Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
15,361
13,596
2,797
1,803
1,725
Contributors
7,678
5,999
5,315
4,504
4,191
Categories
18,113
9,760
3,854
3,760
3,714
Platforms
40,063
7,331
6,542
3,907
3,666
Products / Services
10,442
9,677
6,722
1,888
1,879
MITRE Techniques
13,738
13,119
8,068
5,949
4,415
CVEs
49
45
30
30
29
IDS Classtypes
214
56
43
23
19
IDS Protocols
183
172
20
16
8
Detects the termination of critical processes, including security software (MsMpEng.exe), database services (sql.exe, oracle.exe, sqlservr.exe), and office productivity applications (excel.exe, outlook.exe, winword.exe). The sudden termination of these processes can indicate unauthorized attempts to disable security controls, disrupt database operations, or interfere with end-user activity.
This rule detects activities related to the loading or registration of the 'NvFsFilter' driver (nvfsflt64.sys). It monitors for command-line attempts to interact with services (using sc.exe, reg.exe, or services.exe), registry modifications involving the NvFsFilter service, and the actual loading of the nvfsflt64.sys file. This is intended to identify potential persistence mechanisms or the deployment of potentially unauthorized or malicious drivers.
Detects the use of administrative utilities 'wmic.exe' and 'schtasks.exe' to execute commands or create scheduled tasks on remote systems, excluding local execution scenarios.
Detects the loading of rstrtmgr.dll by processes other than explorer.exe. Adversaries, particularly ransomware, utilize the Windows Restart Manager API (RmStartSession, RmRegisterResources, RmShutdown) to identify and forcibly terminate processes that hold file handles to files they intend to encrypt, thereby bypassing file-in-use locks.
Detects the execution of the 'net user' command with the '/add' parameter using the hardcoded password 'Numlock!123'. This pattern is frequently observed as a persistence mechanism employed by threat actors during ransomware operations to establish unauthorized administrative access.
Detects the use of bcdedit.exe to modify boot configuration data to enable Safe Mode with Networking. This technique is used by Akira ransomware affiliates to potentially disable or impair EDR and other security tooling prior to deploying the ransomware payload.
Detects the use of bcdedit.exe to modify boot configuration data to enable Safe Mode with Networking. This technique is used by Akira ransomware affiliates to potentially disable or impair EDR and other security tooling prior to deploying the ransomware payload.
Detects the execution of ServiceModelReg.exe following parent process activity involving vsdbg.dll/vsdbg.exe, coupled with cross-process access indicators consistent with COM Elevation Moniker UAC bypass and potential process hollowing. This pattern is associated with the PUROSANGUE loader chain used to execute malicious code within a high-integrity process context.
Detects the execution of ServiceModelReg.exe following parent process activity involving vsdbg.dll/vsdbg.exe, coupled with cross-process access indicators consistent with COM Elevation Moniker UAC bypass and potential process hollowing. This pattern is associated with the PUROSANGUE loader chain used to execute malicious code within a high-integrity process context.
Detects evidence of the Alinubx.sys kernel driver being loaded or interacted with via its device interface using a specific IOCTL (0x222024). This driver is known to be abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode, effectively bypassing Windows Protected Process Light (PPL) protections.
Detects evidence of the Alinubx.sys kernel driver being loaded or interacted with via its device interface using a specific IOCTL (0x222024). This driver is known to be abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode, effectively bypassing Windows Protected Process Light (PPL) protections.
This rule detects the execution of the legitimate Microsoft Visual Studio CoreCLR Debugger (vsdbg.exe) from an unauthorized file location. This behavior is indicative of masquerading, where the executable is renamed to appear as an installer to sideload a malicious companion vsdbg.dll, a technique observed in the Rapuncel/BoryptGrab campaign.
Detects attempts by malicious software, specifically SloppyRAT, to query or modify Microsoft Defender settings by interacting with WMI classes like MSFT_MpPreference or MSFT_MpComputerStatus. This activity is indicative of efforts to disable security controls such as real-time monitoring to facilitate further malicious actions.
Detects evidence of SloppyRAT employing the Hell's Gate technique, specifically the resolution and indirect invocation of low-level NT system calls (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) designed to bypass EDR user-mode API hooking during process injection activities.
Detects instances where a user signs in via a Device Code authentication flow and subsequently adds a member to a highly privileged group (e.g., Domain Admins, Global Administrators) within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential account compromise where an attacker uses an OAuth device code flow to establish access and then escalates privileges.
Detects the mass termination of multiple security-related processes on a host within a short timeframe, correlated with the presence of specific driver modules potentially associated with security software interference or evasive behavior.
This rule monitors network and event logs to detect instances where a single user account, logged into a specific host, initiates connections to two or more distinct, potentially suspicious remote IP addresses. This pattern of multi-destination connection activity may indicate command and control communication, scanning behavior, or data staging.
Detects suspicious device registration or join events occurring within 60 minutes of a Device Code authentication flow. This pattern is consistent with the ARToken post-compromise technique, where an adversary uses an intercepted authentication code to register a new device to maintain persistent access to an Entra ID (Azure AD) environment.
Detects instances where processes other than legitimate PowerShell binaries load the .NET Common Language Runtime (clr.dll) or the System.Management.Automation assembly. This behavior is often indicative of 'PowerShell-less' execution techniques, where adversaries interact with the PowerShell engine directly from arbitrary host processes to execute malicious code or scripts.
Detects the deletion of Google Chrome browser extension settings from the Windows Registry. Adversaries often target the 'extensions.settings' registry value under 'PreferenceMACs' to disable security extensions, force the installation of malicious extensions, or tamper with browser-based security controls.
This rule detects the installation of a new Windows service (Event ID 7045 or 4697) with an 'auto start' configuration that is immediately followed by the termination of multiple processes (either 'services.exe' or the service's own image file) within a 60-minute window on the same host. This pattern can indicate an unstable or malicious service deployment that causes system instability or performs rapid cleanup.
Page 314 of 1908