Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects network communication to specific Gusercontent endpoints consistent with malicious browser extensions exfiltrating captured session tokens or cookies. The rule monitors for POST requests containing parameters like leadId, email, and data, often used to transmit stolen authentication material.
This rule detects interaction with specific infrastructure identified as deceptive dating applications. It monitors network communication, sign-in attempts, email interactions, and endpoint execution associated with known malicious domains (e.g., archat.us, heyhru.com, sitin.ai), specific IP addresses (38.129.138.244), and unique package identifiers (com.cavalier.nalo, com.qiga.vio). The detection logic spans across DeviceNetworkEvents, EntraIdSignInEvents, EmailUrlInfo, EmailEvents, DeviceEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to identify exposure to these Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) across both network and endpoint layers.
This rule detects the execution of specific suspicious binary names (TempuARKK20.exe, uARKK20.exe) from within temporary directories or their association with command-line arguments involving 'curl.exe' or specific suspicious web hosting strings. This behavior is indicative of malware staging and downloading secondary payloads in an attempt to masquerade as legitimate utilities.
This rule detects various suspicious activities associated with file staging and execution in the C:\Users\Public directory, including the handling of suspicious ZIP archives, renaming of executables (pythonw.exe to userscreen.exe), and the execution of specific batch scripts or obfuscated commands. These behaviors are indicative of an adversary staging tools or persistence mechanisms on a compromised system.
Detects the deletion of the Windows Application Event Log registry key. This action is a known technique used by adversaries to disable or tamper with event logging mechanisms to conceal malicious activity.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download the 'gitlab-runner-windows-amd64.exe' binary, potentially indicating unauthorized installation or deployment of automation agents using legitimate download sources.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to the installation or misconfiguration of GitLab runner executables. It looks for unusual service creation, direct execution of runner binaries from temporary locations (e.g., C:\Windows\Temp), and the presence of configuration files or PowerShell scripts in unexpected directories that might indicate persistent access or unauthorized setup of a build runner.
Detects the installation of a GitLab Runner service on Windows, specifically identifying cases where the service is configured to run under the LocalSystem account. This is monitored via Service Control Manager (Event ID 7045), Sysmon (Registry Event ID 13), and process creation events involving sc.exe or gitlab-runner.exe.
This rule detects instances where common system utilities like notepad.exe or calc.exe are spawned as child processes by PowerShell.exe, specifically when the initiating PowerShell process was spawned by gitlab-runner.exe but the parent process information no longer resolves correctly. This is often indicative of persistence or post-exploitation activities occurring after a CI/CD job has ostensibly finished.
Detects the sequential execution of multiple Microsoft-signed LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) spawned by the same parent process (PowerShell or CMD) within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a cascading fallback mechanism used by post-exploitation tools to bypass application allowlisting or security controls.
Detects potential Remus infostealer activity by monitoring unauthorized processes accessing AI agent credential directories (Claude, Cursor, OpenCode, Codex) or cryptocurrency wallet files, specifically when combined with .lnk shortcut file access behavior.
Detects processes that systematically query registry keys associated with Outlook configuration and VNC remote access software (RealVNC, TightVNC, TigerVNC). Querying multiple distinct families of these sensitive keys in a short period is characteristic of automated reconnaissance by tools, such as the Remus malware framework, attempting to identify installed software and potential configuration details.
Detects suspicious process injection attempts into browser processes (e.g., chrome.exe, msedge.exe) characterized by direct NT API syscall invocation (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) originating from a non-browser parent process. This behavior, often associated with the Remus infostealer, bypasses standard user-mode API hooking by using direct syscall stubs to chain injection actions.
Detects potential Remus infostealer activity by monitoring unauthorized processes accessing AI agent credential directories (Claude, Cursor, OpenCode, Codex) or cryptocurrency wallet files, specifically when combined with .lnk shortcut file access behavior.
Detects suspicious processes accessing cryptocurrency wallet data files or web browser extension storage folders associated with popular crypto wallets. This behavior is indicative of credential theft or wallet data exfiltration by malware targeting digital assets.
This rule detects unauthorized access attempts by non-browser processes to specific browser extension storage directories. It focuses on directories associated with password managers, 2FA authenticators, and cryptocurrency wallets, as well as core browser credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, logins.json). This behavior is characteristic of info-stealer malware, such as the Remus infostealer, attempting to exfiltrate sensitive data stored by browsers.
Detects a multi-stage, automated attack chain performed by AI-based development agents (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor). The rule correlates process discovery, credential access, file collection (staging), and exfiltration over web services within a tight 15-minute window, identifying potential autonomous exploitation and data exfiltration. Covered T1046, T1552.001, T1078, T1005, T1567
Detects outbound network connections to a known malicious IP address (45.94.31.112) associated with C2 beaconing. The rule identifies communication directed to specific API endpoints (/api/v3/r, /api/v3/s) originating from processes other than common web browsers, suggesting the use of dedicated beaconing or malware agents (e.g., direct WinHTTP usage).
Detects outbound network connections to a known malicious IP address (45.94.31.112) associated with C2 beaconing. The rule identifies communication directed to specific API endpoints (/api/v3/r, /api/v3/s) originating from processes other than common web browsers, suggesting the use of dedicated beaconing or malware agents (e.g., direct WinHTTP usage).
Detects outbound network connections to a known malicious IP address (45.94.31.112) associated with C2 beaconing. The rule identifies communication directed to specific API endpoints (/api/v3/r, /api/v3/s) originating from processes other than common web browsers, suggesting the use of dedicated beaconing or malware agents (e.g., direct WinHTTP usage).
This rule detects scenarios where an AI agent executes shell commands or system-level tools immediately after receiving a prompt injection attack from an untrusted source. It correlates agent audit logs—specifically identifying tool calls flagged for prompt injection—with actual endpoint process creation events. It flags process execution as 'High' severity if the command line matches common malicious patterns like encoded commands, IEX, or attempts to access credential material (e.g., lsass, mimikatz).
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