Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

40,063 detections

CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
004
This rule detects instances where a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS, Event ID 4769) is requested without a corresponding TGT request (AS-REQ, Event ID 4768) from the same user and IP address within a 10-hour window. This behavior is indicative of potential Kerberoasting, where an attacker may have obtained TGS tickets using cached or manually constructed credentials rather than through the normal authentication flow.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
009
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
5016
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to the SyncRootManager registry keys. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts, such as the ShieldCrash zero-day, which abuse the Windows CFAPI sync-root mechanisms to achieve privilege escalation or bypass security features. Legitimate synchronization software is explicitly excluded from this detection.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
SlimKQL
2 months ago
17017
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
SlimKQL
2 months ago
6017
Detects a pattern of multiple failed authentication attempts (brute force) from an external IP address followed by a successful authentication event on remote access services such as RDP, VPN, or NTLM. The rule filters for non-private IP addresses and flags successes occurring outside of standard business hours.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
1007
This rule detects modifications to Windows Registry persistence keys (Run and RunOnce) associated with specific suspicious filenames ('cplsupport.exe', 'wtass.exe'), as well as modifications to specific Synapse agent configuration registry keys. These patterns are often associated with persistence mechanisms or unauthorized software configuration changes.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
007
Detects potential exploitation of PostgreSQL via logical decoding plugins, specifically targeting CVE-2026-6471. The rule monitors for the PostgreSQL server process spawning suspicious shell utilities or loading modules from locations outside of the expected PostgreSQL library or plugin directories, which is a common indicator of unauthorized code execution.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
007
This rule detects the installation of Windows services that utilize names or display names commonly associated with known malware, potentially mimicking legitimate system services to maintain persistence or evade detection.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
007
This rule detects the process 'ShieldCrash.exe' accessing or interacting with the Windows ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) configuration directory. ELAM drivers are critical components for secure boot and early malware detection; unauthorized access or manipulation by unknown processes may indicate an attempt to tamper with security tools or evade endpoint protection.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
607
Matches known Phantom Stealer MaaS infostealer sample hashes
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
004
Detects the presence of known file hashes associated with Vectra Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The rule monitors both file creation/existence events and process execution events where the SHA256 hash matches the identified indicators of compromise.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
004
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
204
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
204
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
004
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using common Windows administrative utilities including vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, diskshadow.exe, or through PowerShell WMI/CIM cmdlets. This behavior is frequently associated with ransomware and data destruction attacks aiming to prevent system recovery.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
003
Detects execution of potentially suspicious processes ('Launcher.exe' or 'GapiUpdate.exe') originating from ClickOnce-related processes ('dfsvc.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' with 'dfshim.dll'). ClickOnce is often abused to proxy execution of malicious code, allowing adversaries to execute applications from user-writable directories without administrative privileges.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
003
Detects access to sensitive credential stores (KeePass databases, Firefox logins, SSH keys, VPN configuration files) by suspicious processes, specifically those associated with potential credential harvesting tools or unauthorized update binaries.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
003
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for specific file hashes, specific suspicious filenames, and suspicious command-line patterns (e.g., 'antivm') initiated by known update or launcher processes. This is likely an indicator of malware behavior involving anti-sandbox or evasion techniques.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
103
This rule detects potentially malicious activities aimed at credential harvesting and system recovery inhibition. It monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with arguments to list shadow copies (often a precursor to deletion) or references to DPAPI master keys in command lines. Additionally, it identifies unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser-based credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) from standard browser installation paths, specifically excluding legitimate browser and update processes.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
003
This rule detects potential automated cryptocurrency wallet draining activity by correlating the execution of known stealer processes (such as GapiUpdate or NeedleStealer) with subsequent outbound network connections to suspicious command-and-control domains or API endpoints within a 30-minute window.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
103
Page 356 of 1908