Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
896 detections
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Detects Microsoft Defender AV alerts associated with the GigaWiper signature, indicating the presence of the GRAT wiper component deployed by Cyber Isnaad Front.
Detects the use of the Add-MpPreference cmdlet to add the root C:\ drive to the Windows Defender exclusion path. Attackers and ransomware families, such as The Gentlemen, use this technique to completely blind Windows Defender to malicious file activity during the encryption process.
Detects the execution of the Set-MpPreference PowerShell cmdlet to disable Windows Defender real-time monitoring. This technique is frequently abused by malware and ransomware affiliates, such as The Gentlemen RaaS, to bypass endpoint defenses prior to payload detonation.
This rule detects when critical services, including security agents, backup solutions, and remote management tools, are stopped on a host. Adversaries often stop these services to evade detection, disable security controls, or inhibit system recovery during attacks like ransomware.
This rule detects Windows devices running an antivirus platform version that is not '4.18.26030.3011'. This could indicate an outdated antivirus installation, which might be a result of defense evasion tactics or a failure in update mechanisms, leaving the system vulnerable.
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33825
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33825
Detects the expiration of the grace period of Windows Defender. This means protection against viruses, spyware, and other potentially unwanted software is disabled.
Detects disabling Windows Defender Tamper Protection
Detects disabling of the "Automatic Sample Submission" feature of Windows Defender.
Detects modifications or creations of Windows Defender's default threat action settings based on severity to 'allow' or take 'no action'.
This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender's ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level,
allowing malicious software to run unimpeded. An attacker might use this technique to bypass defenses before executing payloads.
This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender's ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level,
allowing malicious software to run unimpeded. An attacker might use this technique to bypass defenses before executing payloads.
Detects non-Defender processes accessing the Windows Defender signature definition file (mpasbase.vdm). This file should exclusively be accessed by Defender platform processes (MsMpEng.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, NisSrv.exe, etc.) and Windows servicing components. Any other process touching this file has zero legitimate use cases and is a high-fidelity indicator of the BlueHammer zero-day LPE exploit, which leverages a batch oplock on mpasbase.vdm to freeze Defender mid-read, then performs NTFS junction swapping to redirect SYSTEM-context reads to the SAM hive via a VSS snapshot, resulting in local credential theft and privilege escalation. MITRE: T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. References: https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/BlueHammer, https://www.deobfuscated.dev/posts/defender-lpe-0-day
Detects the full kill-chain used by modern ransomware operators (RansomHub, LockBit affiliates, BlackCat/ALPHV, FIN7) who deploy EDR killers (EDRKillShifter, AvNeutralizer/AuKill, Terminator, RealBlindingEDR, GhostDriver/Poortry, Backstab) in the pre-encryption phase. These tools use the BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) technique — loading a legitimately-signed but vulnerable kernel driver (rtcore64.sys, gdrv.sys, truesight.sys, dbutil_2_3.sys, mhyprot2.sys, procexp152.sys, aswarpot.sys, zam64.sys) as a kernel service, then abusing its IOCTLs to terminate protected EDR processes from kernel space, bypassing PPL. This pack contains 10 queries covering vulnerable driver loads, drivers dropped to user-writable paths, kernel service creation, known EDR-killer binaries, Defender/EDR service tampering, mass security-process termination bursts, unsigned kernel loads, registry-based Defender tampering, full driver→service→kill chain correlation within 1h, and a hash-free behavioural catch-all (unsigned loader → sc.exe create kernel service within 60s).
Detects the usage of "reg.exe" to add Defender folder exclusions. Qbot has been seen using this technique to add exclusions for folders within AppData and ProgramData.
Detects when someone is adding or removing applications or folders from exploit guard "ProtectedFolders" or "AllowedApplications"
Detects disabling of the Windows Defender feature of scanning for malware and other potentially unwanted software
Detects blocked attempts to change any of Defender's settings such as "Real Time Monitoring" and "Behavior Monitoring"
Detects the use of PowerShell to execute the 'Set-MpPreference' cmdlet to configure Windows Defender's threat severity default action to 'Allow' (value '6') or 'NoAction' (value '9').
This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender's ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level.
An attacker might use this technique via the command line to bypass defenses before executing payloads.
This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender's ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level.
An attacker might use this technique via the command line to bypass defenses before executing payloads.
Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by removing Windows Defender Definition Files
Detects the Setting of Windows Defender Exclusions
Detects disabling Windows Defender PUA protection
Detects requests to exclude files, folders or processes from Antivirus scanning using PowerShell cmdlets
Detects applications being added to the "allowed applications" list of exploit guard in order to bypass controlled folder settings
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