Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when a common web server process (node, nginx, apache, apache2, httpd) spawns `curl` or `wget`. This behavior is a strong indicator of post-exploitation activity, as seen in the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell), where attackers download second-stage payloads.
Detects the mass renaming or creation of files with the '.01flip' extension, which is characteristic of the 01flip ransomware. A high count of these files on a single host is a strong indicator of an active ransomware infection.
Detects the creation or modification of the '/tmp/sslvpn.log' file, a known artifact of a new Linux variant of the Lazarus BADCALL backdoor.
Detects the execution of the command to stop the vCenter remote management service (vpxa) on an ESXi host. This is a technique used by the RansomHouse MrAgent tool to inhibit system recovery and impair defenses before deploying the Mario encryptor.
Detects the execution of Node.js with the '-e' flag, which evaluates a string as JavaScript. This technique is used by the EtherRAT implant for fileless execution, particularly for privilege escalation attempts.
Detects the renaming of VMware virtual machine related files to a new file ending with the '.emario' extension. This behavior is characteristic of the RansomHouse 'Mario' encryptor.
This rule detects the execution of known proxyware applications such as Infatica, Honeygain, and IPRoyal by looking for specific command-line arguments. Proxyware applications monetize unused internet bandwidth by routing traffic through the user's device, which can pose security and privacy risks.
Detects the specific command-line sequence used by the 01flip ransomware on Linux to erase itself from the disk after encrypting files. This involves using 'sleep' for a delay, 'dd' to overwrite the file with random data, and 'rm' to delete it.
Detects the disabling of the VMware ESXi firewall using 'esxcli', a technique used by the RansomHouse 'MrAgent' tool as a defense evasion tactic before encryption.
Detects the MrAgent binary, a deployment tool used in RansomHouse operations to manage compromised ESXi hosts and deploy the 'Mario' encryptor.
This rule query identifies likely post‑exploitation activity associated with React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) in which Part 1 identifies web servers spawning unusual child processes (such as command shells or system utilities) combined with suspicious command-line patterns, which may indicate post-exploitation behavior following a compromise. and part 2 detects web servers making outbound network connections to known malicious IPs or hostnames, or to domains associated with tunneling services (e.g., trycloudflare.com), suggesting potential command-and-control activity or data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of the ESXi command 'esxcli network firewall set --enabled false' used by the RansomHouse MrAgent deployment tool to disable the host's firewall. This is a defense evasion technique used to ensure C2 communication and subsequent ransomware deployment.
Detects the renaming of critical virtualization files by the RansomHouse 'Mario' encryptor, which appends an extension containing '.mario' (e.g., '.emario'). This activity is a strong indicator of a successful encryption event on an ESXi host.
Detects the ransom note file 'How To Restore Your Files.txt' created by the RansomHouse 'Mario' encryptor.
Detects the creation of suspicious files (e.g., web shells, executables) by a Node.js or Next.js server process. This activity is a common post-exploitation step after a successful RCE, such as from exploiting CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell), where an attacker drops a backdoor for persistence.
Detects potential exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerability CVE-2025-61882, which allows for unauthenticated remote code execution. This rule looks for specific web request URIs, post-exploitation process activity, and known indicators of compromise (IOCs).
Detects exploitation of a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2025-61882) in Oracle E-Business Suite. The attack involves an authentication bypass followed by the upload and execution of a malicious XSLT template, leading to command execution and potential web shell deployment.
Detects the creation of suspicious child processes (e.g., shells, network tools) by a Node.js or Next.js server process. This could indicate successful remote code execution, potentially related to vulnerabilities like React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182).
Detects outbound network connections from common web server processes to the Telegram API domain (api.telegram.org). This behavior is indicative of the BlackForce phishing kit exfiltrating stolen credentials, as newer versions use a server-side component to relay data to a Telegram channel.
Detects Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) exploitation attempts. This includes network connections to known malicious IP addresses, DNS queries for attacker-controlled domains, process creations involving suspicious command-line arguments (often related to downloading or executing scripts/binaries), and file hashes of known malicious artifacts. The exploit activity is linked to C2 communication, data exfiltration, and potentially cryptomining activities.
Detects the ZinFoq Go-based post-exploitation implant. This rule identifies the binary based on a unique, hardcoded timestamp string used for its timestomping anti-forensics feature, along with other specific C2 artifacts.
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