Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects the use of Evil-WinRM or WinRM-fs command-line utilities combined with network connections over the WinRM ports (TCP 5985/5986). This activity is indicative of remote administrative tools being used for potential lateral movement or agent delivery, specifically observed in the context of the Toy Ghouls threat activity involving the Bird Agent.
Detects unauthorized directory replication requests (DRSGetNCChanges or DRSReplicaSync) originating from a host that is not identified as a Domain Controller. This behavior is indicative of a DCSync attack, where an adversary impersonates a domain controller to extract credential hashes from the Active Directory database.
Detects unauthorized directory replication requests (DRSGetNCChanges or DRSReplicaSync) originating from a host that is not identified as a Domain Controller. This behavior is indicative of a DCSync attack, where an adversary impersonates a domain controller to extract credential hashes from the Active Directory database.
Detects command-line activity associated with Monkey ransomware, specifically attempts to bypass AMSI (patching AmsiScanBuffer, targeting AmsiUtils), disable ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) monitoring, and add Microsoft Defender exclusions to evade detection prior to encryption.
Detects anomalous process execution (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) initiated by PaperCut application server processes (pc-app.exe or java.exe), followed immediately by the modification of the 'Domain Admins' group membership. This behavior is indicative of potential post-exploitation privilege escalation activity following a successful PaperCut authentication bypass.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
This rule aggregates vulnerability data from Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (Threat and Vulnerability Management) over the last 7 days. It groups vulnerable devices by CVE ID and severity level, providing an overview of known software weaknesses currently present across the fleet.
Detects the loading of amsi.dll or clr.dll into the charmap.exe process. Adversaries often inject malicious code into legitimate, system-native processes like charmap.exe to bypass detection and perform in-memory patching of security controls, such as disabling AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface).
Detects unauthorized access to Discord's Local Storage leveldb files, a technique commonly used by malware like LxBaseRAT to extract Discord authentication tokens.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks named after Microsoft Edge updates or the execution of suspicious Wscript commands, which may indicate persistence or execution by the LxBaseRAT malware.
This rule detects the execution of the LXBASE.exe malware and identifies specific strings within the process memory or image that correspond to the LxBaseRAT Hidden Virtual Network Computing (HVNC) module, indicating potential unauthorized remote access activity.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by charmap.exe, a standard Windows utility that does not naturally communicate over the network. This activity is highly indicative of process injection or malicious code masquerading as a system utility to facilitate credential theft or command and control communication.
Detects PowerShell script activity that leverages low-level Windows API calls, such as SetWindowsHookEx and GetAsyncKeyState, which are frequently used by the LxBaseRAT malware to implement keylogging functionality by monitoring user keystrokes.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities involving files placed in 'ProgramData\Firefox'. It identifies the creation or modification of a non-standard executable within this folder, followed by its execution by a trusted process (or itself), and the subsequent creation of a Registry run key for persistence. This pattern is often used by adversaries for persistence mechanism implementation using masqueraded file names.
This rule detects the creation or modification of a file named 'ClipBoard.txt' within the directory 'AppData\Roaming\ConfigsEx\', as well as the creation of the 'ConfigsEx' directory using command-line tools. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging sensitive information, such as harvested clipboard data, for potential exfiltration.
Detects instances where browser processes or related credential files are accessed or targeted by process termination (e.g., taskkill.exe) followed by attempts to access sensitive files like Login Data, logins.json, or key4.db. This pattern is indicative of credential theft from web browsers.
Detects instances where browser processes or related credential files are accessed or targeted by process termination (e.g., taskkill.exe) followed by attempts to access sensitive files like Login Data, logins.json, or key4.db. This pattern is indicative of credential theft from web browsers.
Detects the execution of known development, scripting, and administrative tools (e.g., Python, Node.js, GCC, Docker) from non-standard or unauthorized file paths. The rule leverages allowlists for process names, publishers, and trusted installation directories to identify potentially unauthorized usage of powerful tooling often abused by attackers for post-exploitation activities.
Detects a potential destructive activity pattern involving the staging of a payload in a non-standard directory (utilizing a directory name with a trailing space) followed by a burst of file deletions on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a secondary destructive payload execution, often associated with disk-wiping malware.
Detects a potential destructive activity pattern involving the staging of a payload in a non-standard directory (utilizing a directory name with a trailing space) followed by a burst of file deletions on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a secondary destructive payload execution, often associated with disk-wiping malware.
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