Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,138 detections
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KQL Query
KQL Query from file: glibc critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8)
KQL Query from file: Finding internet facing device with CUPS
KQL Query from file: Critical Vulnerability in Elastic Kibana
Detects the use of GCC (or C89/C99) with the '-wrapper' option to execute a shell, which can be leveraged for privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments. This technique is often documented in resources like GTFOBins.
Detects the use of the 'find' command in Linux to execute a shell. This behavior is often associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempts, particularly when leveraging misconfigurations or vulnerabilities to break out of restricted environments.
This rule detects the execution of the 'capsh' utility followed by a double dash ('--'), which is a common pattern used to invoke a shell through 'capsh'. This technique can be used by adversaries to bypass restricted shell environments or escalate privileges by leveraging 'capsh' capabilities.
Detects the use of the 'env' command to invoke a shell on Linux systems. This activity can indicate an attempt to bypass restricted environments, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary commands by manipulating environment variables before launching a shell.
Detects the use of the "ssh" utility to execute a shell, which can indicate privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or breakout from restricted environments. The rule specifically looks for `ssh` commands that include `ProxyCommand=;`, `permitlocalcommand=yes`, or `localhost` in conjunction with common shell invocations like `/bin/bash`, `/bin/sh`, etc.
This YARA rule detects the ChaosRAT backdoor by identifying specific byte sequences related to its network communication, system information gathering, and file download capabilities. The rule includes three distinct versions of these functionalities, indicating evolution or different variants of the malware. Detection relies on the presence of these unique byte patterns within executable files, specifically ELF files as indicated by the magic byte check.
Detects the execution of 'awk' or its sibling commands (gawk, mawk, nawk) to invoke a shell using the `system()` function. This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
Detects the use of the "git" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments. The rule specifically looks for 'git' as the parent process, combined with command-line arguments '-p' and 'help', and a child process command line containing 'bash 0<&1', 'dash 0<&1', or 'sh 0<&1'. This pattern is indicative of exploiting git's interactive help functionality to spawn a shell.
This rule detects the use of the 'flock' command in conjunction with common shell binaries to execute a shell. This behavior can be indicative of privilege escalation attempts, unauthorized command execution, or efforts to break out of restricted environments. The rule specifically looks for the 'flock' command being executed with the '-u' option and a command line containing paths to common shells like bash, dash, fish, sh, or zsh.
This rule detects the execution of shell programs (bash, dash, fish, sh, zsh) using the 'nice' utility on Linux systems. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to escalate privileges, execute unauthorized commands, or break out of restricted environments by manipulating process priority.
This rule detects the execution of inline Python code that uses the `os.system()` function to spawn a shell. Specifically, it looks for Python interpreter executables being run with the `-c` argument (for inline code execution) and the command line containing both `os.system(` and common shell paths like `/bin/bash`, `/bin/sh`, etc. This technique is often used by adversaries to gain interactive shell access or execute arbitrary commands on a compromised system.
Detects suspicious use of command-line tools such as curl or wget to download remote content - particularly scripts - into temporary directories (e.g., /dev/shm, /tmp), followed by immediate execution, indicating potential malicious activity. This pattern is commonly used by malicious scripts, stagers, or downloaders in fileless or multi-stage Linux attacks.
The following analytic detects the suspicious add user account type. This behavior is critical for a SOC to monitor because it may indicate attempts to gain unauthorized access or maintain control over a system. Such actions could be signs of malicious activity. If confirmed, this could lead to serious consequences, including a compromised system, unauthorized access to sensitive data, or even a wider breach affecting the entire network. Detecting and responding to these signs early is essential to prevent potential security incidents.
This rule detects the creation of hidden files or directories on Linux systems. It specifically looks for common commands like 'mkdir', 'nano', 'touch', 'vi', or 'vim' being executed with arguments that start with a '.' (dot), which is the standard convention for hidden files and directories in Unix-like operating systems. This behavior is often used by adversaries for defense evasion.
Process executed from binary hidden in Base64 encoded file. Encoding malicious software is a.
Technique to obfuscate files from detection.
The first and second ProcessCommandLine component is looking for Python decoding base64.
The third ProcesssCommandLine component is looking for the Bash/sh commandline base64 decoding tool.
The fourth one is looking for Ruby decoding base64.
Technique to obfuscate files from detection.
The first and second ProcessCommandLine component is looking for Python decoding base64.
The third ProcesssCommandLine component is looking for the Bash/sh commandline base64 decoding tool.
The fourth one is looking for Ruby decoding base64.
Detects the use of the "capsh" utility to invoke a shell.
'Malware authors will sometimes hardcode user agent string values when writing the network communication component of their malware. Malformed user agents can be an indication of such malware.'
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