Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
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Detects behavior where PowerShell or pwsh executes msiexec.exe to silently install an MSI file located in a temporary directory with a GUID-prefixed filename, optionally following a recent download from a remote URL.
Detects the execution of the Chisel tunneling tool configured as a client building a reverse SOCKS tunnel with flags such as TLS verification disabled, keepalive, or authentication, or communicating with a known C2 endpoint.
Detects browser processes accessing a chatgpt.com/share/ link followed shortly thereafter by connections to multiple distinct external hosts, potentially indicating exfiltration or unauthorized interaction following an AI chat reference.
Detects a file creation event for any executable inside the "tmphtml" staging
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
Detects cmd.exe executing a ping-based delay to loopback followed by self-deletion of the batch script (%~f0), as well as bulk deletion of common archive and executable files, typically associated with malware droppers like RareWolf.
Detects artifacts and execution patterns associated with the Yoba campaign involving fake AI applications (such as ChatGPT, Claude, Codex) containing malicious setup files, sideloaded DLLs (winmm.dll, wmpdui.dll), and cryptocurrency miners (XMRig).
Detects behavioral indicators of an SSH or autossh reverse tunnel (-R) executed with no remote command (-N) and host-key checking disabled, combined with network connections to a known command and control IP address.
Detects browser processes accessing a chatgpt.com/share/ link followed shortly thereafter by connections to multiple distinct external hosts, potentially indicating exfiltration or unauthorized interaction following an AI chat reference.
Detects a potentially suspicious powershell script executions from temporary folder
The KQL rule detects a ClickFix-style technique in which script hosts reference files disguised with an f_* naming pattern in browser profile cache directories. The key behavioural indicators are:
- Script hosts such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, and mshta.exe referencing browser cache paths.
- Suspicious parent processes, including Explorer, command shells, and script hosts.
- Creation, modification, or renaming of t.vbs under the user's Temp directory by Windows Script Host.
- Script hosts such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, and mshta.exe referencing browser cache paths.
- Suspicious parent processes, including Explorer, command shells, and script hosts.
- Creation, modification, or renaming of t.vbs under the user's Temp directory by Windows Script Host.
Detects the execution of Microsoft Quick Assist followed by a different remote access tool (RAT) or remote monitoring and management (RMM) utility on the same device within a 24-hour window, which may indicate adversary staging or persistence establishment.
Detects suspicious Ghostscript execution patterns where Python spawns Ghostscript with dangerous I/O pipe arguments or disabled SAFER mode, or where Ghostscript spawns shell interpreters.
Detects the sequence where a private key file is written to the host followed by the execution of ssh.exe with parameters indicating a reverse port forwarding tunnel (-R), an identity file (-i), and background execution (-N or -f) within a 30-minute window.
Detects Salat Stealer dropping and executing copies of Lightshot.exe in trusted directories such as Windows NT, Edge, and Chrome application paths, as well as process spawn chains involving masqueraded Lightshot executables.
Detects the execution of the rclone.exe utility with copy, sync, move, or copyto command-line arguments, correlated with outbound network connections to Wasabi S3 or MEGA cloud storage domains.
Detects the execution of two or more distinct Active Directory discovery, credential extraction, or coercion tools (such as NetExec, Kerbrute, noPac, PetitPotam, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or Impacket scripts) on the same device within a 1-hour window.
Detects Microsoft Word (winword.exe) spawning the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) to execute batch scripts (.bat or .cmd files). This behavior is commonly associated with malicious document macros attempting to drop and execute secondary payloads, excluding common system paths to reduce false positives.
Detects process command lines containing Magento database audit strings (cms_block, cms_page) alongside specific loader domains, or network events communicating with these known loader domains.
Detects PowerShell registering a logon scheduled task that executes a Trays.exe binary from an AppData Yandex Trays path with the -tray argument, or a scheduled task specifically named 'Microsoft apdate'. Associated with the RareWolf AnyDesk dropper batch script.
Detects post-exploitation behavior where a PaperCut server Java process spawns local account creation or administrator reset followed closely by Active Directory enumeration on the same host, indicating potential post-RCE meterpreter activity.
Detects a PaperCut server Java process spawning a local account creation or local administrators group addition, followed closely by Active Directory domain or computer enumeration from the same host within a 30-minute window.
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