Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task via schtasks.exe where the initiating process is located in common user-writable temporary or non-standard directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, or Public folders). This behavior is often indicative of malicious persistence mechanisms being established by a dropper or stage-one malware payload.
Detects the execution of potentially malicious processes originating from common mail client attachment cache directories, the use of suspicious double extensions in file names, or common command-line interpreters being spawned by Microsoft Office applications, which are high-confidence indicators of phishing or malicious document exploitation.
Detects the deployment and activity of the MeshCentral remote management agent (meshagent), including process execution, service creation, and network communication to MeshCentral infrastructure. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized persistence and remote command-and-control, often associated with post-compromise activity such as that observed by ShinyHunters.
Detects the execution of the GigaWiper malware or the use of common system commands associated with destructive data activities, such as recursive file removal, disk formatting, or secure data overwriting, often used by threat actors for extortion.
Detects the installation or first execution of common remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, specifically AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or ScreenConnect, shortly after an identity change or MFA reset event, indicative of social engineering vishing-to-remote-access techniques often employed by threat actors such as Scattered Spider (UNC3944).
Detects network connections to known ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix campaign infrastructure (IPs and URLs) as reported by Huntress. This rule covers the network_connection logsource only. Domain/DNS matching is covered by a separate dns_query rule, and file-hash matching is covered by a separate process_creation rule, as Sigma only supports one logsource per rule.
Detects instances where Node.js, Python, or Go processes spawn command shell interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.). This behavior is often indicative of C2 command execution by malware, such as the Graphalgo RAT, which may use these languages to execute shell-level commands after initial infection or payload execution.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software installers or command-line arguments when invoked by PowerShell processes. This behavior is often indicative of malicious post-compromise activity where an adversary uses legitimate remote access tools to establish persistent command-and-control access.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
Detects the DarkMe downloader chain involving staging via WebDAV UNC paths, extraction of password-protected archives using 7-Zip, and subsequent execution using rundll32.exe with the specific RunDllEntryPointW export, which is indicative of this malware's execution flow.
The following analytic identifies `node.exe` directly executing a single `.js` script located in the same directory it was launched from, where that directory is an unusual location such as a user profile, PerfLogs, ProgramData, or Temp folder.
Legitimate Node.js application, module, and package manager directories are excluded.
This pattern is commonly associated with malware loaders and second-stage payloads that leverage the Node.js runtime to execute JavaScript outside of a typical development or application context.
Legitimate Node.js application, module, and package manager directories are excluded.
This pattern is commonly associated with malware loaders and second-stage payloads that leverage the Node.js runtime to execute JavaScript outside of a typical development or application context.
Detects msiexec.exe being executed with a remote HTTP(S) URL argument that includes a token-based query parameter. This pattern is characteristic of ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a user is tricked into manually executing a command to download and run a malicious MSI file.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe' originating from the 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll' directory, which is a non-standard location for executable files and may indicate malicious activity.
Detects instances where 'rnpkeys.exe', residing within a 'keyroll' directory, initiates suspicious child processes or executes suspicious command lines. This includes triggering common scripting engines like PowerShell or cmd.exe, using execution policy bypass flags, or executing binaries from Temp directories, which are characteristic of malicious post-exploitation or persistence activities.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency outbound network connections to port 443 initiated by the binary 'rnpkeys.exe'. This behavior is characteristic of the Sauron Loader, which uses this masqueraded process to exfiltrate collected data, such as screenshots, via an encrypted C2 channel.
Detects various system utilities executing files or payloads staged in user-specific temporary directories (%AppData%\Local\Temp). This pattern is consistent with malware loaders (such as the Sauron Loader) that write payloads to the Temp folder before utilizing trusted Windows binaries (LOLBins) like rundll32, regsvr32, powershell, or wscript for execution. It also tracks potential driver installation or direct process memory access attempts from the same location.
Detects the creation of password-protected archives using 7-Zip or WinRAR command-line utilities. Adversaries often use these tools to compress and encrypt data prior to exfiltration to bypass security controls and prevent inspection of contents.
Detects the deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell (WMI/CIM objects). This activity is commonly used by ransomware to prevent local data recovery by destroying shadow copy backups before encryption.
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