Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
Detects patterns associated with the TeamFiltration backdoor module, specifically unauthorized OneDrive/SharePoint file modifications occurring shortly after an authentication from a previously unseen device/IP. The rule flags file changes (modifications, deletions, or renames) involving potential executable or script extensions, or those performed by the OneDrive SyncEngine app from a new source.
Detects patterns associated with the TeamFiltration backdoor module, specifically unauthorized OneDrive/SharePoint file modifications occurring shortly after an authentication from a previously unseen device/IP. The rule flags file changes (modifications, deletions, or renames) involving potential executable or script extensions, or those performed by the OneDrive SyncEngine app from a new source.
Detects patterns associated with the TeamFiltration backdoor module, specifically unauthorized OneDrive/SharePoint file modifications occurring shortly after an authentication from a previously unseen device/IP. The rule flags file changes (modifications, deletions, or renames) involving potential executable or script extensions, or those performed by the OneDrive SyncEngine app from a new source.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
Detects the TeamFiltration/UNK_CondorFiltration spray signature: a large
number of distinct target UserPrincipalNames within a single tenant, each
receiving only a handful of sign-in attempts, spread across many distinct
AWS EC2-hosted source IPs/regions within a short time window. Individual
sign-ins from AWS-hosted IP ranges (VPN gateways, corporate cloud proxies,
remote contractors) are not flagged on their own; the rule requires both
the account-fanout and the IP-rotation dimensions to co-occur for the same
tenant in the same window.
number of distinct target UserPrincipalNames within a single tenant, each
receiving only a handful of sign-in attempts, spread across many distinct
AWS EC2-hosted source IPs/regions within a short time window. Individual
sign-ins from AWS-hosted IP ranges (VPN gateways, corporate cloud proxies,
remote contractors) are not flagged on their own; the rule requires both
the account-fanout and the IP-rotation dimensions to co-occur for the same
tenant in the same window.
Detects a distributed password spraying campaign targeting cloud accounts, characterized by a large number of distinct accounts being targeted simultaneously from multiple AWS-hosted IP addresses, with a low volume of attempts per account per hour to evade standard threshold-based detection.
Detects a distributed password spraying campaign targeting cloud accounts, characterized by a large number of distinct accounts being targeted simultaneously from multiple AWS-hosted IP addresses, with a low volume of attempts per account per hour to evade standard threshold-based detection.
Detects a distributed password spraying campaign targeting cloud accounts, characterized by a large number of distinct accounts being targeted simultaneously from multiple AWS-hosted IP addresses, with a low volume of attempts per account per hour to evade standard threshold-based detection.
Detects a distributed password spraying campaign targeting cloud accounts, characterized by a large number of distinct accounts being targeted simultaneously from multiple AWS-hosted IP addresses, with a low volume of attempts per account per hour to evade standard threshold-based detection.
This rule detects instances where a user grants high-risk OAuth application permissions (e.g., Mail or Files access) within 30 minutes of a risky or MFA-challenged sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack where an attacker successfully steals a session and immediately establishes persistent access to the victim's resources via OAuth consent.
This rule detects a correlation between high-risk or anomaly-flagged sign-ins and subsequent changes to B2B guest invitation or tenant collaboration policies by the same user account within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary who has successfully hijacked a session (e.g., via AiTM or token replay) and is attempting to establish persistence or pivot by inviting external accounts or modifying B2B security settings.
This rule detects mass-distributed email phishing campaigns that impersonate Google branding. It identifies emails using Google-related sender display names or subjects that originate from non-Google domains and contain links to external, non-Google domains. The detection focuses on identifying suspicious patterns across multiple recipients rather than individual email signatures.
This rule monitors for high-frequency download or access events of files associated with AI development, such as model weights (.pt, .ckpt, .safetensors, .h5, .onnx, .pkl, .pb), checkpoints, and research datasets from cloud storage. It triggers when an account accesses or downloads 20 or more unique AI-related files within a 60-minute window, which is indicative of unauthorized data exfiltration of intellectual property.
Detects instances where end users grant high-risk delegated permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All) to applications via OAuth consent flows outside of standard administrator approval processes. This behavior is indicative of device-code phishing or consent phishing campaigns designed to gain unauthorized access to user data.
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
This rule detects a multi-stage Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack involving executive impersonation via look-alike domains, followed by the creation of suspicious inbox rules (forwarding/deletion) by the victim, and concurrent external communication (Teams/Zoom meeting invites) from a newly created account. It correlates these activities to identify sophisticated payment fraud campaigns.
This rule detects potential 'Quishing' (QR code phishing) attempts by identifying email-based phishing detection or malicious URL indicators followed by a user clicking the URL and subsequently authenticating to a corporate system from a mobile device (Android or iOS) within a 30-minute window. This behavior often suggests an adversary successfully harvesting credentials via a QR code link and then using them to gain unauthorized access.
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