Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
9,759 detections
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Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe with arguments indicative of Install From Media (IFM) backup creation, correlated with subsequent access to the ntds.dit file on the same device within a one-hour window. This behavior is commonly associated with attackers attempting to harvest the Active Directory database for offline credential cracking.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PWSH with encoded command flags (-EncodedCommand, -enc, -e), which is a common technique used by adversaries to hide malicious scripts or payloads from inspection.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that involve suspicious arguments (such as encoded commands, execution from volatile directories like Temp/AppData, or run-once triggers) shortly after a file has been downloaded into a temporary or user-writable directory. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence for downloaded malware.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry Run/RunOnce keys or file creation events in the Startup folder by processes not identified as standard system installers or Windows Explorer, indicating potential persistence attempts.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry Run/RunOnce keys or file creation events in the Startup folder by processes not identified as standard system installers or Windows Explorer, indicating potential persistence attempts.
Detects execution of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe with potentially malicious command-line arguments, including references to external URLs, protocol handlers like javascript:, or loading DLLs from user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads). This behavior is characteristic of Living-off-the-Land (LotL) techniques used to proxy execution and bypass application control or security monitoring.
Detects the execution of command-line archiving utilities (e.g., 7z, rar, zip) to create potentially password-protected archives within common staging directories (Temp, Public, ProgramData), followed by an outbound network connection to an external destination. This behavior is consistent with data staging and subsequent exfiltration.
Detects the execution of the Microsoft HTML Application host (mshta.exe) when it is used to launch scripts from remote URLs (http/https/ftp) or when it spawns common command-line shells and scripting engines, which is a common indicator of living-off-the-land techniques used to execute malicious payloads.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe for proxy execution, defense evasion, and credential access. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns including Squiblydoo (regsvr32 with remote scriptlets), rundll32 executing JavaScript via mshtml.dll, rundll32 performing LSASS credential dumping via comsvcs.dll, and the loading of DLLs from untrusted user-writable locations like Temp or Downloads folders.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that leverage obfuscation or evasion techniques such as Base64 encoded commands, hidden window styles, in-memory script downloads via IEX, and common string obfuscation methods like backtick insertion, character concatenation, and casting. These techniques are frequently used by adversaries to bypass command-line monitoring and execute malicious payloads.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows system utilities certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe to perform remote file downloads or decode remote content. Adversaries often use these dual-use tools to bypass network security controls by masquerading as standard system processes for staging second-stage payloads.
Detects Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) events where a process opens lsass.exe with a GrantedAccess mask matching known credential-dumping access rights (e.g. PROCESS_VM_READ combinations used by Mimikatz/ProcDump-style tooling), excluding common legitimate EDR/AV/diagnostic source processes.
This rule monitors for process creation events where the parent process is identified as the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) or the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (wmic.exe) tool, executing a Win32_Process creation command. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for remote execution and lateral movement.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run or RunOnce keys where the associated file path points to suspicious directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, ProgramData, Users\Public) or utilizes living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe) residing outside of the protected System32 directory.
Detects the use of built-in Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, powershell, wbadmin, and bcdedit) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration to prevent system recovery. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware operations to inhibit data restoration.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to copy the NTDS.dit file from the shadow copy device path. This sequence is a common technique used by attackers to bypass file locks and extract Active Directory credential databases.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the 'CSuite' phishing and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) campaign. It monitors network, DNS, proxy, email, URL click, and file creation telemetry over the past 24 hours to identify interactions with known-malicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes related to the campaign.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the 'CSuite' phishing and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) campaign. It monitors network, DNS, proxy, email, URL click, and file creation telemetry over the past 24 hours to identify interactions with known-malicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes related to the campaign.
Detects the execution of control.exe with suspicious command-line arguments involving WebDAV paths (DavWWWRoot) and file extensions like .cpl or .dll, initiated by Windows task-related processes (svchost, taskeng, schtasks). This pattern is indicative of potential malicious payload loading or proxy execution where a scheduled task is used to trigger a secondary malicious component.
Detects the execution of control.exe with suspicious command-line arguments involving WebDAV paths (DavWWWRoot) and file extensions like .cpl or .dll, initiated by Windows task-related processes (svchost, taskeng, schtasks). This pattern is indicative of potential malicious payload loading or proxy execution where a scheduled task is used to trigger a secondary malicious component.
Detects the execution of control.exe with suspicious command-line arguments involving WebDAV paths (DavWWWRoot) and file extensions like .cpl or .dll, initiated by Windows task-related processes (svchost, taskeng, schtasks). This pattern is indicative of potential malicious payload loading or proxy execution where a scheduled task is used to trigger a secondary malicious component.
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