Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances of ImageMagick binaries (convert, identify, magick) spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., shells, network tools, scripting interpreters) when processing image files with HEIF/HEIC extensions. This is a common pattern for exploiting image processing vulnerabilities (e.g., ImageTragick) to achieve remote code execution.
Detects instances of ImageMagick binaries (convert, identify, magick) spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., shells, network tools, scripting interpreters) when processing image files with HEIF/HEIC extensions. This is a common pattern for exploiting image processing vulnerabilities (e.g., ImageTragick) to achieve remote code execution.
Detects known malicious files associated with Kimsuky (APT-C-55) Stella_Gary attack chain by MD5 hash: OrionQuests-Setup.exe installer, guide.url.lnk, test.bef_fri, and backdoor payload component
Detects known malicious files associated with Kimsuky (APT-C-55) Stella_Gary attack chain by MD5 hash: OrionQuests-Setup.exe installer, guide.url.lnk, test.bef_fri, and backdoor payload component
Detects known malicious files associated with Kimsuky (APT-C-55) Stella_Gary attack chain by MD5 hash: OrionQuests-Setup.exe installer, guide.url.lnk, test.bef_fri, and backdoor payload component
Detects the Kimsuky second-stage payload test.bef_fri which masquerades as an RTF file via a falsified RTF header before header repair and decompression
Detects the Kimsuky second-stage payload test.bef_fri which masquerades as an RTF file via a falsified RTF header before header repair and decompression
Detects the Kimsuky second-stage payload test.bef_fri which masquerades as an RTF file via a falsified RTF header before header repair and decompression
Detects the Kimsuky trojanized .NET installer OrionQuests-Setup.exe that decrypts embedded AES resource OrionSetup.payload.enc to drop a decoy OrionLauncher installer and malicious LNK file
Detects the Kimsuky trojanized .NET installer OrionQuests-Setup.exe that decrypts embedded AES resource OrionSetup.payload.enc to drop a decoy OrionLauncher installer and malicious LNK file
Detects the Kimsuky trojanized .NET installer OrionQuests-Setup.exe that decrypts embedded AES resource OrionSetup.payload.enc to drop a decoy OrionLauncher installer and malicious LNK file
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known malicious file hashes (MD5) across file and process events, and correlating them with known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure communication patterns, including specific IP addresses and URI paths.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known malicious file hashes (MD5) across file and process events, and correlating them with known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure communication patterns, including specific IP addresses and URI paths.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known malicious file hashes (MD5) across file and process events, and correlating them with known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure communication patterns, including specific IP addresses and URI paths.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known malicious file hashes (MD5) across file and process events, and correlating them with known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure communication patterns, including specific IP addresses and URI paths.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that uses a name similar to 'Google Chrome Update' but is initiated by a process other than the legitimate Google Update executable or from an unexpected folder location. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence while masquerading as legitimate software update mechanisms.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that uses a name similar to 'Google Chrome Update' but is initiated by a process other than the legitimate Google Update executable or from an unexpected folder location. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence while masquerading as legitimate software update mechanisms.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that uses a name similar to 'Google Chrome Update' but is initiated by a process other than the legitimate Google Update executable or from an unexpected folder location. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence while masquerading as legitimate software update mechanisms.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that uses a name similar to 'Google Chrome Update' but is initiated by a process other than the legitimate Google Update executable or from an unexpected folder location. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence while masquerading as legitimate software update mechanisms.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
Detects the execution or file activity associated with the 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' installer. This rule monitors both process creation and file system activity to track the presence and usage of this specific installer executable, which may indicate the installation of potentially unauthorized or untrusted software.
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