer'. Additionally, it correlates these process events with network connections to SYSVOL shares or LDAP ports (389, 636) that also contain 'groupPolicyContainer' in the URL, indicating potential GPO access. The rule filters out common system processes to reduce noise.
Detects the creation of a new domain user account that is immediately added to a high-privilege group, such as Domain Admins. This pattern is a strong indicator of persistence and privilege escalation, as observed in the Lynx Ransomware campaign.
Detects a pattern indicative of an NTLM relay attack following an authentication coercion spray. The rule first identifies a single source IP generating a high volume of failed NTLM logon attempts across multiple critical servers in a short time. It then looks for a subsequent successful NTLM logon from that same source IP to a high-value target (like a Certificate Authority) using a machine account. This sequence is a strong indicator that an attacker coerced credentials and is now relaying them to escalate privileges.
Detects the attachment of a virtual disk (.vmdk) likely belonging to a Domain Controller to another virtual machine. This technique is used by threat actors like SCATTERED SPIDER to access the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) for offline credential dumping. This is often done on a newly created, attacker-controlled VM.
Detects any authentication activity (successful or failed) for emergency break-glass administrative accounts
This rule detects modifications to the NTDS.dit file, which is the Active Directory database. Adversaries often target this file to extract credentials and other sensitive information from domain controllers. Monitoring changes to this file can indicate an attempt at credential dumping or unauthorized access to Active Directory.
This rule detects suspicious service account (SPN enabled) logon attempts originating from workstation subnets. This activity can be an indicator of credential dumping techniques. The rule looks for Event ID 4768 (A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested) where the target user name is a known SPN-enabled account and the source IP address falls within defined workstation subnets.
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