Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors email traffic to detect scenarios where a single recipient is receiving a large volume of emails (at least 30 messages) from a high number of unique senders (at least 15) within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a potential bulk spam or phishing campaign targeting a specific mailbox, which may be attempting to overwhelm the recipient or bypass traditional filters through volume.
This rule detects potential MFA phishing attempts by identifying access to known malicious domains used for MFA credential harvesting within email communications and network traffic. It flags instances where users interact with domains masquerading as legitimate multi-factor authentication setup or registration services.
Detects anomalous, high-volume activity in cloud-based services such as SharePoint, OneDrive, and Exchange, specifically tracking file access, downloads, and mailbox exports. This behavior may indicate bulk data collection, unauthorized exfiltration, or malicious data staging by a compromised account.
This rule detects known malicious activity including network connections to a specific C2 IP address (69.48.229.140), downloading files from specific C2 URLs, the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256), and communications involving specific actor-associated email addresses.
This rule detects network activity and cloud API events indicative of an adversary utilizing the VAPI.ai platform to orchestrate automated voice-phishing (vishing) campaigns. It correlates outbound network connections to VAPI.ai endpoints with specific webhook callback patterns used to track call status for victim records.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
Detects Microsoft Graph API requests targeting user information endpoints (/v1.0/users or /v1.0/me) using specific search filters associated with payroll or human resources and identified by the Axios HTTP client User-Agent string. This pattern is consistent with reconnaissance activities.
Detects specific, targeted search operations within M365 environments for keywords related to payroll, HR, and banking information. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise reconnaissance activity, often following AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) session hijacking where an attacker attempts to locate financial documents and payroll correspondence.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Microsoft 365 that filter messages containing financial keywords (e.g., 'direct deposit', 'bank') and perform actions designed to hide or suppress these emails (e.g., 'MoveToFolder', 'DeleteMessage', 'MarkAsRead', 'StopProcessingRules'). This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to hide notification emails regarding financial transactions, which could alert the user to unauthorized activity.
Detects M365 administrative actions related to mailbox forwarding rules or OAuth application consent that occur in the absence of a Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) claim, particularly when preceded by non-interactive session events (LogonType 0) using REST client protocols. This pattern is indicative of potential session hijacking or token replay attacks, where an adversary leverages a compromised session to establish persistence or gain ongoing access to the environment without re-authenticating.
Detects a suspected EvilTokens attack sequence where a user clicks a phishing URL and subsequently initiates a browser session to the Microsoft device-code authorization page (devicelogin) within 15 minutes, with the phishing lure domain appearing in the browser context.
Detects potentially malicious OAuth device code sign-ins by identifying sign-in events that exhibit anomalous characteristics, such as atypical geographic locations, rare client-application combinations, unmanaged/noncompliant device status, or elevated risk signals associated with the account. This detection helps identify account compromise or malicious OAuth consent activity often associated with 'EvilTokens' or device-code phishing attacks.
Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
Detects credential-phishing attempts originating from Proton Mail addresses that result in a user clicking on a link. The rule correlates email delivery from known Proton Mail domains with subsequent URL click events to identify potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity, often associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) threat group.
Detects OAuth application consent events in Entra ID where the application display name mimics legitimate services like Salesforce or Data Loader while requesting high-risk API scopes (full_access, offline_access, api). This behavior is characteristic of phishing-driven OAuth grant campaigns, such as those observed by the ShinyHunters group.
Detects anomalous anti-forensic behavior where a Salesforce Bulk API query job is deleted shortly after its creation or completion. This sequence is often associated with efforts to obscure data exfiltration activities by removing the metadata trail of bulk data exports.
Detects a correlation between a DNS query for a potential typosquatting or brand-lookalike domain (newly observed within the last 30 days) and a subsequent sign-in authentication event originating from the same client IP within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker, such as ShinyHunters vishing operators, directing victims to a lookalike SSO phishing portal to harvest credentials and MFA tokens before attempting access to the legitimate environment.
Detects additions, updates, or modifications to External Authentication Methods (EAM) or federated identity providers in Microsoft Entra ID. This activity is consistent with the TrustSink technique, where an adversary registers a malicious OIDC MFA provider to facilitate authentication bypass or persistence.
Detects OAuth application consent grant events where an application name matches common 'Data Loader' naming conventions and requests high-privilege scopes (read/write/full/api). This pattern is consistent with consent phishing campaigns used by threat actors to gain persistent access to SaaS environments like M365 or Salesforce.
Detects a pattern associated with ShinyHunters/UNC6040, where a user authorizes a new or rarely-used OAuth connected application shortly after performing a help-desk initiated password reset or MFA re-enrollment, originating from a different geographic location.
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